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ABSTRACT
BEYOND THE BLACK LEGEND: SPANISH-AMERICAN POLITICAL
IMAGINARIES IN THE U.S., 1800-1855
Evelyn Soto
David Kazanjian
This dissertation argues that revisions of the “Black Legend”—a set of
Anglophone dogmas about Spanish tyranny and racial degeneracy—conditioned the
terms for both political conflict and possibility in the nineteenth-century Americas. The
project specifically attends to the ideology’s displacement from Spanish imperialism to
the independence movements in Spanish America (1808 - 1826), which in turn enthralled
the diplomatic imagination of the early United States. With the balance of power newly at
stake in the hemisphere, Anglo-Americans relied on the Black Legend to encode the
emergent polities in Spanish America with longstanding representations of the
inhabitants’ political illegitimacy, sociopolitical dysfunction, and non-binary “casta”
system of racial relations. I trace this language of sociopolitical taint not only in
discourses of U.S. expansionism, but more importantly in instances of non-statist,
transamerican political innovation. The project juxtaposes canonical, nineteenth-century
U.S. literature and non-traditional texts by Spanish Americans, such as diplomatic
correspondences, political tracts, subaltern rumors, and propagandist pamphlets. I
assemble what I call an early Latinx counter-archive, which re-narrates Spanish
America’s benighted sovereignty as an opportunity to envision forms of political
community capable of disrupting Anglo-American imperial power.
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Introduction:
The Anvils of the Black Legend
“What could I think of Revolutions and Constitutions in South America?” John
Adams poses this rhetorical question in a letter to former Massachusetts senator John
Lloyd in 1815 after receiving news of the latest plot for Spanish-American independence
by Francisco de Miranda, the longtime Venezuelan revolutionary.1 He answers his own
question: “A People more ignorant, more bigotted, more Superstitious, more implicitly
credulous in the Sanctity of Royalty more blindly devoted to their Priests, in more aweful
terror of the Inquisition than any People of Europe, even in Spain, Portugal or the
Austrian Netherlands, and infinitely more than in Rome itself the immediate Residence of
the Head of holy Church.” The answer Adams posits relentlessly echoes a centuries-old
discourse known within Latin American and Latinx studies as the “Black Legend.” The
Black Legend is a critical term—coined in the twentieth century—that refers to a
composite colonial discourse most consistently weaponized by Spain’s familiar colonial
rival, the British empire.2 This weaponized discourse was forged on an array of
ideological and historical anvils. It integrated, for instance, Spain’s peninsular as well as
colonial histories of racial intermixture, internal religious schisms, inquisitorial
repressions, and illegitimate "New World" conquests in order to disrupt rising Spanish

1

“From John Adams to James Lloyd, 29 March 1815,” Founders Online, National Archives,
accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6443. This is
the source for all further citations of this letter.
2
The term was coined in 1914 by Julián Juderías to describe the denigration of Spanish cultural
and political production relative to other European nations, the “Black Legend” retroactively
names a polyvalent discursive field. For key studies of the Black Legend in pre-modern contexts,
see Julián Juderías, La leyenda negra: studies acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero
(1814); William S. Malby, The Black Legend in England, The Development of Anti-Spanish
Sentiment, 1558-1660 (1971); Eds. Margaret R. Greer, Walter D. Mignolo, and Maureen
Quilligan, Rereading the Black Legend (2007).
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power since 1492.3 By the time of Adams’s letter—dated in Quincy, Massachusetts,
March 30th 1815—not only do its Black Legend tropes resound like a weapon blunted
with the rust of centuries, but it finds a novel user in a former United States president and
a new target in reference to Spanish-Americans’ struggles for independence in the first
half of the nineteenth-century (1808 - 1826).4 While this letter reiterates the Black
Legend across three centuries, current scholarly engagements with the Black Legend also
approach the concept as a discursive sediment that demands re-reading for cyclic
processes of racialization and new insights into colonial interdependencies.5
Not only does Adams draw on the precedence of Anglo-imperial dogmas about
Spain’s intrinsic corruption and backwardness, but in his letter the inhabitants of the
revolutionary Spanish Americas are beyond even peninsular Spain in their political,
social, and moral irredeemability. Here, Adams’s reanimation of Black Legend
discourses asserts a transformation in the colonial matrix of power. Aníbal Quíjano and
Immanuel Wallerstein offer a useful summary of North America’s divergence from Latin
America in the event of its independence, “that it better incarnated ‘newness,’ that it was

3

I want to acknowledge indigenous names for other grammars of place and senses of belonging
that live on in cultural memory and in indigenous communities of the hemispheric South that
persist beyond the European colonial invention of the Americas commenced in 1492: Haiti,
Quisqueya, Bohío, Borinkén (of the Taíno people); Abya Yala (a continental term of the Kuna
people); Tawantinsuyu (of the Incan empire), Anahuac (of the Aztec empire), among many
others. While this dissertation focuses on emergent political imaginaries across the U.S. and what
we now call Latin America, I keep in view Latin American settler-colonial formations that often
get omitted in hemispheric analyses. See Shannon Speed, “Structures of Settler Capitalism in
Abya Yala,” American Quarterly (2017).
4
For histories of the revolution, see Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian
Atlantic (2006); Francois-Xavier Guerra, Las revolutions hispánicas: independencias americanas
y liberalismo Español (1995); John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826
(1973); Jaime E. Rodríguez O., The Independence of Spanish America (1998).
5
See especially Walter D. Mignolo, “What Does the Black Legend Have to Do with Race?” in
Rereading the Black Legend, 312 – 324 and Chi-ming Yang, “Silver, Blackness, and Fugitive
Value, ‘from China to Peru’” (2018).
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more ‘modern’…. The concept of ‘newness’ encrusted [North American] inevitability
into the collective superego of the world-system.”6 Denied the same statist “newnesses”
of independence through Anglo-American and European reiterations of the Black
Legend, the revolutions in South America seem to regress into the past and bear the
visible mark of colonial legacies, which scholars such as Walter Mignolo conceptualize
as “the darker side of modernity.”7 Such ideological impositions of backwardness and
regression explain why Adams’s portrayal of South American societies seem composed
of dislocated Spaniards. Oddly, the region’s inhabitants are bound most tightly to
European seats of authority—to royalty and the church—despite colonial distances
between Europe and the Americas.
But Adams tacitly recognizes that his usage of the Black Legend is preemptive.
He indirectly contemplates the early republic’s own persistent, post-revolutionary
instabilities: “I need not Say anything about our Constitutions, or the Difficulties that
have been experienced to reconcile the People to them, or the dangerous diversities of
Opinion, in the Construction of them, or the dissatisfaction with them, the Uneasiness
under them, or the perpetual Projects to alter and amend them.” Indeed, these democratic
and institutional instabilities promise only to worsen as the sociopolitical potentials of the
revolutionary Spanish Americas proliferate. For Adams, the unsettled political
possibilities of the South Americas unravel into a deluge of questions, and this time the
former president has no ready answer for them: “What would be the Effect of an
independent free Government in South America [on opening, in suspected collaboration

6

Quijano and Wallerstein, “Americanity as a concept, or the Americas in the modern worldsystem,” International Social Science Journal (1992), 552.
7
Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (2011).
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with the British, “a navigable Canal across the Isthmus to the South Sea”]? No Country
has greater advantages for Commerce, and Naval Power. What would Soon happen in
Indostan and in China, if a Communication of Commerce, Navigation and Naval Power
was opened between South America and the East Indies?” The deficiencies of early
national governance demand equivocal silences concerning the United States’ early
national political difficulties while the speculation of Spanish-American political
possibility takes an incessant interrogative mode. Through Adams’s series of questions,
the sociopolitical backwardness of South-American revolutions gives way to a limitless
global potential contrary to U.S. interests.
“Beyond the Black Legend” traces the transmission of this ideological complex
from the strife between Old World empires to the nascent relations between the U.S. and
the emergent polities of Spanish America. In particular, I examine New World
transplantations and counterintuitive political adaptations of the Black Legend, placing
the ideology in relationship to shifting U.S. interpretations of Spanish-American attempts
to establish independence from Spain.8 The project argues that revisions of the Black
Legend not only conditioned the terms for a new phase of hemispheric conflict in the
nineteenth-century, but also of imaginative political possibilities in the nineteenth-century
Americas. As I assert in my foregoing interpretation of Adams’s letter, reading along the
grain of the Black Legend’s discursive and figurative features provide a corrective to
narratives of U.S. exceptionalism that continue to structure conversations in Hemispheric
and early American studies. It joins these conversations with the interventions of an

8

To be clear, I do not use the term “New World” in the naive sense to convey the discovery of
empty or uninhabited lands, but instead to refer to the specific colonial formations that took shape
in the Americas inaugurated by European empires and continued to this day by nation states. My
approach to the phrase is indebted to Sylvia Wynter, “1492: A New World View.”
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emergent field of Latinx studies scholarship in pre-twentieth century literary and
historical contexts. While prior scholarship in the field emphasizes the emergence of a
“divergent” Latino/a modernity in the nineteenth-century, I attend instead to the ways in
which Spanish-Americans and other insurgents read along the ideological grain of the
Black Legend—itself a discourse of anti-modernity—in order to undermine it, and to cull
from the process new political possibilities. I assemble these “anti-modern” SpanishAmerican political imaginaries into an early Latinx counter-archive, which re-narrates
Spanish America’s benighted sovereignty as an opportunity to envision forms of political
community disruptive to Anglo-American exceptionalism.
Despite the inclusion of questions and concerns beyond the U.S. nation-state in
hemispheric studies scholarship of the past decade, there remains a tendency to reproduce
the United States as the center of analysis.9 Studies of slavery’s historical, literary, and
cultural productions rarely go beyond U.S. and Anglophone literary sources that happen
to represent insurgencies in other slave societies, such as Martin Delany’s Blake; or the
Huts of America (1859-1861) where the formerly enslaved protagonist organizes a slave
rebellion across the U.S. South and Cuba. Relatedly, other models of hemispheric
analysis—usually restricted to Mexico or portions of the Caribbean (Cuba, Haiti, and
sometimes Puerto Rico)—often focus on projections of U.S. imperial desires to annex the
lands and resources of these “other” Americas. Even when hemispheric analysis draws
from texts in other languages, primarily those in Spanish, the directionality of
interpretation re-centers U.S. literary, intellectual, and political traditions. For example,

9

For two influential anthologies of the past two decades that take the temperature of the field at
the intersection of hemispheric American studies and studies of U.S. empire, see Amy Kaplan and
Donald Pease, Cultures of United States Imperialism (1993); Eds. Caroline F. Levander and
Robert S. Levine, Hemispheric American Studies (2007).

6
Nancy Vogeley’s landmark study of inter-American, Spanish-language book history
observes, “Mexicans needed the angry rhetoric of Thomas Paine that had helped U.S.
Americans a generation before to declare independence… They needed models of
American state constitutions so as to write their own.”10 While translations of U.S.
political texts were no doubt influential for the creole elite in Spanish America, this
analysis risks reinscribing one-way dispersals of North American political enlightenment
to the anticolonial efforts in the South Americas, made to appear belated and dependent
by comparison. Like the ongoing re-readings and revisions of the Black Legend, the
construction of established hemispheric frameworks also demands renewed
interrogations.
A recent wave of scholarship in hemispheric studies reckons with the trappings of
such comparative methods by proposing “entangled” methodologies. In the introduction
to a 2018 Early American Literature special issue titled The Spanish Americas, literary
scholars Kirsten Silva Gruesz and Rodrigo Lazo respond to the ongoing necessity of
reorienting “an epistemology of scholarship that separates Anglo from Latin America”
and in its place forge a field of “early Americas scholarship that is truly attentive to
languages, cultures, and geographies outside of nation-based disciplinary and institutional
formations.”11 The keyword “entanglement,” referring to its provenance as a
methodology in the historical disciplines of colonial Latin American studies, emphasizes
a method “concerned with ‘mutual influencing,’ ‘reciprocal or asymmetric perceptions,’
and the intertwined ‘processes of constituting one another” in historian Eliga Gould’s

10

Vogeley, The Bookrunner (2011), 10. Emphasis mine.
Gruesz and Lazo, “Introduction: The Spanish Americas,” Early American Literature (2018),
641.
11
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words or as “a mosaic of interdigitated Atlantic histories” in those of Jorge CañizaresEsguerra.12 For literary scholars, entanglement as a methodology entails rigorous work
across multilingual sources and considers “reciprocal or multiple influences on the
transference, translation, and adaptation of ideas or tropes.”13 In the non-comparative
logics to which entangled methodologies aspire, they emphasize networks of cultural,
literary, and historical influence; print, manuscript, and unwritten forms of
communication across geopolitical boundaries; and transnational relationships. As a
result, studies of entanglement attend to “tracing intertwined influences and relationships
in the form of economic relations, technological exchanges, transculturation, and
language interactions”14 Among these many vectors of analysis, there is no strict rubric
for entangled methods. But not all scholarly efforts that draw from multilingual sources
or work across social, cultural, and national boundaries necessarily accord with entangled
methodologies. As we’ve seen, hemispheric approaches of the past decade often focus on
the crossings of Euro-colonial rationales for rule (to the exclusion of other political
possibilities) or they continue to privilege the circulation of U.S.-Anglophone ideas and
contexts. Entanglement, then, names a potent methodological orientation toward the field
rather than a well-defined practice of interpretation or mode of analysis, presumably
because it remains open to many possible disciplinary approaches and conceptual
intersections.

12

Quoted in Gruesz and Lazo, “Introduction: The Spanish Americas,” 651. See Jorge CañizaresEsguerra, “Introduction” in Entangled Empires (2013); Eliga Gould, “Entangled Histories,
Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking World as a Spanish Periphery” (2007). For other
interdisciplinary models of linked histories and cultures, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Connected
Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia” (1997) and Lisa Lowe,
The Intimacies of Four Continents (2015).
13
Gruesz and Lazo, “Introduction: The Spanish Americas,” 651-652.
14
Gruesz and Lazo, “Introduction: The Spanish Americas,” 652.
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The interpretations of nineteenth-century revisions of the Black Legend at stake in
this project produce a literary geography of Spanish-American revolutionary
entanglements in the hemisphere. As yet, these revolutionary movements do not
command the level of critical attention that the U.S.-American, Haitian, or French
revolutions receive in early American literary studies.15 The Spanish-American political
imaginaries at stake in this project are intertwined with literary and non-traditional texts
written and printed in Spanish, English, and French; they are sometimes recited orally
and possibly translated through rumor in many other potential creolized and indigenous
languages. The texts that theorize and engage with Spanish-American political
imaginaries are penned from, published in, and circulate throughout Havana, Cuba;
Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Cádiz, Spain; Les Cayes, the Republic of
Haiti; New Orleans, Louisiana; Texas and California; Caracas, Venezuela; and Kingston,
Jamaica, to offer a non-exhaustive list of the global circulations of the Spanish-American
political imaginaries in the midst of anticolonial revolutions. If Adams’s letter serves any
indication, it was also thought that the revolutionary South Americas could forge
productive connections with India and China to establish an enviable commerce with the
so-called East Indies—“commerce” not only in the sense of economic trade, but also of
broader social exchanges with the South Americas. To be clear, then, the Spanish-

15

For influential examples of “age of revolutions” literary and cultural scholarship for early
American studies, see Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public
Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (1990); David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The
Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (2004); Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (1963); Elizabeth
Maddock Dillon, New World Drama: The Performative Commons in the Atlantic World, 16491849 (2014); Eric Slauter, The State as a Work of Art (2009); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World System Vol. III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy
(1974); Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves,
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (2000).

9
American political imaginaries in this project entail hemispheric analyses unrestricted by
particular geographical regions, continents, or set of national boundaries. Rather, I situate
my readings of texts amidst multi-sited and multidirectional transformations of prior
Spanish-colonial orders particular to the hemispheric South. The scope of these
sociopolitical transformations necessarily overlaps with transnational, Atlantic, and
Caribbean studies frameworks for American literary studies. Nicolás Kanellos, for
example, elaborates the wide-ranging production and circulation of Spanish-American
publications, where “books and pamphlets crisscrossed the Atlantic and the Caribbean,
invading forces were literally equipped with printing presses manned by professional
printers, and revolutionary manifestoes were issued on broadsides and in pamphlets [in
the United States and Europe] to be smuggled and used for proselytizing the colonials”
(84). My first and third chapters in particular elaborate covert yet expansive circulations
of political aspirations and information through diplomatic correspondence, a vital genre
of this project. Across all four chapters, anonymous publications and rumors also amplify
the circulation and reception of insurgent ideas that crisscross the globe.
At times, it will appear that I use the terms “Spanish-American” and “Spanish
America(s)” interchangeably with “South-American” and “South America(s).” Both sets
of terms appear in the nineteenth-century archives with which I work. Whenever possible
I use “Spanish-American” to denote not only the specificity of the language in which
most of the project’s counter-archive is written, but also to acknowledge a set of archival
conditions, Spanish colonial legacies, and the largely white creole elites who composed
the political and theoretical texts I assemble here. In other instances, I use “SouthAmerican” more capaciously to include non-elite, racialized insurgents and unwritten

10
political imaginaries that contribute to novel political possibilities in the hemispheric
South despite the archival limitations this project confronts.16 However, I recognize the
extant terminological slippages between them, and in doing so, my use of these two sets
of terms produces an inevitable form of conceptual tension since they do not name
absolute distinctions among subjects, languages, texts, or geographies. Neither my use of
“Spanish America” nor “South America” is necessarily bound to any continental
boundary since they encompass all the former Spanish colonies of the Americas in
anticolonial upheaval—with the term “South America” working always in excess of
“Spanish” language and dominion. I also prefer both over “Latin America,” a later lexical
invention that does not solve the linguistic and colonial burdens that affixes to “Spanish”
or “Latin” alike.17 From the perspective of unfolding revolutions, the connections
between the formerly Spanish colonial polities of the hemispheric South—whether
Caribbean or continental South American—appear in these archives as densely
interconnected sites rather than absolutely discrete zones.
“Beyond the Black Legend” foregrounds asymmetries of hemispheric
relationships that Spanish-American political imaginaries bring to light. Across all four
chapters, the dissertation examines creative, Spanish-American understandings of

16

Historians of the Spanish colonial world have often turned to court and colonial records for
partial yet highly generative insights into subaltern lives and political claims. Here I think of the
exemplary work by historians Rachel O’Toole, Bound Lives: Africans, Indians, and the Making
of Race in Colonial Peru (2012) and Herman Bennett, Colonial Blackness: A History of AfroMexico (2009). For marginalized subjects caught up in the anticolonial movements, however, the
juridical and procedural infrastructures that fed into archival records were largely unavailable. In
the absence of established “anticolonial” archival processes and structures, the insurgent acts of
the marginalized sometimes register in elite creole’s correspondence and anticolonial writings
that were intercepted by Spanish royalists or later preserved by Latin American national archives.
I put these sources to speculative analysis whenever possible.
17
“Latin America” is a term that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. See Walter Mignolo, The
Idea of Latin America (2004).
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political community that contravene U.S. frameworks for national sovereignty. U.S.
writers narrated Spanish-American degeneracy according to logics of revolutionary
progress, natural law, racial difference, and democratic life that were incommensurate
with the colonial histories and social realities of emergent Spanish-American societies.
This dissertation follows a series of political exchanges that bring into view these four
counter-narrative elements. The political exchanges I study include Spanish-American
diplomats’ early engagements with U.S. officials and the press to recruit support for the
cause of independence; inter-American debates on political society’s relation to
indigeneity; Simón Bolívar’s informal alliance with the first president of the Republic of
Haiti; and patriot exiles’ interactions with and adaptations of U.S. democracy. I pair each
of these inter-American political encounters with a canonical text or figure of American
literary studies to interrupt teleological narratives of U.S. triumphalism in the
hemisphere. I also bring methods of close reading to bear on non-traditional forms of
writing—diplomatic correspondences, political tracts, travel narratives—in order to
elaborate pre-national, Spanish-American political imaginaries, which largely did not
take conventional aesthetic forms such as the novel.
Although this project does not separate “Anglo from Latin America”—a
comparativist distinction Lazo and Silva Gruesz warn against—it examines the ways in
which Spanish-American political imaginaries overwhelm U.S. boundaries, subjects,
social imaginaries, and political paradigms. The project seeks to methodologically
dismantle unidirectional analyses of U.S. cultural influence on or exploitative desires
projected on the South Americas. More precisely, the project attends to dispersals of
Spanish-American political imaginaries in the United States that interrupt conventional

12
histories and narratives of the relationship between colonial regressions and revolutionary
progress. In this sense, “Beyond the Black Legend” contributes to insistent efforts in
nineteenth-century American literary studies to think through “regions, times, and
peoples of unsettlement” highlighting one sense of the term “unsettlement,” as the
“undoing and contesting of received narratives.”18 Brickhouse elaborates the potency of
the term for critiques of settler colonialism in The Unsettlement of America (2014), where
unsettlement “signifies in its literal sense as the thwarting or destroying of settlement
along with the active attempt to discourage future European colonization—a heuristic
term for understanding a wide range of texts related to settler colonialism.”19 This project
reads along the discursive grain of the Black Legend as a related heuristic for openended, unsettling political possibilities. Here, the discourse of the Black Legend does not
privilege old or new forms of Anglo-imperialism, but instead unsettles the narrative
modes of both Spanish and English colonial legacies. While my counter-archive consists
of texts by creole elites, the political insights made possible under the ideological
conditions of the Black Legend torque against Anglo-imperial foreclosures of SpanishAmerican political imaginaries through teleological narratives of modern revolutionary
progress.
Within hemispheric and early American studies periodizations, the historical
scope of this project skews earlier than the typical timeframes for studies of U.S. - LatinAmerican cultural exchanges and political relations. This study begins with the earliest
U.S. diplomatic correspondence concerning the Spanish-American revolutions in 1810,
although the overall project attends to non-linear temporalities of racial formation,
18
19
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discourses of blackness, and colonial relations that can be traced back to the Spanish
imperial reconquest of Al-Andalus (Islamic Iberia of the medieval period). The long
histories of racialization and inter-imperial conflict that subtend revisions of the Black
Legend for the revolutionary South Americas also inform my reading of early to midnineteenth-century texts. Chapter 1, “The Sleight of Nature” and Chapter 3, “Conspiring
the Américas” engage most directly with the Black Legend’s cyclical returns and
revisions of conquest narratives and discourses of blackness, respectively. In the second
chapter, Hernán Cortés’s conquest of Mexico becomes source material that lingers in the
decolonial possibilities of political irresolution over formal procedures and strict
institutionalized forms of republican governance. Pre-modern histories of racial and
religious impurity refuel Anglo-imperial anxieties in the third chapter about the insurgent
potential of “blackness.” The third chapter traces discursive currents and historical
formations of blackness that reshape imaginaries of Spanish-colonial social orders, nonbinary racial categories, and the “tainted” demographic majority of the castas. Taken
together, these histories of conquest and racial disorder frame the impossibility of
democratic society in South America, a revised Black Legend imputation of political
disorder that guides the analysis of Chapter 4, “Outcast from the Patria.”
The project’s orientation toward the Black Legend’s uneven temporalities
counters a prevailing focus in the field on the pronouncement of the 1823 Monroe
Doctrine or the incorporation of territories under Mexico’s jurisdiction in the aftermath of
the 1848 Mexican-American War, which set the typical chronologies for hemispheric
scholarship in literary disciplines. Cultural analyses that follow the timelines and
doctrines of these events tend to retell narratives about how the U.S. consolidated its
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power in the hemisphere and how cultural imaginaries fulfilled the imperatives of
Manifest Destiny. The primacy of the Monroe Doctrine in hemispheric studies
scholarship construes 1823 as an inaugural event of transamerican affiliation and
imposition, although only Mexican-America and parts of the Caribbean come into view
as legible sites for hemispheric study. In other words, the texts assembled in relation to
either the Monroe Doctrine or the Mexican-American War attend to cultural and political
mediations almost exclusively in Anglo-American terms and cultural forms. For example,
Gretchen Murphy’s landmark Hemispheric Imaginings (2005) endeavors to “better
understand how the United States came politically to dominate and culturally to express
“America,’ and how ‘the hemisphere’ became a meaningful cultural and geopolitical
frame for America,” where the term “America” remains monopolized by the United
States.20 Although Chapter 2 of this dissertation reads the diplomatic correspondence of
U.S. officials—some of them penned by Monroe himself as Secretary of State—it
discerns understudied representations of U.S. political insecurity shaped by new political
shifts in the hemispheric South outside Anglo-American control, revealing forms of early
U.S. national porousness to political movements in the southern Americas. Additionally,
Yucatecan creole Lorenzo de Zavala theorized the possibilities and pitfalls of MexicanU.S. sociopolitical affiliations from a Spanish-American perspective, which I elaborate in
Chapter 4. “Beyond the Black Legend” therefore understands the Monroe Doctrine’s
unexceptional emergence from earlier political crises and early national exchanges with
Spanish-American political imaginaries.
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Most critical engagements with the legacy of the Black Legend itself remain fixed
on the medieval period or the early phases of inter-imperial rivalry in the settlement of
the Americas—notwithstanding scholarly calls to return, reread, and reassess the
discourse. For example, the landmark anthology Rereading the Black Legend (2008)
traces the discourse’s political and cultural circulations across Old World imperial
imaginations of the Ottomans, Mughals, Spanish conquista and reconquista, Dutch, and
English. This pre-modern location also holds true for the Black Legend’s ideological
opposite, the White Legend. For my purposes here, the White Legend refers to any
whitewashing discourse of European imperial violence in the New World.21 Ralph
Bauer’s recent discussion of the White Legend focuses on the legacy of Columbus’s
“discovery” and its ready incorporation into U.S. national histories in contrast to Hernán
Cortés’s conquest of Mexico. According to Bauer, this division between Cortés the
conquerer and Columbus the discoverer informs “the story of the inordinate cruelty of the
Spanish conquest of America and the story of the English ‘discovery’ of a virginal
America, respectively—thus became the two interdependent founding myths of AngloAmerican settler colonialism.”22 Black Legend discourses about the Spanish Americas

21

While Ralph Bauer invokes the White Legend as a particularly Anglo-American settler colonial
narrative, it more commonly refers to Hispanist justifications of the Spanish empire in response to
Anglo-imperial uses of the Black Legend. These types of justifications claim that the Spanish
empire was more civilized than the British empire because it debated and incorporated concepts
of indigenous humanity into its colonial orders; that domestic (and therefore more “gentle”)
forms of slavery prevailed in Spanish America in contrast to the brutalities of U.S. plantation
slavery. For the contemporary afterlife of the Hispanist White Legend, see Jessica Leinaweaver,
“Transatlantic unity on display: the ‘white legend’ and the ‘pact of silence’ in Madrid’s Museum
of the Americas” History and Anthropology (2016), 39-57.
22
Bauer, “The White Legend: Edmundo O’Gorman, Hemispheric Studies, and the Paradigm of
New World Exceptionalism,” 51.

16
largely drop from view in the nineteenth-century perhaps due to the primacy of the
Monroe Doctrine and the narrowing focus on Mexico and fragments of the Caribbean.
What critical insights might we glean if we re-introduce nineteenth-century
afterlives of the Black Legend to studies of nineteenth-century literature and culture?
Anna Brickhouse’s contribution to an MLA symposium on Raúl Coronado’s A World Not
to Come (2013) gestures toward a possibility that I take seriously and elaborate in-depth.
Brickhouse reflects, in “The Black Legend of Texas,” that the Mexican creole Gutiérrez
de Lara’s failed expedition to declare Texas independent from both Spain and the United
States provoked “a quite specific concern about the racial meaning of Latinidad within
United States borders: not the commonplace fear that racial mixture will destroy the
purity of the national body politic but a more profoundly existential anxiety about the
fragility of loyalties in a settler colonial modernity” incited by Lara’s implied “complicity
with the Comanche Indians” to thwart U.S. interests in the territory.23 This project
mobilizes a recalcitrant discourse of sociopolitical abjection—The Black Legend—to
probe unheralded forms of sociopolitical and cultural creativity that develop contrary to
the imperatives of what Brickhouse calls “settler colonial modernity.” Nineteenth-century
pronouncements of the Black Legend therefore re-narrate potential betrayals to settler
colonial modernity—such as motley racial coalitions, decolonial movements, and antislavery plots—into negative, backward, and tainted forms of social stagnation.
The negativity of the Black Legend intersects with contemporary studies of
Latinidad that also turn “backward” to improper subjects and affective orientations of
abjection in order to re-imagine politics through what Leticia Alvarado calls
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“nonassimilative irreverence” that challenges “bounded understanding[s] of Latinidad” in
Abject Performances (2018).24 In the contemporary cultural context Alvarado studies, the
undocumented student activists (DREAMers) became “the representative figure selected
as part of a strategy to achieve concrete small victories with potentially large
implications.”25 Despite the significant interventions of student-activists, Alvarado
observes coverage of the DREAMer movement “with ambivalence as once again, the
revered, respectable, and protected figure of the student” overshadows less assimilable
figures and realities of the undocumented community, such as the stigmatized foreignborn mother, with “her demographic-growing capabilities.”26
This study also reconfigures our critical understanding of “Latinx” cultural
productions and sociopolitical formations. My understanding of “Latinx” builds on the
cross-disciplinary insights of recent debates about the term’s possible orthographies,
sociopolitical stakes, and conceptual possibilities among the variations of “Latino,”
“Latina/o,” “Latin@,” and the most recent and therefore hotly debated, “Latinx.”27
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Before I engage with the ways scholars have debated the term, I want to acknowledge
that the critical traction of the term “Latinx” arises from grassroots trans, nonbinary,
gender-non-conforming, and queer activism and scholarship.28 But the “x” of Latinx can
also be mobilized for other ends. For example, “Latino Studies Now,” the recent theme of
the 2018 Latina/o Studies Association conference also apprehends the “x” to denote
dissent as well as “a history of alphabetic challenge to naming and claiming in the
Americas.”29 Read another way, the “x” is also “+”—it “calls us to the necessary
presentism and urgency of the now and to the equally necessary historicism demanded of
our field and its practitioners in a contemporary moment saturated in crisis and
emergency, danger and risk, resistance and resilience.” Alongside the interdisciplinary
questions "Latinx" invokes for our political present and colonial legacies, forms of
scrutiny and institutional backlash also closely attend it. Resistance to “Latinx” as a
nonbinary and transgressive concept have been legion, with charges against the term
denouncing its corruption of the Spanish language; erasures of feminist critique; and
faulted for its own augured impermanence, where detractors deem it a fleeting fad that
will give way some new lexical expression of latinidad.30 In my view, “Latinx” in our
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contemporary moment has always necessitated a conjuncture of feminist scholarship with
queer, trans, and nonbinary intellectual and political projects. The term’s perceived
violation of the grammars and pronunciations of Spanish—which is, after all, a colonial
language no different than English in that respect—is precisely the kind of unsettled
lexical energy needed for work that crosses inter-imperial and colonial histories of the
hemisphere at a little-known juncture of revolutionary upheaval for American literary
studies. The suspected impermanence of “Latinx” points us toward other politics,
lexicons, and communal modes that we glimpse only partially or yet lie on the horizon,
beyond our current critical strategies and mainstream apprehensions.
I also harness the term’s wayward energies as accomplice to this project’s
readings along the grain of the Black Legend—conjuring dynamic forms of
backwardness, abjection, and taint—that render imaginable new political possibilities
from the hemispheric South. María DeGuzmán provides the most resonant scholarly
theorization of the term, which she elaborates in relation to a coalitional campus
movement at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill in the wake of HB2 (House
Bill 2: The Public Facilities, Privacy, and Security Act). I quote at length:
Latinx signals a here-ness, an aquí that is a crossroads and the multivalent
possibilities of a crossing of people and ways: anything can happen.
“Anything” means that we cede control—that the incalculable and the
unnamable reassert themselves. The “x” is “uncanny,” or, to use Freud’s
terms, “unheimlich”—unhomely—from his 1919 essay on the uncanny. It
does not take us to a familiar place but to a familiar place rendered
unfamiliar because it participates in the unknown. Furthermore, the
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crossroads “x” is not only associated with the uncanny but what is most
often an element of the uncanny—and that is the abject: the socially
marginalized, rejected, taboo, forbidden. The “x” of Latinx has begun to
include all those forms of abjected “Latin” being: the refugee, the
migrant, the undocumented, the incarcerated, the stateless, and so on. This
might be one of the strongest arguments for adopting it in place of other
available denominations. Proud adoption of a term associated with those
who are routinely abjected could be considered part of an intentional
decolonizing project.
Not only does Latinx include what it was originally invented to
include—those who are gender-non-conforming and/or who do not
subscribe to the traditional male/female, masculine/feminine binaries, its
“x” does more than that. Its “x” is especially adaptable in its uncanniness
to those Latina/os who have been consigned repeatedly to the margins by
dominant US culture, by the State, and even by subaltern communities
caught up in legitimizing themselves through assimilation, integration,
and/or citizenship.31
The ways in which DeGuzmán elaborates the “x” of Latinx resonates with this project’s
contributions to entangled methodologies for hemispheric literature and culture. “Beyond
the Black Legend” in particular contributes to DeGuzmán’s open-ended theorization of
“Latinx” by exploring the confluence of abject and marginalized political imaginaries in
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pre-twentieth-century contexts, before the modern consolidation of nation-states in the
South Americas.
As the title of and scholarship in the groundbreaking anthology The Latino
Nineteenth-Century (2016) indicates, scholars working at the intersection of early
American studies and Latinx studies have yet to widely use “Latinx” although they
productively think about the strategic anachronism of its gendered variants, “Latino” and
“Latina/o” in earlier contexts. In this project, “Latinx” (along with its variants in the
scholarship) is a vibrant keyword for the scholarly innovations it inspires for cultural and
literary scholarship of pre-twentieth-century texts, contexts, and questions. Often, the
disciplinary category of traditional “Latino” studies is understood to be bordered by
temporal and spatial parameters that align with the typical chronologies of hemispheric
studies. As literary historian Raúl Coronado puts it, Latino cultural productions become
available for study “after some form of U.S. invasion and conquest: from the 1836
annexation of Texas or the 1846-1848 U.S.-Mexican War.”32 Earlier traces of Latinx
intellectual and cultural production do not accord with the borders of the U.S. nation
state, and necessarily “[refer] less to a subject-position than it does to a literary and
intellectual culture that emerges in the interstices between the United States and Spanish
America.”33 The Spanish-American political imaginaries at stake in this project are a part
of this errant, non-statist literary and cultural circulation, interacting with and potentially
undermining Anglo-American assumptions for political legibility. To foreground “Latinx”
as a dynamic cultural formation rather than a stable identity allows this project’s analysis
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to cross between U.S. Latinx and Latin American studies, and thereby contributes to a
genealogy of Latinx literary and cultural production in the nineteenth century. The
political imaginaries this dissertation foregrounds can be thought along a “Latina/o
continuum”—to borrow Carmen Lamas’s coinage—as a function of Spanish-American
affiliations, migrations, and written exchanges that traversed national boundaries in the
hemisphere, and in many cases, even predated the consolidation of Latin American nation
states.34
Regarding nineteenth-century Latinx texts, the category of literary genres
necessitates an expansion from recognized forms (plays, novels, poetry) to
interdisciplinary archives and nontraditional textual forms. This dissertation accords with
Raúl Coronado’s alternative exploration of “a discursive history of textuality that did not
necessarily yield to the teleological category of the literary.”35 This teleology from
dispersed textual forms to neat literary genres runs parallel to the consolidation of the
nation-state and its foundational literatures. The textual conditions for Spanish-American
political imaginaries also involve a jarring interplay of written production from elite
subject positions (ex. literate creoles with relatively unrestricted mobility) and their
relegation to the margins of memory in hemispheric archives and scholarship. “Though
elite,” Coronado writes, “these [Spanish-American] voices have been ignored and
forgotten, and will have to be read and analyzed in order to shed light on discursive
realms just as complex, such as those of women, mestizos, Hispanicized Indians, and
various Native American nations.”36 Textuality—a capacious sense of disparate literary
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histories and nontraditional forms—encompasses not only multiple forms of political
writing (pamphlets, correspondences, travel narratives) by elite Spanish-Americans, but
also “the work of orality and visuality in the making of knowledge,” and by implication
the speculative knowledge about how emancipatory ideas recirculated for racialized,
enslaved, and indigenous peoples not counted among elite Spanish-American society.37
Forms of archival excess and scarcity therefore construct paradoxical conditions
for early Latinx archives. Alberto Varon considers archival excess in Latinx print cultures
through the profusion of its fragmentation, impermanence, and “ongoing archival
recovery [that] continually [shift] our understanding of the past, rendering archives that
are migratory and fluid, characteristics that speak to the Latinx experience and that stand
in counterpoint to a closed canon that privileges a single national narrative.”38 In other
words, the early Latinx archive is transnationally excessive. When it comes to the
marginalized and subaltern discursive realms of early latinidades—“those of women,
mestizos, Hispanicized Indians, and various Native American nations,” as well as free
and enslaved peoples of the African diaspora omitted in this particular list—the early
Latinx archive confronts similar modes of archival violence that preoccupy Saidiya
Hartman in “Venus in Two Acts” (2008) or Michel Rolph-Trouillot in Silencing the Past
(1995). In its assemblage of an early Latinx counter-archive, however, the chapters of
“Beyond the Black Legend” attend to various discursive formations of blackness that
bring into view hemispheric colonial legacies, histories of slavery, and subaltern political
speculations inscribed throughout transnational circulations of latinidad.
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Lastly, “Beyond the Black Legend” contributes to the critical concept of
“translation” in hemispheric American studies. To do so, I draw from translation studies
to detail the relation between Spanish-American and U.S. political thought, as well as to
define the project’s interventions at the intersection of Hemispheric, Latinx, and
nineteenth-century American literary studies. Translation is vital to this project not only
in practice as I engage multilingual sources, but also because it helps me to disassemble
the discourses of backwardness that surround Spanish American political imaginaries.
Based on prior hemispheric scholarship, I understand “translation” to be a mode of
selection, mimesis, circulation, and interpretation.39 Attention to each dimension of
translation helps me to consider what had to be made inconceivable in U.S. discussions
about Spanish America’s political experiments.
I also adhere to Kirsten Silva Gruesz’s call to “think through the relationship of
translation to national state formation in the nineteenth century,” where “translation” is
understood to be a multivalent performance that exceeds the transparent figure of “a
bilingual writer [who] ‘translates’ a culture’s ideologies along with its language.”40 This
one-dimensional view of a translator facilitates unidirectional analyses of the primacy of
U.S. independence over the political struggles in the hemispheric South, where the figural
translator becomes a compliant conduit for North-to-South ideological and political
influence.
The dissertation refuses this North-to-South directionality across all four chapters.
Throughout, I build on Anna Brickhouse’s alternate conception of “motivated
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mistranslation in the shaping of hemispheric encounter, and proposing it as the default
condition of all translation in the colonial American world and in many of the subsequent
literary and historical writings that have sought to represent it.”41 Such an emphasis on
methods for strategic mistranslation deployed by marginalized, racialized, and indigenous
subjects vexes the distinction between successful, accurate, and transparent translation to
a target audience on the one hand, and infelicitous, deceptive, and opaque
communication, on the other. While Brickhouse organizes her study around a focal
Native interpreter, Don Luis de Velasco, the (mis)translations in “Beyond the Black
Legend” do not center on a main translating subject. The translations of political theories
and colonial histories that feature here tend to be of diffuse, anonymous, and
contradictory sources; in the spirit of mistranslation, my readings attend to textual (and at
times, oral) misuse and refusal of the demand to be fully legible to Anglo-imperial
powers. For example, political irresolution in Spanish America obsesses U.S. Secretaries
of State in Chapter 2 while elite creoles such as Simón Bolívar learn to read along foreign
imputations of black taint in order to forge unexpected antislavery alliances with the first
black republic in Chapter 3.
The chapters in this dissertation therefore show how U.S. officials and canonical
writers made sense of Spanish American political innovations in their writing and from
their own political-theoretical groundings incommensurate with political realities and
imaginaries of the South Americas. Such innovations were translated, often in the same
breath or sentence, as an inspiring revival of revolutionary spirit in the Americas and a
threat to U.S. eminence in the hemisphere. These fraught translations lead us to
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foreground the language that Spanish Americans deployed to develop their own political
concepts in the diplomatic records, pamphlets, and fiction produced by them. It is a
language that remains largely unheeded in contemporary scholarship of nineteenthcentury American literary studies and contemporary Latinx studies, and it asks us to
engage—however fleetingly—with unfamiliar forms of sovereignty, transamerican
belonging, and cross-racial collusion.
*****
In the chapters that follow, I assemble an early Latinx counter-archive to
dominant revisions of the Black Legend that draw on multilingual writings by Spanish
Americans in multiple genres. I argue that Spanish Americans seized the language of
sociopolitical taint to forge insurgent imaginaries for political community. Not only did
these political imaginaries potentially disrupt nascent Anglo-American power, but their
development through exchanges between Spanish-American subjects, exile communities
in the U.S., and Caribbean collaborators help us to conceptualize latinidad in relationship
to blackness and overlapping colonial legacies. All four chapters draw on theories of the
archive and exercise historically-attuned close readings of literary fiction alongside nontraditional texts. The first two chapters focus on hemispheric debates about the proper
arrangement or source of political sovereignty in Spanish America. The second half of the
project examines representations of the Black Legend at multiple timescales, before,
during and after the years of armed conflict. As a whole, the dissertation traces the
discursive vestiges of the Black Legend that reshape hemispheric relationships and
political imaginaries as they circulate from the South Americas to the United States.
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The first chapter, “The Sleight of Nature: Figural Indians in Félix Varela’s
Constitutional Philosophy and Jicoténcal,” considers two Spanish American texts that
nullify the Lockean state of nature as a foundational concept for political society, in
contrast to paradigmatic writings of U.S. independence such as Thomas Paine’s Common
Sense (1776). I analyze Jicoténcal—the first Spanish language historical novel in the
Americas—which was published anonymously in Philadelphia in 1826. The novel
reimagines Hernán Cortés’s 1518-1520 conquest of Mexico from the perspective of the
indigenous republic of “Tlascala,” whose warriors are conscripted by Cortés to overthrow
the Aztec emperor. Alongside Jicoténcal, I read revolutionary Cuban priest Félix Varela’s
lectures on Spain’s first constitution, Commentaries on the Political Constitution of the
Spanish Monarchy (1821). I attend to these texts’ political-philosophical figuration of
indigenous sovereignty as a function of the revolutionary irresolution from which each
text emerges. Caught between U.S. iterations of the Black Legend and the timeworn grip
of Spanish imperial rule, these texts unshackle the figural Indian from the state of nature
to open out onto decolonial possibilities foreclosed by familiar forms of modern U.S.
republicanism. These textual theories for political society entail a continual confrontation
with transamerican legacies of conquest, slavery, and racialization that circulate from
Havana to Philadelphia.
My second chapter, “Recoding Spanish-American Alterity: U.S. Diplomatic
Correspondence and the Arts of Neutrality,” examines U.S. diplomatic correspondence
concerning Spanish America’s uncertain political futures in the midst of anticolonial
revolution. The chapter reads primarily the correspondence conducted from the Secretary
of State from 1810 to 1819 in order to theorize the politics of hemispheric knowledge that
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this archive generates. I find that U.S. officials deemed Spanish-American political wills
to be illegible in private correspondence with special agents dispatched to the region.
Secretaries of State during the multiple tenures of Robert Smith, James Monroe, Richard
Rush, and John Quincy Adams develop a discourse of willful unknowing that justified
over-extensions of U.S. power abroad and exposed the early republic’s vulnerability to
upheavals in the hemisphere. I read the resultant discourse of U.S. neutrality as a volatile
exercise of imperial desire where the interaction between formal state policy and informal
actions inextricable from the state shore up the defective fictions of U.S. sovereignty. In
other words, this chapter offers a counter-narrative to teleologies of U.S. national
consolidation in the early nineteenth-century.
The third chapter, “Conspiring the Américas: Literary Afterlives of the Black
Legend and Bolívar in Haiti,” focuses on Simón Bolívar’s informal alliance with the first
president of the Republic of Haiti, Alexandre Pétion. In light of this key yet historically
fraught affiliation, this chapter reads anew Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno (1855), and
in particular Delano’s fleeting suspicion aboard the San Dominick about a joint Spanish –
black conspiracy. The hesitant question, “Could then Don Benito be any way in
complicity with the blacks?” quickly becomes overwritten with a second question: “Who
ever heard of a white so far a renegade as to apostatize from his very species almost, by
leaguing in against it with negroes?” Critics have often read the novella as an allegory of,
on the one hand, U.S. triumphalism in the aftermath of the 1848 Mexican - American
war, or on the other, the Haitian Revolution’s threat to the nation’s slaveholding interests.
I bring the epistles of this South - South alliance together with Benito Cereno to offer a
counter-archive for U.S. triumphalism and to expand from the now familiar emphasis on
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the Haitian Revolution. This chapter argues that the novella’s representations of the
racialized sovereignty aboard the San Dominick register insurgent imaginaries for interAmerican and cross-racial solidarities.
The final chapter, “Outcast from the Patria: Tocqueville, Zavala, and the
Speculation of U.S. Democracy,” focuses on two theoretical and ethnographic studies of
U.S. democracy: Lorenzo de Zavala’s Viaje a los Estados-Unidos del Norte de America /
Journey to the United States of North America (1834) and Tocqueville’s well-known
Democracy in America (1835). Zavala’s text not only predates Tocqueville’s famous
study, it is also informed by the author’s exile and the chaotic aftermath of Mexico’s
independence. As a political exile from an independent yet politically unstable Mexico,
Zavala assesses the North American democratic experiment for inspiration on how to
remedy post-independence ills. This chapter examines the ways in which Zavala risks
complicity with Tocqueville’s account of Spanish America’s backwardness, dependence
on the U.S., and teleological destiny to absorb U.S. democratic principles. I aver that
Zavala undertakes such an idealized theorization of American democracy to anticipate
both the cultural and political possibilities that might arise from “a combined regimen of
the American system and Spanish customs and traditions.” The dissertation concludes
here to examine the ways in which Zavala’s exilic journey and analysis sutures together
rumors, anecdotes, and other “secondary” narratives in order to think through social,
racial, and customary regressions of “el Norte” that underwrite the successes of U.S.
democracy.
In the Coda, “Returns of Taint: The Tornatrás, Feminine Opacities, and
Contemporary Statelessness,” I assemble visual and political archives of Black Legend
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afterlives that draw us, recursively, to our contemporary moment. This archive includes a
combination of casta paintings in Natasha Trethewey’s collection of ekphrastic poems
entitled Thrall (2012); the opening tableau of Melville’s Benito Cereno (1855) featuring
the spectacular disguise of nineteenth-century Tapadas in Chile and Peru; and forms of
taint that flow through contemporary conditions of statelessness from the Mediterranean
Sea to Puerto Rico. A conceptual figure from the Mexican colonial casta paintings called
the tornatrás (throwback, (re)turn-backward, hark back) brings together notions of
heuristic opacity, legacies of conquest, racial taint, and sociopolitical backwardness that
collectively inform ideas about Black Legend deviations, past and present.
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Chapter 1
The Sleight of Nature:
Figural Indians from Félix Varela’s Constitutional Philosophy to Jicoténcal
Beginning in January 1821, Félix Varela delivered a series of lectures on Spain’s
first written constitution at the San Carlos Seminary of Havana, Cuba. These lectures
addressed an audience of nearly two hundred students and circulated as a textbook under
the title Observaciones sobre la constitution política de la monarquía Española (1821)
[Commentaries on the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy]. In the second
commentary dedicated to elucidating the foundations of sovereignty, Varela rejects a
commonsensical trope central to the state of nature as a necessary antecedent of political
society: “We do not want to suppose, as does an orator of Rome, a chimeric time where
men lived in jungles like beasts, who afterwards associated themselves by means of their
word.” 42 Varela explicitly distinguishes his account of political society against an
unnamed orator of Rome, which likely references Cicero’s De Inventione (84 BC). At the
beginning of this handbook for political oration, Cicero writes: “For there was a time
when men wandered at random over the fields, after the fashion of beasts, and supported
life on the food of beasts; nor did they do anything by means of the reasoning powers of
the mind; but almost everything by bodily strength… nor had any one any idea what
great advantage there might be in a system of equal law.”43 In this archaic imaginary of
the state of nature, the first exercise of a singular “wisdom and eloquence” tames the
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All citations of the Observaciones will be in-text. The Spanish reads: “No hemos querido
suponer, como el orador de Roma, un tiempo quimérico en que existían los hombres en las selvas
a manera de las bestias, y que después se hayan reunido por medio de la palabra” (12).
43
Cicero, De Inventione (84 BC). Quoted in Stephanie B. Martens, The Americas in Early
Modern Political Theory: States of Nature and Aboriginality, 72.
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“savage and brutal” tendencies of scattered wild men to inaugurate the beginnings of
political society.
The millennia-long legacy of this figural wild man—who occupies a “chimeric”
time and space beyond reason, language, and political association—is reworked in
imaginaries of indigenous being in the so-called New World. The figural Indian, as a
trace of or shorthand for the state of nature, notably punctuates the Enlightenment
political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and other thinkers who elaborated
universal accounts of political right and property that sought to reconcile the indigenous
Americas within their frameworks. While such imaginaries of the Indian mobilized
colonial conquest throughout the Americas, they took widely divergent forms in Angloand Hispanic colonial understandings of humanity and political subjectivity. Most
influential for the British American context, Lockean narratives for the emergence of
political society invoke the figure of the Indian as evidence of pre-political society;
secondly, as a projection for the possessive subject who later renounces the isolation of
the so-called wild to ensure his self-interest within one “Body Politick”; and finally, as a
justification for settler colonialist ventures in British America and later U.S. expansionist
designs. 44 Varela, by contrast, summons the figure syncretically and in negation—he
44

On the state of nature, see John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1689) and María
Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, Indian Given: Racial Geographies Across Mexico and the United
States (2016). Saldaña-Portillo elaborates this point about the body politic most thoroughly in
Indian Given, decenters the prevailing tropes of the “vanishing” or “nomadic” Indian within the
U.S. imperial context. Of the Revolutionary period, she avers that “Colonists recognized the
Indian by ascribing a liberal agency and a British notion of property holding to them” that
nonetheless “deepened the subjection of indigenous peoples and their ‘voluntary’ alienation of
territory” (55). A more nuanced understanding of the simultaneous, seemingly incompatible
productions of the figural Indian in relationship to the state of nature is borne out in Locke’s
treatise, where the Indian’s labor is instructive for the origins of property and liberal agency. At
the same time, the sovereignty of indigenous societies is always cast as degraded or illegitimate:
“Thus we see, that the Kings of the Indians in America, which is still a Pattern of the first Ages in
Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the Country, and want of People and
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envisions it not in the “fields” or “woods” of Anglo American settlers’ foray into the wild
but rather dislocates its emergence within the “jungles [las selvas].” The figure not only
inhabits a geographical difference from Lockean imaginaries of the wilderness, but it also
negates, through its citation, the state of nature as a legitimate premise for political
society in the Spanish Americas.
Varela’s active rejection of the state of nature along with the teleological
development it implies—namely, that political society is always preceded by an asocial
primitivism, and therefore an apolitical lack of subjectivity—also conditions the rewriting
of the conquest in Jicoténcal (1826). Jicoténcal is an anonymously published, Spanishlanguage novel bearing the imprint of a Philadelphia press. The novel allegorically
harnesses the ongoing discord of the independence struggles in Spanish America to the
conquest of Mexico. It foregrounds the siege of the republic of Tlascala’s political
sovereignty by, apparently, two forms of absolutism: the tyranny of Hernán Cortes on the
one hand the the despotism of Motezuma on the other. The sovereign integrity of the
indigenous republic [república] of Tlascala operates as the novel’s central yet nonindividuated protagonist, within which all other characters of clashing imperial and
political affiliations—the Spanish, Aztecs, Tlascaltecans, and the indigenous allies of

Money gave Men no Temptation to enlarge their Possessions of Land, or contest for wider extent
of Ground, are little more than Generals of their Armies…” (Locke, 339). Such tropes of liberal
agency and inferiority are not incompatible at all; they merely establish the terms and conventions
upon which the sovereignty of indigenous polities are disavowed. The quote on the “Body
Politick” appears in full: “The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty,
and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other men to joyn and unite into a
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure
Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it. This any
number of Men may do, because it injures not the Freedom of the rest; they are left as they were
in the Liberty of the State of Nature. When any number of Men have so consented to make one
Community or Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick,
wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest” (331).
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each—exist in allegorical relation. The ways in which these characters’ actions become
entangled in the shifting tactics of Spanish conquest represent a conflict of virtuous and
corrupting influences upon the indigenous polity. If indigenous sovereignty cannot be
disavowed in either Varela’s framework for Spain’s first written constitution or in the
allegorical function for one of the first novels to emerge from Spanish America’s
independence struggles, this chapter asks: What consequences does this particular
premise of indigenous sovereignty pose for rethinking more familiar models of settler
colonialism in the Americas?
Both of these writings participate in a varied theoretical and political project that
took shape in the upheaval and eventual bids for independence that swept Spanish
America in the early nineteenth century. In A World Not to Come (2013), Raúl Coronado
fleshes out the non-Lockean contours of early Spanish American political thought, which
refused the individual as the legitimate source of political sovereignty and foregrounded
instead the collective well-being of the pueblo.45 In this chapter I focus on another key
departure from Lockean notions of political subjectivity: both Varela’s lectures on the
Spanish constitution and Jicoténcal refuse the state of nature as a theoretical concept that
subtends all legitimate political community. I suggest that the rejection of the state of
nature in these texts productively interrupts more familiar frameworks for the critique of
white settler colonialism within American Studies. Such prevailing critiques focus on the
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The pueblo, as Coronado defines it through an engagement with the Diccionario de la lengua
española de la Real Academia Española, is not only “an indivisible collective,” it is also related
to the town inhabited by the common people; in other words, it invokes the notion of an
Aristotelean polis that necessarily excludes the nobility. Pueblo also denotes: “‘the people,’ the
masses, as in populacho, which is still used today to refer to the working classes or to a disorderly
group of people” (67). In sum, pueblo signifies a kind of volatility or “mayhem” that to this day
continues “to operate as an irreducible political entity, as the source of sovereignty” (67). See
Coronado, A World Not to Come (2013).
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ways in which U.S. national sovereignty extends and maintains its dominion through the
disavowal of indigenous sovereignty. This disavowal, furthermore, often invokes the
state of nature as a discursive sleight to naturalize the dispossession and racialization of
indigenous societies. The imperial discourses activated by the state of nature therefore
contributed to Anglo colonial mappings of the world that, as Jodi Byrd reminds us in the
Transit of Empire (2011), “transformed indigenous peoples into the homo nullius
inhabitants of lands emptied and awaiting arrival.”46
U.S. models of settler colonialism also drew on the state of nature to refashion the
Black Legend as it extended control of Spanish American territories. Mark Rifkin, for
instance, writes about a later context of Anglo American settlement of Tejano lands in
Manifesting America (2009). According to Rifkin’s argument, Anglo American settlers
reanimated an old imperial and representational strategy known within Latin American
and Latinx studies as the “Black Legend” to justify U.S. expansion into “an existing
Euramerican system of governance and property-holding, which previously had been
acknowledged as foreign.”47 Although Rifkin never names this representational strategy
as an iteration of the Black Legend in particular, this chapter retains the phrase as a name
for a discursive complex that specifically repudiates Spanish American political thought
and organization—not just “Euramericans” generally. The mingling of indigenous and
Spanish barbarism characterizes the imperial imaginaries and discourses that the Black
Legend employs, within which the state of nature is an operative concept:
The [Anglo settlers’] disavowal of native territorialities provided a template for
dismissing Tejano claims as well, linking ‘Mexicans’ to ‘Indians’ as similarly
46
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Byrd, The Transit of Empire, xxi.
Rifkin, Manifesting America, 110.
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barbarous threats to the security and jurisdictional cohesion of Texas space. The
Indianization of non-native groups—their portrayal as having adopted to some
degree the characteristics of their native neighbors—provided an implicit basis on
which to disqualify large sections of the Spanish-speaking population from
exercising rights under U.S. law without categorically barring them from
citizenship or formally repudiating prior property claims en toto.48
Here, Anglo settlers overwrite Tejano sovereignty (and as I argue for this chapter’s
earlier periodization, the sovereignty of the Spanish Americas writ large) through a
revision of the state of nature that expands the scope of illegitimacy, vacancy, and
lawlessness to non-indigenous, Spanish-speaking inhabitants. The inextricability of the
state of nature from the figural Indian is also apparent in this analysis, in which the
equestrian Comanche provide the specific rhetorical resources “on which to disqualify”
Tejano land claims.
However, the Lockean state of nature that American Studies presupposes in
critiques of settler colonialism overlooks other colonial situations in the Americas, and
other imperial mappings that did not completely blot out the sovereignty of indigenous
populations. In reply to Byrd’s assumption of a stable “Indianness,” María Josefina
Saldaña-Portillo argues in Indian Given (2016) that “there was not a singular ‘Indianness’
but multiple ones—at least as many as there were European colonial ventures in the
Americas—each with its own set of human-making and space-making imperatives.”49
Working within a Hispanic context of conquest and colonialism rather than a Lockean,
Anglo-imperial one, scholars such as Saldaña-Portillo and María Elena Martínez in
48
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Rifkin, Manifesting America, 110.
Saldaña-Portillo, Indian Given, 35.
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Genealogical Fictions (2008) elaborate another epistemology of Indianness at work in
Spanish imperialism and humanist thought. For example, María Elena Martínez
historicizes the manifold ways in which the Spanish empire imagined itself in
relationship to indigenous peoples. According to Martínez, these imperial imaginaries
materialized in colonial systems for categorizing racial intermixtures (the sistema de
castas) and in the quasi-autonomous “Indian Republics” [repúblicas de indios] that
formed one half of the “two separate commonwealths or ‘republics’—one Spanish, the
other indigenous” that constituted the whole of the Spanish empire.50 The cross-racial
mingling of colonial subjects and the projection of an unadulterated, indigenous
sovereignty were an animating paradox, rather than an irresolvable impediment, to
imperial expansion in the Spanish Americas. Politically, the indio [Indian] signified a
category for indigenous peoples who, as a legacy of the earlier repúblicas de indios,
“were considered political entities with the right to their own structures of authority.”51
This political categorization of Indian purity and putative autonomy subsequently lent
coherence to the Spanish colonial hierarchy of the sistema de castas and left its trace in
the cultural ethos of mestizaje, from which various nationalisms in the Spanish Americas
developed. In sum, the indio named a foundational, cultural and political category for the
Spanish empire.
The imagined forms of “Indianness” that populate Jicoténcal and which appear as
negations of the state of nature in Varela’s Observaciones do not accord with the “homo
nullius inhabitants” that Byrd names as a production of Anglo settler colonialism, and
which informs Rifkin’s analysis of Texas settlement. Nor do these texts comply,
50
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Martínez, Genealogical Fictions, 5.
Saldaña-Portillo, Indian Given, 124.
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precisely, with the foundationalism of the Spanish colonial indio that Saldaña-Portillo
and Martínez elaborate. Despite their ideological and structural differences, the Lockean
state of nature and the Spanish colonial indio both “prodigiously produced new terms for
interpreting all of humanity, and by examining them with a critical eye we glean the
absence/presence of the Indian at the heart of the human.”52 Put simply, both forms of
“Indianness” proffer an arrangement of tropes and lexicons for the ideological as well as
institutional scope of their respective colonial systems: each coordinated its own vision
and version of “the absence/presence of the Indian at the heart of the human.” The forms
of “Indianness” in question delineated not only what was integral or antithetical to each
colonial project, but to an attendant definition of humanity, which triggered the
assimilative inclusion or exclusionary decimation of indigenous particularity.
In this chapter, I read the imaginaries of indigenous sovereignty that traverse
Varela’s constitutional philosophy and Jicoténcal as a function of the revolutionary
irresolution from which these texts emerge and with which they engage. Caught between
U.S. iterations of the Black Legend and the long legacy of Spanish imperial rule, these
texts unshackle the figural Indian from the state of nature to theorize alternate
frameworks for political society.
I argue, first, that Félix Varela develops in his lectures a hermeneutic for
“sovereignty” and “liberty” that not only refutes U.S. and British imperial imputations of
the Black Legend, but it also develops a theory for Spanish American political society
that cannot be affixed to any formalist scheme or political institution, whether imperial or
national, monarchical or republican. On the one hand, the emancipation imagined by
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Varela’s theory of “sociedad” [society] risks the imposition of formal and abstract
equality, of an “empty” promise of universality, because the concept is not beholden to
anything except, perhaps, an unleashed creole patriotism conditioned by the liberalism of
the 1812 constitution.53 On the other hand, “sociedad” also releases and harbors a range
of anticolonial claims from the rest of Spanish American society: the indigenous, the
racialized, and the otherwise disenfranchised. Through the concept’s nullification of the
state of nature, the parameters for political contestation exceed creole terms for
“independence” or “autonomy,” and can encompass unheralded, decolonial imaginaries
for another kind of americanidad.
I subsequently read Jicoténcal as an allegory and critique of creole patriotism as it
reimagines the downfall of the indigenous república of Tlascala.54 The novel’s allegory
of creole patriotism irreverently veers between the generic conventions of the historical
novel, the conquest chronicle, the sentimental novel, the tragic, and even the parodic. 55
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Here I refer to David Kazanjian’s analysis of U.S. racial governmentality and Judith Butler’s
elaboration of the perils of formal and abstract universality. See David Kazanjian, The Colonizing
Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003) and Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal” in Contingency, Hegemony,
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, eds. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj
Zizek (New York: Verso, 2000).
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All citations of Jicoténcal are my own translation of the original Spanish in the 1995 edition
published by the Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage Project. Eds. Luis Leal and
Rodolfo J. Cortina.
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My understanding of allegory is indebted to Emma Stapely’s analysis, which engages with
Walter Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928). Stapely writes: “Allegories bear
witness to history as it transpires within the reach of aesthetic honor and discredit—indeed, it
abolishes the distinction between the aesthetic and the world. This means that allegory resists
contextualization by methodologies that conceive of The Historical as a kind of box-like
container surrounding aesthetic objects extrinsically. By the same token, allegorical aesthetics
offer no protection from historical flux. The scene of allegorical reading is thus one in which the
reader is caught up, with allegories themselves, in the ferment of historical process. To read
allegorically is to enter into unsheltered negotiation with contingencies whose purport remains to
be decided. Allegory’s ruinous absorption by time is therefore characterized by sorrow—the
sorrow of non-transcendent historical being—as well as by a kind of indigestible surplus of
interpretations. Indeed, ‘allegory’ seems to name a specific formal arrangement for Benjamin as
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Throughout this chaotic allegorical elaboration, Jicoténcal develops a hermeneutic for
political society that continually mistakes republican institutions and formalism for the
proper source of sovereignty within the indigenous república. These misreadings of
sovereignty elucidate the stakes of Spanish American anticolonial imaginaries, and of the
refutation of the Black Legend on U.S. soil, which must disinter from the ruins of
conquest and the wreckage of independence more vigorous imaginaries for political
association that, otherwise, modern republicanism forecloses and deadens. Together,
these texts’ theories for political society—routed through representations of indigenous
sovereignty—entail a continual confrontation with the legacies of conquest, slavery, and
racialization that cut through the political collectives that “sociedad” and “pueblo” name.
Such theories for political society’s contradictions circulate in this chapter’s archive from
Havana to Philadelphia, the colonial legacies of each enfolding into the other.
I. “A Tribe of Savages, Afflicted with the Vices of Civilization”
Varela's 1821 lectures on the landmark Spanish constitution respond to Cuba's
unstable situation within a rapidly disintegrating Spanish empire. The Constitución
política de la monarquía Española (1812)—otherwise known as the 1812 constitution or
the Cádiz constitution—had been unprecedented in the Hispanic world as the first written
constitution of the Spanish monarchy. When, in the crisis of 1808, Napoleon invaded the
peninsula and deposed the Spanish royal family, Spanish representatives convened the
nation’s first modern parliament known as the Cortes in the port city of Cádiz, Spain.56 In

well as the knowledge of history that it entrains: a knowledge that subsists not in mastery over
time, but rather in our enthrallment by its motions” (54). Emma Stapely, Insurgent Remains:
Afterlives of the American Revolution, 1770-1820. 2015. U of Pennsylvania, PhD dissertation.
56
For histories in English about the 1812 Constitution and the modern Cortes’ impact on Spanish
America, see M.C. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions: The Constitution of Cádiz and its
Legacy in Spanish America (New York: Cambridge UP, 2015); Scott Eastman and Natalia
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the name of the absent king, they sought to consolidate imperial Spain through liberal
reforms that resembled prior republican constitutions; it guaranteed, for instance, “civil
liberty, property, and all other legitimate rights pertaining to all who [compose the
Nation].”57 Ever since Ferdinand VII renounced the 1812 Constitution upon his return to
the throne in 1814, Cuban creoles not only reverted to their status as colonial subjects,
but also by 1821 their island was one of the few remaining Spanish colonial possessions.
Independence movements had already swept most of the continental Spanish Americas
when a vacuum of legitimate political authority allowed creoles of present-day Buenos
Aires, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and others to maneuver bids for
independence in the name of the deposed king. Among the most pertinent repercussions
of the constitution’s renewal in 1820 for Cuban creoles entails, first, the unification of
Spain’s territories under one nation and, secondly, a redefinition of who counted as a
Spaniard, defined as “all free men born and resident in the dominions of the Spains, and
the sons of these.”58 But if the innovation of the Cádiz constitution in 1812 was to place
sovereignty in the nation and not in the king, this was no longer a robust innovation for

Sobrevilla Perea, eds. The Rise of Constituitonal Government in the Iberian Atlantic World: The
Impact of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 (Tucaloosa: U of Alabama Press, 2015). For key works
in Spanish on the Cortes, the 1812 constitution, and Spanish America, see François-Xavier
Guerra, Modernidad e independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones Hispanicas (Madrid:
Editorial MAPFRE, 1992); José Maria Portillo Valdés, Crisis Atlántica: Autonomia e
independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana (Madrid: Fundación Carolina Centro de
Estudios Hispánicos e Iberoamericanos, 2006).
57
Spain, Constitución, Título I, Capítulo I, Art. 4. The Spanish reads: “…la libertad civil, la
propiedad, y los demás derechos legítimos de todos los individuos que [componen la Nación].”
58
Spain, Constitución, Título I, Capítulo II, Art. 5. The full passage in Spanish reads: “Son
españoles: Primero. Todos los hombres libres nacidos y avecindados en los dominios de las
Españas, y los hijos de estos.” This clause gestures toward the idea of the Spanish nation as a
unified plurality, “the Spains” of both hemispheres.
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the empire’s remaining overseas colonies by 1820—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines—who experienced its annulment in 1814.59
Cuban creoles’ inconsistent political belonging in the first, fitful years of Spanish
constitutionalism consequently informs the strategy with which Varela approaches his
interpretation of the constitution. His pedagogical project in these lectures is in implicit
dialogue with the preface of the 1812 constitution. Antonio Fernández García notes that
this frequently omitted introduction to the constitution “assumed a pedagogical and
doctrinal function, providing the plainest expression of the constitution and expounding
the political theory that serves as its basis.”60 It was also framed as an imagined address
to the deposed Spanish sovereign, opening with the honorific “V.M.,” vuestra majestad, a
notable rhetorical maneuver that legitimated the authority of the constitution despite the
absence of the crown when it was inaugurated by the Spanish Cortes in 1812. The priest,
by contrast, does not name the king as an authenticating measure for his lectures, nor
does the Crown figure at all as an imagined auditor. Instead, Varela’s embodied audience
at the seminary—comprising nearly two hundred enrolled students and anonymous
eavesdroppers among Havana’s public—inspire an interpretation of the constitution that
does not justify, to the Crown, the transfer of sovereignty from the monarchy to the
“nation.”61
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The Bayonne Statute, also known in Spanish as the Constitución de Bayona of 1808 contends
for recognition as the first written Spanish constitution. However, it is also widely considered a
royal charter intended to consolidate Bonapartist rule upon Napoleon’s invasion of Spain. This
document posited the Crown as the source of sovereignty.
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García, “Introducción,” 189. The Spanish reads: “…asumió una función pedagógica y
doctrinal, explicando la escueta expresión de la Carta y desarrollando la teoría política que le
sirve de fundamento.”
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Some of the few studies of Félix Varela’s life describe an atmosphere in which the Cuban
public could eavesdrop on Varela’s lectures from just outside the lecture hall. See Helen and
Joseph McCadden, Félix Varela, Torch Bearer from Cuba. (New York: US Catholic Historical
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In this section, I attend to Varela’s exegesis of the Cádiz constitution at the juncture
of two discourses: the Black Legend’s afterlife in this era of Hispanic constitutionalism
and Spanish imperial definitions for the nation that were reworked between the
constitutions’ first appearance in 1812 and its revival in 1820. I argue that Varela’s
theoretical innovation consists in his understanding of “society” as always denoting a
political entity, and as the source of sovereignty. This chapter foregrounds the Spanish
term for society, “sociedad,” to emphasize this concept’s specific emergence within the
constitution’s stream of Spanish liberalism. It also contributes to contending anticolonial
lexicons that developed within the upheavals that engulfed the Hispanic world in this
period alongside pueblo, nación [nation], libertad [liberty], and soberanía [sovereignty].
62

Within the text of the Observaciones, the term sociedad ultimately breaks free from

any obligation to the Spanish monarchy to denote an autonomous moral and political
entity. I suggest, furthermore, that Varela’s transformation of a crucial clause in the
constitution—the replacement of nación with sociedad as the lexical anchor for
sovereignty—indicates sociedad’s conceptual emergence within the lived experience of
Spanish American society. The “nación” inadequately addressed Spanish America’s
racial hierarchies and slave systems, for which it bore the racializing burden of the Black
Legend differently from the metropoles of peninsular Spain.63

Society, 1969); Olivia Miranda, Félix Varela: su pensamiento político y su época (Havana:
Ediciones de Ciencias Sociales, 1984).
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For an elaboration of this untranslatable term, see note #3.
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Spaniards residing in Cuba did not necessarily stand on equal footing with those designated
“citizens”: “…the Constitution made a distinction between “Spaniards” (españoles) and
“citizens” (ciudadanos); the latter posssessing political rights in addition to civil rights. This
distinction was apparently based on the French model of 1789, which separated active citizens,
those with political rights, and passive citizens, those with only civil rights. The division would
have great significance in relation to Spanish populations in America. On October 15, 1810, the
Cortes decreed the equality between Spaniards of the both hemispheres who were born in and
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Varela's introductory lecture defines his pedagogical aims in relationship to both his
audience and foreign antagonists. Let us keep in mind that Varela was appointed to the
highest professorial rank named after the 1812 constitution. The cátedra de Constitución
[Chair of Constitution] was the official title of this appointment.64 Over the course of this
opening lecture, Varela renames the title—or more accurately, the institution of the
cátedra as it reintroduces the study of Spanish constitutionalism in Cuba—to inscribe
upon the concept of “Constitución” a palimpsest of proliferating, liberal virtues that
amend Spanish political organization:
… and I would call this cátedra, the cátedra of liberty, of the rights of man, of
national guarantees, of the regeneration of dignified Spain, the fount of civil
virtue, the groundwork of the great edifice of our happiness, that which for the
first time has reconciled the laws with Philosophy, by which I mean, laws have
been made that circumscribe the fanatic and the despot, while also establishing
and conserving the sacred Religion and the wise Government; it is that which
opposes the attacks of foreign nations, presenting the Spanish pueblo not as a tribe

whose origin was these territories. Slaves and, more generally, castas or blacks were missing
from this definition. Arguments to abolish the slave trade or slavery failed against those who
raised the economic ruin of masters and the possibility of political upheaval as consequences of
dismantling slavery. The independence of Haiti was also a recent event…. it should be noted that
slaves were excluded from the term ‘Spaniards;’ freed blacks were included and might, under
special circumstances, become ‘citizens.’ Citizens had political rights and could elect and be
elected to government positions, but under the Constitution, the exercise of citizenship rights
could be suspended through judicial decision, incapacity, debt, status as a domestic servant, lack
of known employment, accusation of criminal activity, and afer 1830, illiteracy. Women and
domestic servants were similarly excluded based on a lack of autonomy” (Mirow, Latin American
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of savages afflicted with the vices of civilization, but rather as the pueblo really is,
generous, magnanimous, just, and enlightened.65
These paratactic appellations and aspirations for the cátedra de Constitución amplify the
document’s potential to elevate Spain’s standing among other nations and histories that
set a precedent for the principles of “liberty,” “the rights of man,” “national guarantees,”
and “civil virtue” drafted in the ink of republican constitutions. Unlike these familiar
republican political values drawn largely from the dominant language of the American
and French Revolutions, however, Varela also integrates unfamiliar praise—which would
not be heard from the voice of a patriot of any known secular republic—for the political
virtues of a constitutional monarchy imbricated with the religious values of the Catholic
church. The priest avers that although the 1812 Spanish constitution maintains the
“sacred Religion” of Catholicism and moderates “the wise Government” of monarchical
rule, the document’s commitment to liberal principles nonetheless guards against both
extremes represented by the religious fanatic and the arbitrary despot that endanger the
Spanish political body. In other words, the constitution’s expansion of liberal virtues
ideally work to moderate and by extension preserve the dual integrity of the Catholic
church and the monarchy. Varela’s apparent encomium of the constitution suggests that
no contradiction in either terms or practice necessarily dooms the Spanish nation as a
renewed constitutional monarchy.
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Varela therefore responds to a new iteration of the Black Legend presumably
voiced by Spain’s rivals in Europe and the Americas. As a centuries-old discourse, the
Black Legend took manifold forms throughout the development of inter-imperial
competition in the New World. The features of such a discourse were rhetorically crafted
and precisely calibrated to tarnish the legitimacy of the Spanish empire at both the height
and nadir of its power. Given the backdrop of the Atlantic revolutions that unfolded in the
Americas and Europe at the turn of the late eighteenth- into the early nineteenth-century,
Spain is often deemed a belated entrant into the debates about liberal principles and
constitutional theories that characterized the period’s upheavals. As other scholars have
remarked, this entrance into more paradigmatic forms of revolutionary and constitutional
discourse was the result of the “forced collapse of the Hispanic world brought about
externally by a foreign invader [Napoleon]” rather than any internal uprising against the
crown and nobility.66 Strikingly, Varela apprehends in the last sentence of the quoted
excerpt that competing forms of constitutionalism had become, by 1821, a new front for
inter-imperial rivalry and international claims to supremacy. Varela's lectures therefore
defend against the “attacks of foreign nations” that construe "the Spanish pueblo" as a
degenerate “tribe of savages” whose constitutional thought merely exemplifies “the vices
of civilization” because it did not endeavor to be a secular and anti-monarchical state like
other, more celebrated models of republican revolution, monarchical overthrow, and
constitutionalism.
The foreign projection of Indian savagery onto the Spanish pueblo is compounded
by the generalized “vices of civilization,” which refigures the 1812 constitution as
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evidence of such undefined, civilizational vices. I linger on Varela’s recognition of the
“attacks by foreign nations” on the constitution to theorize the specific logics of the Black
Legend at work here, and to better contextualize how Varela’s interpretation of the
constitution offers a defense against this discursive and often Anglo-imperial diplomatic
weapon. Unlike other settler imperial powers in the Americas, only the Spanish empire
inherited the discursive condition typically imputed to indigenous and racialized
populations that European empires brought into subjection. Within this non-Hispanic,
inter-imperial imaginary, Spanish sovereignty is portrayed as a monstrosity: it is that
which defies the proper teleological progression from the state of nature to political
society. Spanish sovereignty therefore devolves over the conquest of the Americas,
regressing to something akin to the state of nature, but somehow worse because it is
irredeemable—its barbarism bears with it, indelibly, the so-called “vices of civilization.”
By consequence, there is no state of nature to which Spanish American society can return
and no political legitimacy that a society benighted by Spanish conquest can attain. The
offensive attacks that the Black Legend leverages against Spanish morality and
modernity are potentially limitless; Varela’s nearly ceaseless expansion of constitutional
virtues rhetorically parries and pushes against the syntactical limits of the sentence, and
attests to the discourse's persistence as a framing concept in his opening lecture.
The Black Legend therefore allows Spain’s imperial competitors to mask the
human toll of their own imperialisms and to even justify their imperial projects by mere
comparison: their settler colonialisms, their slave trades, their ways and forms of
destruction in and beyond the Americas, are all somehow exempt from the taint of this
discourse. Working in tandem with Black Legend tropes, the state of nature is
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fundamental to the construction of this exception. Take, as an instance of the discursive
inequality that the Black Legend underwrites in the Age of Revolutions, Thomas Paine’s
narrative for the origins of political society in Common Sense (1776) with which Varela
was likely familiar, and which circulated in various translations produced by the first
expatriate communities of Spanish Americans in Philadelphia.67 Subjects "in possession
of natural liberty" are overtly conceptualized through the figure of the colonist and the
colony:
Let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the
earth, unconnected with the rest; they will then represent the first peopling of any
country, or of the world. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first
thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto.… Four or five united would
be able to raise a tolerable dwelling in the midst of a wilderness…. Thus
necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly arrived emigrants
into society, the reciprocal blessings of which, would supercede, and render the
obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained perfectly just
to each other…. But as the Colony encreases, the public concerns will encrease
likewise…. Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode
rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world; here too is
the design and end of government, viz. freedom and security.68
On the surface, Paine portrays a rather a bloodless and placeless colonial settlement,
conveying nothing of the animosity that structures the meaning of the term, "colony,"
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which traces its etymological development from the Latin colonia, "the proper term for a
public settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered territory."69 Any
explicit representation of indigenous peoples would be antithetical to Paine's narrative for
the emergence of political society and good government, since it would throw the
legitimacy of the nascent settler society into question, and make such a society
answerable to its own conquests. Of course, Paine's abstract account of how a settlement
becomes an independent political society functions as an allegory for the sovereignty of
British American society. Paine's settler society therefore relies on the conversion of
indigeneity into a homo nullius inhabitance (to slightly revise Jodi Byrd’s phrase),
producing the "wilderness" as the condition of possibility for its founding. The "Doctrine
of Independence" that the famous pamphlet proliferates also universalizes the
particularity of the British American colonies into the whole “cause of America, [which]
is in a great measure the cause of all mankind" in stark contrast to the generalized burden
of the Black Legend that Varela refutes.70
Paine's theory of the separation between society and government also allows us to
grasp what the dual ascription of Indian savagery and "the vices of civilization" implies
about Spanish sovereignty, and the ways in which Varela's interpretation of the 1812
constitution responds to this charge. According to Paine, "society" is defined in positive
relation to the wants of the settlers, while "government" is designed as a negative check
on the vices of an extended society. Morality and a reciprocal sense of social duty
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attenuates as a society expands and exceeds its immediate “wants,” which is the point at
which government functions to preserve the “freedom and security” of political society.
In Paine’s foundational imaginary of an early society of emigrants, the “[unity] of
affections” that society encourages ultimately relies on nothing other than an economic
calculus of necessity in the wilderness, which, once met and surmounted, requires
government “to supply the defect of moral virtue” that is no longer regulated by the
natural pressures of necessity.71 Given the ways in which the state of nature is operative
in this imaginary of British American political society, we might infer that a society
founded on an acknowledged conquest of indigenous ways of life can never
accommodate the positive definition of the term because it is founded on a violation of a
preexisting society. And any form of government that such an overtly imperial society
constructs is ipso facto contrary to "freedom and security.” In other words, if the conquest
of one society by another generates a fundamentally corrupt social morality, then a
government of and by the conquerors can only compound vice upon vice. Here, then, we
glimpse the theoretical underpinnings for a version of the Black Legend that Varela
negates in the introductory lecture: “the attacks of foreign nations, presenting the Spanish
pueblo… as a tribe of savages afflicted with the vices of civilization.”
Yet for Varela, the cátedra of the constitution counters this Black Legend discourse:
as he puts it, a proper reading of the constitution portrays “the pueblo as it really is,
generous, magnanimous, just, and enlightened.” His theory for the foundations of society
and forms of governance differs markedly from Paine’s narrative and other streams of
Lockean thought that rely fundamentally on the state of nature for their account of a
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sovereign society. Rather than offer an alternate, teleological narrative for the origins of
political society, Varela derives his alternate conceptual foundations through an
interpretation of the Cádiz constitution. As an explanation of the constitution, the
Observaciones surprisingly do not offer an in-depth study of each of the constitution’s
articles. The lectures do not prescribe the relationship between Spanish society and
monarchical governance, nor do they enumerate the contents of the articles. Instead, a
proper grounding in the constitution’s key principles emanate from every dimension of
the constitution, and span the definitions for sovereignty, equality, rights, and the social
contract, and individual as well as national liberty; the division between and the
equilibrium among governing powers; an account of the nature, origin, and limits of the
foregoing; the features of a political constitution that distinguish it from civil codes and
politics in general; the difference between an “absolute” and “temporary” power of veto;
the idealized harmony among categories of force, which encompasses the force of law as
well as moral force. Rather than offer a prescriptive interpretation for each of these
constitutional domains, he models a flexible hermeneutic—instead of a narrative—for its
core principles: “Sovereignty and liberty are the principles that emanate the entire
constitution” (11).
“Sociedad” is a pivotal term in the lectures for theorizing the basis of these two
fundamental principles for the Cádiz constitution, sovereignty and liberty. In the first
“observación/commentary” dedicated to the study of Spanish sovereignty, for example,
Varela expounds on the constitution’s provision (Title I, Chapter I, Art. 3) that declares,
“Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation [la nación], and by extension the exclusive
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right to establish its fundamental laws resides in it.”72 What entity or form of association
does the idea of nación/nation invoke for Varela? The nation, in his exegesis of
constitutional philosophy, is essentially coterminous with society: Varela rephrases this
key provision in the constitution to proclaim that “all sovereignty resides essentially in
society [la sociedad]” (12). If we recall that Varela’s objective in these lectures is not to
offer a procedural, step-by-step explanation of the constitution’s articles but rather to
offer a theory of the political principles upon which the entire confederated system of the
Spanish monarchy is established—the principles of “liberty” and “sovereignty” that he
argues emanate the entire constitution—the exchange of nation/nación with
society/sociedad provokes a variety of questions. With what consequences does he
translate “nación” to mean “sociedad” as the locus of sovereignty, and how might this
translation at once rework the meaning of “nation”? Does “sociedad” open up a reading
of the constitution that “nación” cannot? Given that Varela takes aim at the Black Legend
from the outset of these lectures, how might his conceptualization of society revise
British American assumptions about political society that Thomas Paine’s Common Sense
or John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government attest to?
To address these questions concerning Spanish American understandings of
“society,” I return to Varela’s refusal of the state of nature with which this chapter begins.
This refusal, I suggest, occasions more than a simple negation of prior colonial models
for political society that depend on the state of nature as a constitutive exclusion or
foundational inclusion of indigeneity. Most importantly, such a refusal also generates the
anticolonial potential of Varela’s alternate understanding of the multifaceted relationship
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between sovereignty, society, and nation. Diverging from Lockean understandings of
political society as a stage in the organization of human sociality achieved by a particular
agreement, “to enter into one Community, and make one Body Politick,” society in
Varela’s mind is not a stage, category, or descriptor for social organization as it aligns
with, or is excluded from, a legitimized political form. Nothing conceptually precedes
sociedad.73 Except, of course, the fleeting recognition of the dominant discourse of the
state of nature, wherein he invokes the image of beast-like men who wander the jungles
only to negate them in the same breath. And by doing away with such an antecedent to
political life and form, the term “sociedad” always already refers to a sovereign polity.
Put another way, “sociedad” denotes the active presence of political life and social
reciprocity without prescribing that society assume a legible form of governance, in other
words, that social association be legitimated as a formalized and institutionalized “Body
Politick.”
To be clear, the concept of sociedad does not involve the rejection of all forms of
governance or institutions, but it leaves the question of political form open-ended and
becomes a matter of collective self-determination. For example, in the first lecture Varela
states: “Effectively, by nature all men possess equal rights and liberty; but gathered in
large societies, diversified in their interests and passions, they require a direction, and
what is more, an authority that conserves them in their mutual rights and which permits
neither the dissolution of society nor the incursion of mutual harm among its members”
(11-12).74 The “mutual rights” and the diversification of “large societies” apparently
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require a governing “authority” that protects and gives society a “direction.” A
diversified society, according to Varela, cannot be left to its own devices for its
organization, although the required “authority” that gives it shape, as we will see, is not
earthly but divine. Furthermore, he avers that the legitimacy of a monarchy or any form
of political corporation ultimately derives from individuals’ collective delegation of “a
part of their liberty, for their own benefit and that of their fellow citizens” (12).75 On this
premise of a collectivized “liberty,” Varela bases his key revision of the Cádiz
constitution’s most important clause to proclaim: “All sovereignty resides essentially in
society [sociedad]” (12).
Varela’s idea of “sociedad” differs in its moral logic from Paine’s imaginary of
political society, which depends on the image of discrete settler “emigrants” whose
morality amounts to an economic exchange to satisfy the demands of necessity. We
already glean sociedad’s distinction from Paine’s model in the above excerpt, in which
individuals reciprocally delegate a portion of their “liberty” in the name of the collective
citizenry. Here, the non-tangible ideal of “liberty” motivates this reciprocity. Without the
state of nature as an organizing concept for political society—as is the case for Paine—
the “morality” of sociedad is not dependent on a reciprocal exchange of social duties,
which is either enforced by the raw necessity of the wilderness or is regulated by the
government once political society overcomes the wild. Therefore, the individual offer of
an unquantified and unquantifiable portion of natural liberty for the common good
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crucially informs Varela’s idea of society as a vivified collective and a mutable ideal: a
“moral body” in and of itself, invested with sovereign power. He explicitly defines
society as such when he declares, “Society, as a moral body, possesses its rights that no
one can assail without destroying Justice: there is a mutual pact between the pueblos and
the Supreme authority, the fulfillment of which is an an act of the same virtue [Justice]”
(emphasis mine, 14).76 Leading up to this assertion of society as a moral body, he
personifies the concept of society as a coherent and sovereign authority: “[Society]
generates herself with the aim of her own augmentation and elevation, incompatible with
her subjection to slavery, and would never renounce the right to secure her well-being
and her liberty should she ever witness herself defrauded of such esteemed graces” (12).77
“Nación” is therefore rendered as an effect of the moral condition of society.
Between these two images of “society”—one as a cohesive “moral body” and the
other personified as a feminine sovereign—a number of contradictions surface to
complicate the conceptual integrity of Varela’s imaginaries for Spanish political society.
In the first case, this “moral body” arises out of a “mutual pact” between, on the one
hand, a multiplicity of “pueblos” and on the other, what Varela calls “the Supreme
authority,” which is coterminous not with the Spanish monarch but instead supersedes it
by invoking an abstraction of divine authority.78 A mutual pact of this kind effectively
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circumvents an acknowledgement of monarchical power; by extension, it performs a
rather counterintuitive occlusion of the Spanish monarchy in a lecture dedicated to
explaining the fundamental provisions of a political constitution that is, in its own title
(Constitución politica de la monarquía Española) and prefatory introduction (Discurso),
addressed to the Crown. In the second case, Varela’s gendered personification of selfaggrandizing society neatly represents the reflexive and indivisible qualities of sovereign
power. Following the rhetorical logic of this personification prompts us to ask: If
sovereignty emanates from “society” herself, then what agency from without could
subject her to slavery or defraud her of liberty, well-being, and security?
“Sociedad,” then, not only counters Anglo-colonial deployments of the Black
Legend and dominant paradigms for political society, but it additionally defines society
as autonomous from Spanish imperial structures. According to Varela, the dangers that
lurk in wait for a sovereign society are twofold, and they derive from the composite
quality of the constitution—and by extension, the Spanish nation—as it configures the
Spanish monarchy in relationship to a representative branch of government known as the
Cortes. Or, more precisely, these dangers emerge not from the duality of the constitution
itself but rather a total reduction and misunderstanding of its composite parts: the role of
the diputado (representative to the Spanish Cortes) and the role of the Spanish monarch.
A misinterpretation of these two roles not only affects their relationship to one another in
a balance of power but also their respective duties to what is called “nación” in the Cádiz
Constitution and “sociedad” in Varela’s lectures.
To be clear, the concepts conveyed by the terms “nación,” “sociedad,” and even
“pueblo” are not mutually exclusive. Their mutual complexity becomes apparent to the

57
degree that Varela deploys them as seemingly interchangeable terms within his
framework of interpretation. For example, immediately following the quotation of the
key provision in Title I, Chapter I, Art. 3 (“all sovereignty resides in the nation”), Varela
explains the foundational principles that underlie the provision:
Nothing more reasonable and just; because if it is el pueblo who must
renounce a part of its liberty voluntarily and not by any coercion of
tyrannical violence—the latter being contrary to all justice and reason—it
therefore belongs exclusively to the pueblo to establish its fundamental
laws, which includes these renounced rights, this portion of liberty that
every individual loses in favor of la sociedad, and in it [y en él]
sovereignty resides essentially, which is nothing other than the primary
power and the origin of all others. (12)79
“El pueblo” and “la sociedad” are, as Varela clarifies later on, the primary principles that
undergird any legitimate account of national sovereignty. For example, the term “nación”
appears in a series of rhetorical questions following the above excerpt: “What liberty
could a nación possess if it did not possess in itself sovereign power (“el poder”)? And
what nación could deserve the name if it is not free?” (13).80 Although both the “pueblo”
and “sociedad” appear as dual foundations for the sovereignty of “la nación,” their
differences in definition remain slippery and uncertain; they both denote collective and

79

The Spanish reads: Nada más razonable y justo; pues si el pueblo es quien ha de renunciar una
parte de su libertad voluntariamente, y no por violencias tiránicas, contrarias a toda justicia y
razón, a él toca exclusivamente el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales, que incluyen
estos derechos renunciados, esta parte de libertad que pierde cada inividuo en favor de la
sociedad, y en él reside esencialmente la soberanía, que no es otra cosa sino el primer poder y el
origen de los demás.
80
The Spanish reads: “¿Qué libertad tendrá una nación que no posea en sí misma el poder? Y
¿qué nación podrá merecer este nombre si no es libre?”

58
corporate entities that express the integrity of a sovereign nation. In this particular
excerpt, the “pueblo” functions as a collective actor: it renounces “a part of its liberty” in
order to transmute that very portion as the establishment of “fundamental laws.”
Meanwhile, “la sociedad” appears in relation to “every individual” who reenacts the
sacrificial and regenerative act of “el pueblo.” However, from the perspective of “every
individual,” what motivates such an act of renunciation of their individual liberty is not
specifically the establishment of “fundamental laws” but a moral ideal of collective good
conveyed by “sociedad.” Strikingly, in this passage “pueblo” rather than “sociedad” is the
locus of where “sovereignty resides essentially,” which is affirmed by the use of the
masculine subject pronoun “y en él” instead of the feminine subject pronoun “y en ella”
in the original Spanish. Pueblo is the active term, the domain of human activity and
design, while Sociedad conveys the moral ideal. Although the terms coexist as origins for
sovereignty, when they appear in concert they inflect distinct features of an imaginary
that “nación” names, which is at minimum a legal and moral formation, a unity of pueblo
and sociedad.
The composite quality of the Spanish nation and the conceptual basis for its
unity—the legal “rights” of the pueblo and the animating force of a “common good”
morality known as “sociedad”—leaves the liberty and rights of the pueblos vulnerable to
violation through different political maneuvers. In the paragraph that commences the
lecture titled “Liberty. Equality.” Varela identifies the threat to national stability as
twofold: it can stem from the oppression of a tyrant or the subtle ambition of “some
individuals.” The second of these, Varela avers, is a much less perceptible threat that
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“often escapes even the most experienced politicians” (15).81 For all of Varela’s
arguments against the quasi-theological doctrine of “divine right” attributed to the Crown
or commonplace understandings of the Crown as the fount of sovereignty throughout
these lectures, we also read here a cautious regard toward power struggles in the
representative branch of Spanish politics. “If the exercise of the pueblo’s sovereignty
recognizes no limits,” Varela warns, “its representatives, who believe themselves invested
with all of it [sovereignty], could arise as despots, and sometimes the backwards interest
of a [political] faction will become the disgrace of the nación” (15).82 Tyranny of the
representative sort poses a problem of recognition precisely because it takes a plural form
or a combination of forms at once, in other words, as a coterie of despots on the one hand
and as a power struggle among political parties—despots one or all—on the other. In this
second form of threat, power is no longer contorted by the abuses of the singular Crown,
but is rather manipulated in the hands of the multiple who claim to act on behalf of the
nation. Varela concludes his summary of threats, “It matters not to an oppressed citizen
whether his calamity derives from a single person or from a congress” (15).83
Varela’s theory for “sociedad” therefore functions as an anticolonial concept that
unexpectedly codes an expression and justification for creole patriotism through an
interpretation of the Cádiz constitution. To be clear, by “creole patriotism” I do not mean
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that Varela’s elaboration of “sociedad” ushers in a claim for outright independence, but it
does loosen the hold of the Spanish constitution upon the Cuban pueblo, and proffers a
conceptual resource for future anticolonial claims independent of the constitution’s tenure
(it collapsed again in 1824). The priest’s theorization of sociedad is generated at the
conjuncture between two hostile discourses and contexts, which I’ve elaborated
throughout this section: the Anglo-imperial, Black Legend defamation of Spanish
sovereignty, on the one hand, and Cuba’s uncertain reincorporation within the imperial
plurality of “the Spains,” on the other. Most importantly, the lack of a state of nature is
what generates the conceptual power of “sociedad” to unfasten the sovereignty of the
Spanish Americas from the double-bind of foreign and domestic imperialisms.
Yet the capacious, non-teleological corporatism of "sociedad," which safeguards
the sovereignty of the Spanish Americas from foreign interference and the whims of the
Spanish empire, nonetheless occasions other reckonings with these inchoate polities' own
social stratifications. Even though a constitutional theorist such as Varela cognized
British and Spanish imperial structures in the Americas as somehow external, foreign, or
at least improper to the social domains of Spanish America, an anticolonial creole in
Cuba or in other regions of Spanish America remained a settler and likely benefited from
an array of Spanish imperial structures of racialization: the casta system, the plantation
economy, and so on. In other words, the political claims of marginalized Spanish
Americans—the indigenous, the enslaved, and the otherwise racialized—could no longer
be held in abeyance through the occlusions that the state of nature enacted across the
British American and, in a different modality through Catholic elaborations of natural
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law, former Spanish colonial contexts.84 The capaciousness of “sociedad” on the one
hand enables Spanish American political society to break free of the state of nature’s
political teleology, as well as to deny allegiance to any particular empire or formalized
nation-state; but on the other it occasions a reckoning within itself. In what ways would
the anticolonial imaginaries of creole Spanish Americans be made to heed their
relationship to the long legacy of the conquest—the histories, survivals, and political
claims of the racialized nonelite who also participated in the upheavals across Spanish
America?
II. A “Ruinology” of Jicoténcal
Jicoténcal (1826) contributes to a range of anticolonial claims and imaginaries
that circulated within and beyond the bounds of “La Famosa Filadelfia,” to borrow
Rodrigo Lazo’s coinage for one of the earliest U.S. Latinx communities. As a harbor for
political exiles and itinerant diplomats from the insurgent Spanish Americas, Philadelphia
is often regarded by literary historians as a historical and symbolic resource for the
anticolonial struggles taking place in the hemisphere around the global Hispanic crisis of
1808. From the earliest throes of this political upheaval, elite Spanish Americans
translated a number of documents from the U.S. era of independence and circulated those
translations within the expatriate community and, conceivably, out past the censors of
Spanish colonial authorities to influence the uprisings of the pueblos. For example,
Spanish Americans in Philadelphia turned to The Federalist Papers and Thomas Paine’s
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Common Sense as sources of inspiration for political theories and institutional orderings
that might be transposed to the early Spanish American context.85 Throughout the
hemisphere, from roughly the period between 1808 to 1826, former and current Spanish
colonies confronted political instability fueled by internal social divisions and a clashing
array of imaginaries, claims, and arguments for the emergent nations’ future political
configuration. As this line of analysis goes, Philadelphia’s historical, intellectual, and
symbolic resources provided elite creoles with a desired, if imagined and textual, salve to
the ongoing turmoil in Spanish America.
Less critical attention has been directed toward the ways in which Spanish
Americans forged their political frameworks in the very anvils of their own imperial
legacies and anticolonial struggles. When such studies do appear, they foreground
Spanish Americans’ reworking of North American political theory and political economic
thought as an alternate genealogy of modernity. “Modernity,” in nineteenth-century
Latinx scholarship and in studies of white settler colonialism, signifies in diverse and
divergent ways. It is variously conceptualized as settler-driven change and orderings of
temporality (Rifkin, Beyond Settler Time); a divergent or alternate Enlightenment
deriving not from Anglo- protestant traditions but from developments within Catholic
Scholasticism; a process of secularization; broadly, the historical development of the
nation-state and nationalism; a (potentially traumatic) rupture or break associated with
“new” epistemes; the continual dissension and competition within these various
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developments, resulting in modernity’s characteristic incoherence (Coronado, A World
Not to Come).86
Throughout all these inflections of “modernity,” except perhaps the last, and
including the dominant and the divergent alike, a teleological and progressivist arc
remains inscribed. Modernity’s coalescence through teleology renders it a risky keyword
for critiques of the nation-state. Referencing Giorgio Agamben’s notion of a
“philosophical archaeology” or a “ruinology” as a way “to think outside the logic of the
nation,” specifically a Romantic telos of national triumph, Raúl Coronado asks, “How
can this dystopian history at the margins—figuratively and literally—of Spanish America
and the United States reveal alternative though perhaps all-too-often closed-off paths to
modernity?”87 If an alternate modernity can remain a teleological destination, it is unclear
how such a modernity leaves behind or excises a certain teleology of the nation from
itself. My reading of Jicoténcal, then, does not trace an alternative or foreclosed path to
another horizon of modernity. Instead, Jicoténcal theorizes the ruins of the conquest as
the very prolepsis of Spanish American encounters with liberal thought, and dwells with
the conquests and colonialisms that remain unresolved within Spanish American visions
for independence. To be clear, I share a critical investment in tragedy, failure, and
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ruination as offering a nonteleological critique of triumphalist narratives of the nation.
Nonetheless, I do not approach such tragic forms and failures as a divergent modernity
gone unfulfilled, but instead as a tumultuous reckoning within Spanish America’s
anticolonial lexicons and imaginaries.
Rather than focus on the ways in which Philadelphia’s intellectual capital radiated
its influence outward through the translations and adaptations of U.S. republicanism by
elite Spanish Americans, then, I read Jicoténcal in the opposite direction. I approach the
novel as an irruption of an alternate, specifically Spanish American hermeneutic for
political association within the iconic, U.S. “republican” city. Much like Varela’s
constitutional lectures, Jicoténcal’s allegorical didacticism also trains its readers in a nonteleological hermeneutic for alternate understandings of sovereignty and political
community. However, these texts engage in different ways with the discursive residue of
the Black Legend. Varela’s lectures keep buried any particular memory or representation
of the conquests, while Jicoténcal turns to the conquest as an allegorical resource for the
wars of independence and generalized upheaval in Spanish America. Furthermore,
Jicoténcal’s print circulation in the U.S. and its critical reimagining of the relationships
between national sovereignty, indigeneity, and the legacy of the Spanish conquest—
amounting to a critique of the Black Legend on U.S. soil—critically reflect back on
Anglo American settler colonial paradigms that subtend any privileging of U.S.
republicanism.
The performance of historical amnesia or active rewriting in relation to the
conquest influences the reading practices that the Observaciones and Jicoténcal yield for
Spanish America’s anticolonial efforts. Instead of centering its heuristics on the
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constitutional principles for sovereignty, right, and morality—all derived from the fluid
yet “proper” relationships between sociedad, pueblo, and nación, as does Varela—the
novel stages a sequence of misreadings for such proper foundations of sovereignty, of
failures to read rightly and (in)actions mistaken through misguided interpretations.
Departing from contemporaneous publications by Spanish Americans in Philadelphia,
Jicoténcal reworks the history of the conquest not to portray republican governance as a
redemptive outcome of the wars of independence or to represent the expulsion of Spanish
authorities from the Américas as atonement for the conquests. Instead, it warns that the
very wake of independence poses an unresolved and renewed danger of complicity in the
violence of settler colonialisms that, in turn, animates “new” and seemingly unanticipated
forms of political instability and corruption in the Spanish Americas.
Given Jicoténcal’s emergence as part of a “literary and intellectual culture that
emerges in the interstices between the United States and Spanish America,” following
Coronado’s genealogical and proleptic approach to the term “Latino,” it asks of us an
ineluctable question.88 How might we read Jicoténcal in the “interstices” of Anglo- and
Spanish- American settler colonial paradigms that thrive on a proliferation of discourses
and tropes for assessing the status of indigenous humanity? I read the novel interstitially
rather than at the juncture of these two colonial contexts because its allegorical
arrangement does not presume any stable distinction between them. To rework Homi K.
Bhabha’s definition of the “interstice” away from “the subject” and toward a literary and
intellectual intervention, I suggest that the novel’s allegorical critique is formed “in
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excess of, the sum of the ‘parts’ of difference” between the U.S. and Spanish America’s
nationalisms and colonialisms.89
Let us recall that the república of Tlascala operates as the novel’s central yet nonindividuated protagonist.90 By reading the indigenous polity as the central protagonist, I
read against the expectations of individuation established by its title, the singularity of a
proper name. Even so, the proper name Jicoténcal refers to two characters in the
narrative: both the senior senator of Tlascala and his son, who is the general of the
Tlascaltecan warriors and functions as a heroic foil to Hernán Cortés. I read the novel’s
conception of political sovereignty alongside Varela’s constitutional philosophy, to grant
us a point of entry into the novel’s allegorical arrangement. The relationship between
“pueblo” and “sociedad,” for instance, entails a distinction between the force of law and
moral force within the collective, between human activity in political life and an ethical
ideal of the collective good, between a view of the whole polity conserved as law or the
individual, “self-sacrificial” act within the reciprocal bonds of the collective. Between
these two inflections of political society, then, the indigenous república registers this dual
sense. The república signals, on the one hand, the “moral ideal” that sociedad conveys
and, on the other, its animation as an active political collective—a pueblo—by the
various indigenous characters who justify their acts and arguments in its name. The
battleground of political persuasion and claim-making takes place in what the narrator
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approximates as a type of Tlascaltecan “congress or senate,” with two main factions: the
father and son Jicoténcal versus Magiscatzin and Hernán Cortés. Yet the indigenous
polity’s well-being and sovereignty is not sequestered within the senate as the formal
space of political deliberation; Tlascala veers between the prospect of redemption and its
fated downfall from both inward and foreign influences as the various Tlascaltecan
characters become entangled with “outsiders,” such as the Spaniards, the Aztecs, and
members of other indigenous polities.
While the narrative dramatizes the encroachment of foreign influences on the
república, the novel begins from the premise that indigenous sovereignty cannot be
disavowed. It narrates the pivotal encounter between two sovereign forms: that of the
indigenous república and that circumscribed by Hernán Cortés, who proclaims himself
and his attendant troops as mobile agents of the Spanish Crown. The political actors on
either side of the physical, political, and conceptual boundaries of these two sovereign
arrangements constantly test and interpret one another’s limits—and, notably, the
sovereign affiliations and figurations to which Cortés lays claim exceed more than one
stable form. In the opening chapter alone, he is introduced in absentia by two indigenous
ambassadors from Cempoala, a nation allied to Tlascala, as an “ambassador for a very
powerful prince”; along with his army, they arrive as ministers of “another God, superior
to ours,” although they themselves appear to be “deities because they travel in large
palaces and wield thunder and lightning”; Cortés also professes himself a liberator of
tribes and nations subjugated or threatened by Moctezuma’s empire (5-6).91 He cycles
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The full Spanish passage reads: “…de las partes del Oriente han llegado a sus tierras unos
hombres invencibles, que parecen deidades porque navegan sobre grandes palacios y manejan
los truenos y los rayos, armas reservadas al cielo; ministros de otro Dios, superior a los
nuestros, a quien offenden las tiranías y los sacrificios de sangre humana.” Italics are original to

68
through ambassadorial, revolutionary, and divine invocations of sovereignty. These words
of introduction, however, are all relayed by two natives of Cempoala who speak not only
on behalf of their cacique, but also to relay a consensus among all the other caciques who
are identified as the “friends and confederates” of Tlascala who live in neighboring
mountain ranges (4).92 Yet the mediation of the Cempoalans’ ambassadorship goes even
further, since they claim to speak on behalf of the confederation’s caciques while also
conveying a separate, albeit repetitive word on Hernán Cortés’s behalf to deliver the
following request: “We have travelled ahead to ask you and to recommend on behalf of
your caciques and the entire confederation that you admit these foreigners as do-gooders
and allies of your allies…. and on behalf of these foreigners’ captain we inform you that
he comes in peace and only seeks a path through your lands…”93 (6). Although Cortés’
arrival in allied lands already impinges upon the sovereignty of Tlascala, there can be no
outright seizure of Tlascaltecan lands or evacuation of Tlascaltecan sovereignty: he must
first abide by their diplomatic and political protocols, as in the case of the Cempoalan’s
ambassadorship; and he must rely at this point on persuasion to rhetorically influence
their parliamentary decisions.

the Leal and Cortina edition of the novel, to denote excerpts transposed from Antonio de Solís’s
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From the outset, Cortés encounters the Tlascaltecans as a political society, even
though his mediated self-presentation to their senators and political leaders echoes some
discursive elements of Spanish humanism that developed religious justifications for the
conquest of the Americas. Saldaña-Portillo and María Elena Martínez elaborate this
Spanish humanism in terms of the Catholic imperative of inclusion and conversion of the
indios, and through the propagation of figural indios bárbaros [barbaric Indians] that
amounts to a Spanish humanist configuration of the state of nature.94 Cortés’s iteration of
this discourse not only dovetails with the dual imperative of Spanish conversion and
conquest, but it also imputes to the Tlascaltecans and their allies an inability to overthrow
Motezuma, and therefore an incapacity to govern themselves because they cannot
absolutely secure their freedom from the threat of the Aztecs. Magiscatzin, an indigenous
senator who becomes Cortés’s collaborator from within the república and whose actions
are guided by an individuated grudge against both the elder and younger Jicoténcal,
essentially capitulates to such echoes of Spanish humanism and Cortés’s contradictory
claims to a quasi-divine sovereignty. Magiscatzin also argues that Tlascala lacks
sufficient provocation to declare war against the Spanish foreigners, concluding on both
sides of the foreigners’ ontology, as divine emissaries or fellow mortals: “My opinion is
that we admit them with benevolence and that we concede the path they seek: if they are
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men, because reason is on their side, and if they are something else, because the will of
the gods suffices for reason” (7). 95
Jicoténcal the younger, by contrast, reanimates the figures and tropes of conquest
from which the ideological fabric of the Black Legend is woven as a component to his
counterargument. His counterargument inverts the parallel structure of Magiscatzin’s
rationale. He begins by supposing the Spaniards to be “something else,” that is, monsters
“that the ocean has spewed on our coasts, who rob our pueblos, who live by their
arbitrary whim, thirsting for gold and silver, and lost to the pleasures of the land; who
scorn our laws; who attempt dangerous novelties in justice and religion; who destroy
temples and altars; who blaspheme the gods… And yet they are esteemed as celestial!”
(8). 96 With the legitimacy of the wars of independence allegorically tethered to the
sovereignty of the indigenous república, and particularly to the words and actions of the
younger Jicoténcal as a titular character, the novel apparently reiterates such discourses of
Spanish barbarism and predictably imputes those qualities to the Spanish conquerors. The
figural Indian’s reiteration of the Black Legend displaces the object of scrutiny within
Spanish humanist debates on the status of indigenous humanity. Here, it is the colonizer’s
humanity that the novel puts into question throughout; it is a discourse voiced variously
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by the Jicoténcal patriarchs but also by other native characters and, occasionally, by the
narrative voice. For instance, a native of Tezmeluca describes Hernán Cortés as a living
caricature of evil. She lists his physical features—a parody of evil—and catalogues the
acts of his colonizing minions: “His wrinkled forehead, his unibrow, his hoarse voice, his
sinister look… His troops uprooted our crops and torched our trees… it was as though the
muse of destruction and disorder reigned in our peaceful home” (136).97 The novel’s
discursive resonance with the Black Legend is not, however, totalizing. Cortés’s
comparatively virtuous subordinate, the captain Diego de Ordaz, is singled out by this
same native character as the diametric opposite to the reputation of the Spanish foreigners
as a “race of monsters.” Unfortunately, her initial encounter with Ordaz leads to a
misguided offer of hospitality to Cortés: “Upon his last journey to Tlascala, my husband
and I left to find our good friend [Diego de Ordaz]. Oh! By misfortune we did not find
him, and with our hearts upon our lips we offered hospitality to one of the leaders, whose
elder aspect appeared to us a more respectable and dignified object of our humble gift”
(136). 98 Diego de Ordaz, as an exception to this discourse, folds back into the discursive
tactics and misinterpretations that facilitate Cortés’s colonial venture.
Does Jicoténcal merely echo the discourse of the Black Legend to allegorically
justify the Spanish American independence movements against the counterrevolutionary
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efforts of the Spanish monarchy, as most of the extant criticism assesses?99 The opposing
stances of the novel’s opening debate—between Magiscatzin’s reaffirmation of Spanish
humanist arguments for colonial intervention and Jicoténcal the younger’s deployment of
the Black Legend to delegitimize Spanish imperialism—are directly quoted from Antonio
de Solís’s Historia de la conquista de México (1684). Jicoténcal extracts and recirculates
a substantial amount of text from this widely popular chronicle, but not merely to repeat
it. The allegorical excess of the narrative actively reworks this centuries-old opposition
between a justification of the conquests and a stereotypical condemnation of it in order to
unfix the Black Legend taint from Spanish national origins or even the confines of
historical epochs. In the novel’s opening passage, the narrator transcribes what is at once
an impossible memory, a collective memory that functions like an omen, and a beginning
through the end written in the “fatal book of destiny”:
The fall of Motezuma’s great empire was written in the fatal book of
destiny, the ruins of which ought to bury the república of Tlascala and the
other governments of a beautiful region of América. Mankind has already
witnessed invasions of half-savage barbarians who, abandoning their dens
and their disagreeable land, took possession of more pleasant climes,
destroying their former inhabitants; some ambitious men of genius, placed
at the head of the pueblos, had armed nations against one another to
subjugate them all, and the immense ocean of passions had spilled over to
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internecine and terrible upheavals in which civil societies have suffered
disruptions impossible to describe.100
The narrator therefore expands the Black Legend through a proliferation of the passive
voice to obscure a stable referent, and gestures expansively toward the tortuous
circumstances of any sociopolitical upheaval. The past perfect and present perfect
progressive tenses structure this passage to muddle any clearly discernible, causal
relationships between past, present, and future actions and conditions. In fact, the only
common denominator between the acts and aftermaths in this passage are impositions of
force, possession, destruction, armament and subjugation, in short, of conquests and
colonialisms, which culminate in the past perfect’s transfer to the present perfect
progressive tense to convey an action that began in the past and continues into the
present, with the possibility of its extension into the future: “the immense ocean of
passions had spilled over to internecine and terrible upheavals in which civil societies
have suffered disruptions.” Through the excessive sweep of allegory, the passage
potentially refers to Spanish conquerors, the duplicity of Jeffersons and Bolívars
throughout revolutionary history, colonial authorities, corrupt senators both ancient and
modern, and other figures of power that have yet to arrive on the scene of history.
Jicoténcal stages a critique of political formalism and institutions through its
allegorical capaciousness and its intertextual engagements with prior chronicles of the
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conquest. In this sense, it closely accords with Félix Varela’s anti-institutional philosophy
and mode of interpretation for the 1812 Spanish constitution that counterintuitively keeps
the Cuban pueblo/sociedad unfastened from an imperial and national polity—the
“Spanish nation”—to become its own political society without ever declaring
independence or even, explicitly, an argument for greater autonomy.101 At the time of
Jicoténcal’s publication in Philadelphia, the institutional apparatus of the Spanish empire
no longer bounded many of the Spanish American pueblos and the nation-state was not a
foregone resolution to the full range of anticolonial claims and imaginaries that cut across
social divisions in the colonies. The novel’s allegory therefore critiques commonplace
understandings of political sovereignty that misattribute the source of sovereignty to
formal institutions of governance. As the narrative unfolds, the downfall of Tlascala
results not only from a coup by Hernán Cortés as a figural Spanish tyrant, but also from a
fatal overinvestment in the formal structures of republicanism. Along with Varela’s
Observaciones, the novel declines to work towards assembling political community in
institutional terms and consequently offers a peculiar counterpoint to the translations and
pamphlets being circulated by expat Spanish Americans in Philadelphia. In contrast to
structural reforms being proposed by a range of Hispanic Enlightenment intellectuals, a
vision for the bureaucratic state continues to be deferred in the novel. Where, in the
1810s, “the concept of the nation had been given flesh” by intellectuals in Philadelphia
through the language of political economy and bureaucratic reform.102 At this slightly
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later time the novel dwells in the ruins of the conquest and their portents for the present,
the uncertain outcomes of the revolutions. By extension, the novel’s anti-institutional
critique deconstructs both Anglo and Spanish paradigms for political society, as we’ve
seen in its undoing of the state of nature, the Black Legend, and the familiar terms of
Spanish humanism.
The cast of indigenous characters who demonstrate a virtuous affinity towards the
república are all bound in every personal passion and deed to the mandates of the senate.
Both the elder and younger Jicoténcal are primary actors in this cast, but so is Teutila, the
only primary character of the novel who has no corollary in histories of the conquest.
Teutila’s connections to tribal polity, kin, domesticity, and freedom, shift rapidly and
considerably throughout the narrative's unfolding (besides Doña Marina, who is also
known as La Malinche in nationalist lore and Chicana feminist scholarship, Teutila’s are
the only affiliations that change). These characters’ continual interpretation of the
Tlascaltecan senate as the source rather than the formal vessel of sovereignty is a
misreading that Cortés exploits to rout indigenous rule with the collusion of the traitorous
indigenous senator named Magiscatzin. As leader of the senate, the elder Jicoténcal
apprehends early on—even as a precursor to the novel’s diegesis—that political
institutions and their agents provide a weak guarantee for political unity:103
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the Cortina and Leal edition.
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“Until today our patria has been invincible because of its justice and its
virtues… this upright spirit has united us and has supplied in large part the
defects of our manner of government, because, what would become of
truth, of us, if the senate was overtaken by some bad and greedy men,
given that senate appointments are for life? Well then, now there is no
unity in the senate, my son. Magiscatzin, a traitor to his oaths, has
committed the horrible crime of being a slanderer and unjust.” (21)104
Despite these words recognizing the weakness of republican institutionalism, the elder
Jicoténcal seems even more distrustful of what he calls the “ignorant mass [el vulgo
ignorante],” and its capacity to rid itself of the internal corruption that Magiscatzin
represents (22). At the patriarch’s insistence, Jicoténcal the younger and Teutila—as the
younger’s enslaved love interest and, eventually, his wife—are unable to disobey the
demands of moderation and self-regulation that republican and domestic virtue demands
of each, until even decisive action is belated and futile.
This fatal misreading of the proper source of sovereignty also precludes any
positive representation of political society as a functional entity in the novel. In Varela’s
account, the collectivity of pueblo and sociedad made possible political life and coexisted
as sources of sovereignty. By contrast, in the novel, the profane and nonrational “mass”
appears across Jicoténcal the younger, Jicoténcal the elder, and Magiscatzin’s
deliberations in the Tlascaltecan senate, as signs for the pervasive and latent dysfunction
of political society. All of the Tlascaltecan leaders, no matter their faction, cite this
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The Spanish reads: “Hasta el día nuestra patria ha sido invencible por su justicia y por sus
virtudes…. este espíritu de rectitud nos ha unido y ha suplido en gran parte los defectos de
nuestra manera de gobierno, porque ¿qué sería, a la verdad, de nosotros, si se apoderasen del
senado unos hombres ambiciosos y malos? Pues ya no hay unión en el senado hijo mío.
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concept of “el vulgo” almost in diametric opposition to what we understood, in the
lexicon of Varela’s lectures, of the moral ideal of “sociedad” or the collective selfdetermination through “established laws” that goes by the name pueblo. As a revision of
Varela’s lexicon, the pueblo does not only act to produce law, but to also undo it.105 The
term “vulgo” may be broadly translated as the common people, but also specifically as
the “a grouping of people who in every topic know nothing more than the superficial
aspects”106 (RAE); the term derives from the latin vulgus, which denotes the mass and the
multitude, a crowd, the commons (OED). While vulgus connotes the potential for the
multitude’s physical disorder and unpredictability, the “vulgo ignorante” appears instead
as a perpetual threat of conceptual disorder and sentimental volatility. It is an entity with
an excess of wayward credulity and passion rather than an unruly physical presence. The
indigenous orators, no matter their faction, can only claim the moderation of reason and
good judgment against the vulgo. It is as though the novel’s allegory transfers the dual
source of sovereignty from the pueblo/sociedad to a hollowed-out exterior. Sovereignty
has been displaced to republican formalism: the indigenized protocols of ambassadorship,
the orations of the indigenous vanguard, and the institutions of republican deliberation.
Jicoténcal the elder encapsulates this negative orientation to political society: “Wretched
are we if the wicked want to abuse the credulity of an ignorant mass! These sad
circumstances, my son, make me fearful of internecine schisms and dissension” (22).107
In his earlier counterargument to Magiscatzin, the younger Jicoténcal presages the elder’s
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See note #3 for an elaboration of the term “pueblo.”
The definition reads in the original Spanish: “conjunto de las personas que en cada materia no
conocén mas que la parte superficial” (RAE).
107
The Spanish reads: “¡desgraciados de nosotros si un perverso quiere abusar de la credulidad
del vulgo ignorante! Estas tristes circunstancias me hacen temer, hijo mío, un rompimiento y una
disensión intestina” (22).
106
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exclamation and lament, “Human weakness has always found refuge in the timid
credulity of such prophecies, but wretched is the pueblo that lets itself be deluded by
those who sow faction from its credulity!” (8). 108
By juxtaposing the wayward senses of sovereignty and society that Jicoténcal
represents alongside Varela’s lexicon in the Observaciones, I suggest that the novel
dramatizes the perils of formal and abstract universality borne by the stream of Spanish
liberal thought that circulates globally, from the original promulgation of the 1812
constitution to its revival in 1820 to the cusp of national independence for most of the
Spanish Americas by 1826. Many scholarly studies have shown the limits and violences
of the emancipation that liberal thought circumscribes.109 Most instructive for my
analysis here is the contradiction that Saldaña-Portillo elaborates in the transition from a
Spanish colonial order to a liberal (in her case, Mexican) nationalism; specifically, the
interruption that indigenous particularity poses for such a transition.110 Through a reading
of Marx’s “On the Jewish Question,” Saldaña-Portillo explains the reordering of cultural
particularities and structural inequalities under liberal nationalism:
The state is not only thus free to ignore these structural differences and
inequities of power [ex. race, wealth], now naturalized as mere accretions
of private cultural differences and chance, but is required to do so. To
consider the structural reasons for a discriminatory effect of such
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The Spanish reads: La flaqueza humana ha acogido siempre con una tímida credulidad
semejantes profecías pero ¡desgraciado el pueblo que se deje alucinar por los que intenten sacar
partido de ellas! (8).
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For a recent study on this topic, in addition to the work of scholars I’ve synthesized in the
introduction, see Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Durham: Duke UP, 2015).
110
In contrast to Saldaña-Portillo, I do not locate the emergence of liberal nationalism within any
instance of national independence. As mentioned in this chapter, the 1812 constitution enacted its
own form of “national” liberalism to maintain its colonial holdings.
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differences would be a violation of political emancipation, understood as
the abstraction from one’s differences before the law; to consider the
negative effect of structurally produced differences would violate an
abstract principle of equality and would be tantamount to
discrimination.111
According to Saldaña-Portillo, the indio cannot be easily reconciled with the “abstract
principle of equality” that undergirds the political emancipation that liberalism prescribes.
As I summarized in the introduction to this chapter, the indio names a foundational
political category from which indigenous peoples “also derived concrete rights and
privileges,” and which presented “a powerful challenge to the abstraction of equality and
a breach to Mexican [I argue, Spanish] liberalism.”112 I read Jicoténcal as extending this
challenge. The novel asks us to consider, but does not resolve, the ways in which
indigeneity and other forms of human difference might animate another kind of politics
without erring into a form of foundationalism for schemas of imperialism and
nationalism, whether statist or ethnic. This way of reading the novel suggests that,
indeed, any settlement of human difference—especially in the image of the Indian—is to
preclude a revolutionary striving.
The corruption of Tlascala is explained not only by Cortés's infiltration of the
senate through Magiscatzin, then, but also through Jicoténcal the elder's counsel of
moderation to his son, the general of the Tlascaltecans. At this midway point in the
narrative, Magiscatzin operates as Cortés’s agent in the senate and, through their
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Saldaña-Portillo, Indian Given, 121.
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collaboration, increases the number of “sellouts to the particular interest” (49).113 As a
response to the burgeoning ranks of those who have defected to Magiscatzin's persuasion
and the allure of “the particular interest” [el interés particular]—implying a “selfinterest” in conflict with the well-being of the patria—the senator Jicoténcal advises an
indirect counter-strategy, one that bides time until a proper moment of attack can be
discerned:114
In the meantime, let us stay alert to attack the patricidal faction in their
first moment of weakness; let us accord with [contemporicemos] the
respect that they still comport towards public decorum; let us gently
complain of their affronts, supposing them isolated deeds, without
accusing them of their motivations… and if, as I think, the foreigners
intend to invade Motezuma's States, we shall offer them an auxiliary army
with which we will assist them, if they are faithful to their treaties, or they
shall be vanquished, if they falter in them. (49) 115
As a direct counsel from the senior senator to the general, Jicoténcal the elder
“recommends” to the younger, above all, “moderation, and that you do not allow yourself
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The Spanish reads: “…vendidos al interés particular” (49).
The patria signifies the place of one’s birth, a homeland. For an elaboration on the meaning
and etymology of patria during the Spanish American wars of independence, see Coronado,
“Anxiously Desiring the Nation” in A World Not to Come pp. 37-74.
115
The Spanish reads: “En el ínterin, estemos alerta para atacar la facción patricida en el primer
momento de flaqueza; contemporicemos con el respeto que aparentan todavía al decoro público;
quejémonos con dulzura de los atentados, suponiendolos hechos particulares, sin acusar de ellos a
sus valedores… y si, como yo pienso, los extranjeros intentan penetrar en los Estados de
Motezuma, les ofreceremos un ejército auxiliar con el que les ayudaremos, si son fieles a sus
tratados, o los batiremos, si nos faltan a ellos” (49).
114
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to be swept by your fiery passions, and that you become lost, and along with you, the
well-being of our patria is lost” (50).116
Yet this resolution to watch and wait for the opposing party's moment of weakness
quickly slips into a form of unwitting collusion with Hernán Cortés and the violence of
conquest. In the indigenous senator's extreme effort to maintain the balance of power
between those who remain “under the banner of the patria” and its enemies, his language
of deferral and discernment, of placation and conservation, risks granting to Cortés a
sovereign power to wage war in Tlascala’s name—in addition to the rhetorical power he
already wields in the senate through Magiscatzin. The decisive moment of attack is
delayed until the Tlascaltecan army is brought to the brink of surrender or delegation to
Cortés; it is a gamble on whether the Tlascaltecans' desired aims to oust Motezuma can
coincide with Cortés's ambitions. This political wager, which teeters between abetting the
conquest or frustrating it, plays on the verb the elder Jicoténcal uses in relation to the
behavior of unruly senators: contemporizar (95).117 Unlike the English sense of to
“contemporize,” or to synchronize, the Spanish contemporizar moves from an act of
synchrony to a teleological movement; it means to “accommodate to a foreign opinion or
decree for some particular end.”118 The senator’s strategy against Cortés cannot be
thought apart from his desire for political equilibrium, which slips into complicity with
the conquest and becomes yet another iteration of “the particular interest.” To overthrow
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The Spanish reads: “Lo que más recomiendo, hijo mío, es la moderación y que no te dejes
arrastrar de tu fogosdad y te pierdas, y contigo se pierda la salud de nuestra patria.”
117
The term “contemporizar” appears in the opening to the fifth book. The full passage in Spanish
reads: “La pereza, natural al hombre, y el temor de desprenderse de las cosas que se aman
demasiado, son siempre los consejeros de esas medidas de conteporización que dan
infaliblemente la victoria a los perversos, cuya fuerza se funda en la osadía y en la constancia.”
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RAE. The Spanish reads: “… acomodarse al gusto o dictamen ajeno por algún respeto o fin
particular” (RAE).
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one, perhaps more familiar embodiment of absolutism (Motezuma), the senator embraces
another (Cortés).
Jicoténcal the younger inherits and enacts the kinds of liberal violences
engendered by his father’s interpretation of Tlascala's political emancipation from Cortés.
The Tlascaltecan general demonstrates such a profound blindness to various forms of
contingency and particularity, that this way of seeing and reading also structures the third
book’s didactic maxim. Each “book” in the novel begins with such a maxim or thesis,
which the allegorical characters prove in their ensuing actions, arguments, and
entanglements. This maxim reads: “All nations have had times of glory and degradation,
and sometimes they have passed over from one to the other of these extremes in such
rapid succession that to turn over a single page from its history, it appears to the reader
that another century and another pueblo is being spoken of” (49).119 These words presage
not only an allegorical and temporal ambiguity—between the conquest and
contemporaneous political unrest—but also the collapse of distinctions among several
characters whose oscillating “passions” become confused in the novel’s romantic subplot.
Jicoténcal becomes unable to differentiate between Doña Marina and Teutila as
the proper object of his romantic affection. Until the end of the narrative, the former is
portrayed as morally lax and manipulative, a confidante to Cortés who occasionally flouts
his commands to act on her own whims. By contrast, the latter represents a feminized
virtue for an América under siege, who resists being tarnished and raped by the arbitrary
power that Cortés wields over her. The romantic entanglements of this third book
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The Spanish reads: “Todas las naciones han tenido épocas de Gloria y de envilecimiento, y
algunas veces han pasado de uno a otro de estos extremos con tanta rapidez que al volver una
página de su historia le parece al lector que se le habla de otro siglo y de otro pueblo” (49).
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resonate with the early sentimental literature of the U.S. republic, which often represent
an ensnaring network of misinterpreted passions that the characters act upon in untimely
and ultimately tragic fashion.120 The younger Jicoténcal’s recalcitrant, “particular”
passion performs an abstraction of another kind, one that subtends the formal and abstract
equality of republican citizenship. After Cortés denies Jicoténcal permission to visit
Teutila in her prison, he finds himself in conversation with Doña Marina. She introduces
herself a defenseless slave, which provokes the following exclamation from Jicoténcal in
free indirect discourse: “A woman who, in her slavery, knows and loves virtue! What a
noble and grand object for Jicoténcal’s compassion! In a word: without losing his love for
Teutila, he fell in love with the graces that Doña Marina had embellished in her dealings
with the Europeans, and speaking with her about the other [Teutila], he expanded his
passion towards them both” (53).121 By indulging in his particularized passion that
violates his father’s law of moderation, Jicoténcal swiftly collapses Teutila’s and Doña
Marina's characters through a single condition: their figural slavery, which he does not
discern as an element of a gendered and racialized hierarchy, but as a flattened,
sentimental figure of the virtuous damsel in distress. To put it more precisely, Jicoténcal’s
sentimental language replicates a mode of racial and gendered violence that does without
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Examples of early U.S. sentimental literature include The Power of Sympathy (1789), The
Coquette (1797), and Charlotte Temple (1791), among others. As Carla Mulford writes in a
critical introduction to The Power of Sympathy and The Coquette, “If republican principles were
to succeed… they needed to be inculcated not only at the level of government but also within the
culture as a whole,” from the feminized private sphere to the public domain (xvi). See Carla
Mumford, “Introduction,” The Power of Sympathy and The Coquette (New York: Penguin Books,
1996).
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The Spanish reads: “Una mujer que, en su esclavitud, conoce y ama las virtudes! ¡Qué objeto
tan noble y tan grande para la compasión de Jicoténcal! [….] En una palabra: sin dejar de amar a
su Teutila, se enamoró de las gracias con que doña Marina se había embellecido en su trato con
los europeos, y hablando con ésta de la otra, se explayaba su pasión a las dos.”
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the coercive recognitions of humanity that Saidiya Hartman analyzes in Scenes of
Subjection.122 Here, the relationship is one of an objectifying compassion, although
Jicoténcal is in turn being seduced by Doña Marina, which undermines the presumed
power relation. Along the third book’s circuit of confused passions, Jicoténcal’s character
is also nearly overwritten by Diego de Ordaz, who falls in love with Teutila.
In a clash between his personal and public roles, as Teutila’s lover and the general
of Tlascala, Jicoténcal disavows his “particular” passion for Teutila because of her status
as a foreigner and a slave. Before the joint expedition departs for Aztec lands, Teutila
flees from Cortés's grip to Jicoténcal's arms, which brings the fraught alliance between
the Spanish and the Tlascaltecans to the brink of war. Following through on his father's
counsels, however, Jicoténcal addresses those under his command and resolves upon
absolute inaction:
Tlasaltecans! Calmly hold your formation. This innocent victim, by
misfortune, is not from our nation, and Tlascala has not given us arms to
protect her. The voice of the patria is the only one that the republican
soldier should hear, and to the patria it matters little whether noble or base,
virtuous or criminal, is the passion that is sacrificed to its interests. May
your valor aspire to hear this voice, and may it be known that you are as
subordinate as you are valiant. (69)123
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Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 5.
The Spanish reads: ¡Tlascaltecas! Guardad vuestra formación con serenidad. Esta inocente
víctima, por desgracia, no es de nuestra nación, y Tlascala no nos ha dado las armas para
defenderla. La voz de la patria es la sola que debe oír el soldado republicano, y a la patria le
importa poco que sea noble o baja, virtuosa o criminal, la pasión a que se sacrifiquen sus
intereses. Que vuestro valor espere oír esta voz, y que se conozca que sois tan subordinados como
valientes.
123
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This inaction nonetheless enacts the exclusions of a formal and abstract nationalism, as
Jicoténcal abandons Teutila outside the boundaries of the patria. This attests to the
entanglements of allegiance and belonging that structure much of the novel, where the
Tlascala being fought over is sometimes imagined as a liberal, republican institution, or
an interconnected political entity whose synecdochic relationship to the whole of the
Americas potentially countermands a stable, nationalist liberalism. The “voice of the
patria” being spoken of here succumbs to the liberal and institutionalized understanding
of Tlascala, and so Jicoténcal must abjure all appearances of individuation and
particularity. His personal passion is sacrificed to the patria while Teutila's enslavement
cannot register as a violation of justice. Her slavery is rerouted as a sentimental trope for
an appeal to Cortés: “This very tlascaltecan who knows how to sacrifice his passions to
his public duties, pleas and asks for the liberty of that unhappy and innocent creature
whose slavery taints your splendors” (69).124 Yet this might have been the particular
passion to act upon, one that contravenes rather than colludes with Cortés, and works to
counteract the maintenance of racialized slavery, gendered differences and oppressions,
and bordered modes of belonging.125 Here, we might return to a question Jicoténcal once
poses to Doña Marina: “Are you still americana?” (53).126 If roles were reversed by the
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The Spanish reads: “…este mismo tlascalteca que sabe sacrificar así sus pasiones a sus deberes
públicos te suplica y te pide la libertad de esta infeliz e inocente criatura cuya esclavitud oscurece
tus glorias.”
125
Although all the characters in Jicoténcal are either indigenous or Spanish, Teutila’s slavery
and Doña Marina’s coercions evoke the unsettled question of slavery in the emergent Spanish
American states. This anxiety can be traced back to the 1812 Constitution, in which slaves and
the majority of the free black population did not count as “Spaniards,” while indigenous peoples
did.
126
The full passage in Spanish reads: “—¿Eres—le dijo él—todavía americana? ¿Arde aún en tu
pecho la llama del amor patrio, o bien te han corrompido y contaminado las artes mágicas de esos
hombres que trastornan todas las ideas de lo justo y de lo injusto, de lo bueno y de lo malo?
Respóndeme con franqueza” (53).
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end of this decisive scene, it might have dawned on Jicoténcal that to be a “republican
soldier” is to apostatize from a more promising, open-ended sense of americanidad.
III. Jicoténcal: An Errant Reimagination of the Conquests
The novel’s proleptic critique of modern republicanism and Spanish liberalism
also takes aim at U.S. national complicity in the legacies of the conquest. This critique
comes about through the novel’s “errancy,” a term that Kirsten Silva-Gruesz uses to
unsettle paradigmatic classifications for figures of Latinidad.127 Unlike other
classifications for Latinx cultural production, such as the ‘native,’ the ‘immigrant,’ and
the ‘exile,’ the figure of the ‘errant’ is characterized by a certain lack of intentionality and
teleological purpose. Summarizing its significance for deconstructive approaches to texts,
Silva-Gruesz writes that “the poetic or prophetic word that hopes to make itself heard
through the dead shell of language’s conventions must get to the truth waywardly, from
the margins.”128 Errancy is also “the name for a movement that has no idea where it is
headed,” and which is particularly reactive to the present.129 Such “errancy” not only
characterizes the Spanish novel’s anonymity and print circulation in the birthplace of U.S.
republicanism—the errancies of its material production and its circulation—but also its
reckoning with the ruins of the Spanish conquest in a time of political unrest and
potential. Jicoténcal, then, prompts us to rethink the movements and engagements of
errancy beyond the figure of the solitary wanderer and toward Latinx imaginaries that not
only run adrift from conventional teleologies of revolution that resolve in the nation state,
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but also the spatiotemporal boundaries that keep separate the conquests of empires,
republics, and the inchoate political formations between.
To be sure, there are many culturally specific variations in Latinx studies for
modes of nonteleological movement and critique. In The Borders of Dominicanidad
(2016), Lorgia García-Peña reminds us of a lexical array for Latinx spaces and conditions
of “dual marginality,” of the “neither here nor there.”130 Across a selection of Dominican,
Tejana, Puerto Rican, and Cuban modes of alterity we encounter such phrases and
figures: “El Nié” (Josefina Báez), “living on barbwire” (Gloría Anzaldúa), “La guagua
aérea [the flying bus]” (Luis Rafael Sánchez), and “living on the hyphen” (Gustavo Pérez
Firmat).131 García-Peña finds that among these, “Báez’s El Nié… queers both the
hegemonic narrative of the nation-state(s) and the very location of in-betweenness” that
the other thinkers emphasize, where the in-between often supposes a stable opposition on
either side.132 (4).
While my own analysis of Jicoténcal also runs against the trappings of “inbetweenness,” especially where U.S. and Spanish American settler colonial legacies are
concerned, I conclude not to evaluate the critical capacity of these concept metaphors
against one another, but rather to briefly reflect on what brings them into relation. Each of
these figures and lexicons provide their own critical affordance for imagining the
waywardness, the “neither here nor there” of Latinidad. What word or turn of phrase
might Jicoténcal offer for such wayward paths and insights? I return to the range of
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responses, possible and impossible alike, to the condition and question that Jicoténcal
poses to Doña Marina: “Are you still americana?” For Spanish Americans in Filadelfia,
and the anonymous author(s) of Jicoténcal, it seems likely that a notion of americanidad
was one of the few concepts available to express a “neither here nor there” situation, an
idea beyond regional fidelity, a form of political association and social belonging yet to
come. Today, perhaps, our sense of americanidad signals not only a “neither here nor
there,” or a potentially revolutionary anticipation, but also a constellation of movements,
interstices, and distinctions among imaginaries and histories characterized by the hyphen,
the barbwire, “El Nié,” “la guagua aérea,” and others.
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Chapter 2
Recoding Spanish-American Alterity:
U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence and the Arts of Neutrality
Hemispheric studies scholarship often tells the story of inter-American relation in
two phases: the first as an idyll of anti-colonial commonality against European empires
and the second as a lapsarian decline of transamerican republicanism into U.S.
dispossessions of the hemispheric South.133 Given this chronology, the 1810’s and 1820’s
in particular manifest the optimism of what Anna Brickhouse calls in Transamerican
Literary Relations and the Nineteenth-Century Public Sphere (2004) “the enthusiasm for
inter-American revolutionary solidarity.”134 Anglo-American audiences of early literary
journals such as the North American Review imbibed a fount of “articles on the history of
colonial Spanish Florida and Mexico; essays covering Alexander von Humboldt’s
writings about Latin America, US Minister to Mexico Joel R. Poinsett’s Notes on Mexico,
and the Ecuadorian writer Vicente Rocafuerte’s Ensayo político, published in New
York,” among others, in an effort to make sense of their hemispheric counterparts in the
contested Spanish colonies.135 But this chronology occludes co-existing narratives of
transamerican unease and antipathy that predate the putatively optimistic 1820’s. For
example, The History of Don Francisco de Miranda’s Attempt to Effect a Revolution in
South America, in a series of letters (1808) by U.S. officer James Biggs recounts an early
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and failed attempt to light the torch of independence in Caracas, then a part of the
Spanish colonial Viceroyalty of New Granada.136 Francisco de Miranda communicated to
Thomas Jefferson and the Secretary of State indications of his revolutionary intention;
organized the expedition from New York; and recruited U.S. citizens in the effort. But in
its failure, the expedition violated the official stance of U.S. neutrality and risked
bringing the wrath of Spain on the United States.137 In an attempt to distance himself
from his role in the failed expedition and its legal consequences, Biggs slanders
Miranda’s character when he writes, “It may be questioned, however, whether his failure
should not be ascribed more to his own mistakes and perversity than to his want of
force.”138
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Nancy Vogeley remarks, in The Bookrunner, “Biggs’s work was so popular that re-editions
followed in 1809, 1811, 1812, and 1819” (45). Other narratives published from the perspective of
U.S. citizen participants in the Miranda expedition include: Moses Smith, History of the
adventures and sufferings of Moses Smith (1814); John Edsall, Incidents in the Life of John
Edsall (1831).
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Miranda’s was the first among many South American filibustering expeditions that sought to
take advantage of the currents of political change. For a helpful summary of the Miranda
expedition, see the archivist’s note in “Thomas Jefferson to Valentín de Foronda, 4 October
1809,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019. The note reads: “The
expedition of Francisco de Miranda, the renowned Latin American revolutionary, sailed from
New York on 2 Feb. 1806 in the Leander, an American ship fitted out in New York and manned
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Venezuelan general in an anticolonial strategy guided by the maxim of “coupé tetes, brulé cazes”
(cut off heads and burn houses).
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A precursor to the widespread independence movements in 1808, Francisco de
Miranda’s failed expedition stages the impossibility of U.S. noninterference in the
hemispheric South. According to Andy Doolen in Territories of Empire: U.S. Writing
from the Louisiana Purchase to Mexican Independence (2014), U.S. officials and citizens
turned to neutrality as a strategy in the age of republican empire characterized by an
avowed loathing “to engage in territorial conquest and military intervention.”139 Doolen
demonstrates how techniques of neutrality “produced a distinctive, if often covert,
interplay between state and nonstate power: while private citizens violated neutrality laws
in taking advantage of political and commercial opportunities in the Spanish colonies, the
United States was also learning how to exploit the vicissitudes of neutrality.”140 For
Doolen, the period of the Spanish-American independence movements marks an
important flashpoint for retooling practices of neutrality in ways that allow the U.S. to
exert territorial control in the hemispheric South and maintain “plausible deniability”
under accusatory fire from European powers at the same time. Neutrality, then, manages
the slippage between state and nonstate powers as a set of governing discourses and
protocols. The concept also defines a key feature of early U.S. republicanism as it tested
the limits of Old World imperial power and the capacities of its own imperial designs,
resulting in a distinctly “republican” modality of empire.
The dynamics of neutrality in early America bring into focus current critical
theories for hemispheric connection and entanglement. As we recall from the
dissertation’s introduction, “entangled” methods for interpreting transamerican literary,
cultural, and political networks offer alternatives “to comparative method, [focusing] on
139
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tracing intertwined influences and relationships” that refuse to reproduce the dominance
of, typically, Anglo- and U.S.-centric narrations about “economic relations, technological
exchanges, transculturation, and language interactions.”141 For example, in “On the
Borders of Independence,” literary scholar Emily García identifies a reciprocal
relationship in “how Latin American interests were dependent on the United States and
the ways in which the U.S. national imaginary was dependent on Latin American
independence for its own development in the early nineteenth-century.”142 In other
words, García suggests a framework for understanding the political, literary, and cultural
productions of the early Americas through continuities of anti-colonial independence
movements and political thought across the hemisphere. Rather than ask how the
Spanish-American independence movements are discontinuous with, or failed in
comparison to, the monumental cast of 1776, her essay explores a different set of
questions. How do the freedoms associated with U.S. independence depend on the
independence struggles in Spanish America for their perceived fulfillment? Put another
way, how does Spanish-American political irresolution renew the promise of revolution
foreclosed in the United States since its establishment of governing institutions and
written constitutional codes? Along this line of inquiry, García emphasizes Spanish141
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American contexts of independence “because it reverses the relationship of dependency
as typically regarded in the hemisphere: Mutual imbrication challenges the idea that Latin
American states simply modeled themselves on the United States.”143 The model of
analysis that stages Spanish-American mimicry of North American revolutions is
dismissed in favor of “mutual imbrication” between those independence struggles.
In this opening chapter, I also attend to forms of transamerican entanglement
between the U.S. and Spanish America, although I stress the asymmetrical relationships
that subtend hemispheric independence over forms of mutual dependence. The “mutual
imbrication” that interests García or the “vicissitudes of neutrality” that shape Doolen’s
study of U.S. republican empire both entail ideas of hemispheric interdependence that
reproduce U.S. ideological and material investments in republicanism, the state, or
individual profiteering and upward mobility. Even as these concepts for transamerican
interdependence—in either terms of “mutual imbrication” or “neutrality”—allow early
American scholars to examine reversals in the typical narrative of U.S. exceptionalism,
U.S. officials and citizens nonetheless manipulate Spanish-American political upheavals
for the fulfillment of their desired ends, within or beyond the sanction of the state. In this
chapter, I want to think less in terms of U.S. citizens’ or the state’s profitable dependency
on the Spanish-American independence movements. Instead, I read U.S. diplomatic
correspondence to think through the ways in which the irregularities imputed to the
Spanish-American independence movements are imagined to spill over, or rend apart, the
presumed coherence of U.S. sovereignty. To put it another way, this chapter attends to
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the frustration, rather than advancement, of official and private U.S. interests in South
American revolutions.
Diplomatic correspondence conducted across a succession of U.S. officials—
primarily from the office of the Secretary of State—forms the basis of this chapter’s
archive.144 Taken together, this chapter’s epistolary archive spans four tenures in the
office of Secretary of State including those of Robert Smith (1809 - 1811 under James
Madison), James Monroe (1811 - 1817 under James Madison), Richard Rush (ad interim,
March 10, 1817 - September 12, 1817 under James Monroe), and John Quincy Adams
(1817 - 1825 under James Monroe). Attention to the form and context of these diplomatic
missives illuminates an important turning point in the production and politics of
hemispheric knowledges during the unfolding wars of independence in the hemispheric
South. My analysis of U.S. diplomatic correspondence borrows from the reading methods
Ann Laura Stoler calls for in “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” where in
order to apprehend the fine-grained imaginaries of non-traditional archival texts “our
readings need to move in new ways through archives both along their fault lines as much
as against their grain.”145 In the scholarly conversations of colonial archives that
primarily interest Stoler, she summarizes that they “all converge on questions about rules
of reliability and trust, criteria of credence, and what moral projects and political
predictabilities are served by these conventions and categories… what [produces]
qualified knowledges that, in turn, disqualified other ways of knowing, other

144

All citations of U.S. diplomatic correspondence in this chapter are from the compilation by
William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the
Independence of Latin-American Nations (1925) unless noted otherwise. Citations of the
diplomatic correspondence will appear in-text.
145
Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” 109.

95
knowledges.”146 But the diplomatic correspondences from the Secretary of State are not,
exactly, coterminous with the knowledge-making protocols of traditional European
colonial archives. Instead, the official correspondences pertaining to the early national
United States tirelessly insist on what officials need or desire to know about the
anticolonial upheavals in Spanish America. At the same time, these letters strategically
avoid the creative production of knowledge about those proximate political upheavals.
Instead, official U.S. correspondence reiterates the recurring illegibility of SpanishAmerican society and its shifting political formations; accordingly, the discourse the
correspondence generates operates less through a politics of knowledge production than
through a politics of willful unknowing. U.S. diplomatic correspondences work to
encode—rather than elucidate—the sociopolitical conditions and relations in Spanish
America.
U.S. officials deemed Spanish-American political wills to be illegible in private
correspondence with special agents dispatched to the revolutionary South Americas. By
the “political will” of Spanish Americans, I refer to a set of ongoing, mutable, and
therefore unresolved questions about possible sociopolitical forms, foreign relationships,
and internal arrangements of the independence movements in the Spanish colonies.
Anglo-American constructions of Spanish-Americans’ illegible political wills, I argue,
also exposed the early U.S. republic’s vulnerability to the hemisphere’s unpredictable
upheavals as much as those illegible political wills created pretenses for intrusive acts for
U.S. republican empire. U.S. officials negotiated the imagined risks and payoffs of
interacting with the Spanish-American revolutions through untenable declarations of
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diplomatic neutrality between Old World European investments in the conflict and the
anti-colonial causes of Spanish-American insurgents. Instead, this chapter reads
successive versions of the correspondence’s construction of neutrality into a volatile
exercise of imperial desire—as miscalculations of risk and advantage—where the
interaction between formal state policy and informal powers shores up the defective
fictions of U.S. sovereignty.
The first section examines the ways in which U.S. officials interpret the initial
outbreak of the Spanish-American revolutions in their diplomatic correspondence by
rereading histories of revolution and imperial rule in the Americas for precedent. Namely,
officials anticipated a matrix of political hazards and advantages through the entwined
legacies of the Haitian Revolution and the contested Spanish-British imperial claims to
West and East Florida. Both of these precedents, I argue, make impossible—from the
perspective of Anglo-American officials—a reading of the Spanish-American revolutions
as a set of proximate and immediate political expressions. Rather, U.S. officials
misapprehend the emergent revolutions of the hemispheric South as an ongoing conflict
between Old World empires that beset the interests of the early republic, and which U.S.
officials must find ways to counteract.
The second section close-reads instructions by various Secretaries of State to U.S.
agents when the Spanish-American upheavals inevitably confront government officials
with profound rearrangements of hemispheric relationships and imaginaries. I examine
successive revisions in U.S. arts of neutrality—defined here as a set of discursive
imaginaries and transamerican relations—that render the Monroe Doctrine’s imperial
instantiations unexceptional. In this analysis of neutrality, I depart from Doolen’s
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analysis, which discerns an advantageous synchronicity between state and nonstate
powers for U.S. interests. Instead, I focus on a series of asymmetrical South-to-North
political entanglements that transgress the desired terms of U.S. neutrality and ultimately
confound the imagined coherence of U.S. sovereignty. In the chapter’s conclusion,
Washington-based political projections onto the Spanish Americas give way to an
anonymous, pro-independence pamphlet published in Philadelphia in 1812 that responds
to theories of revolutionary failure in Spanish-America; in doing so, the pamphlet sheds
light on the impasses of racial difference unique to Spanish-American societies.
I. The Cases of St. Domingo and the Two Floridas
In the earliest diplomatic correspondence concerning the independence
movements in the Spanish colonies, U.S. officials assess their initial relationship to the
conflict based on what U.S. Secretary of State Robert Smith calls “the case of St.
Domingo” (3). Through the precedent of “St. Domingo”—or in other words, the prior
unfoldings of the Haitian Revolution—officials of the early republic learned that
revolutionary turmoil elsewhere in the hemisphere subjected the U.S. to the injunctions of
established imperial powers, primarily those of Britain and France (in this case, French
authority is somewhat interchangeable with that of Spain, since Napoleon invaded Spain
and controlled the Spanish throne in 1808). In the epistolary chronology of U.S.
communications about the Spanish Americas, the very first letter from Secretary of State
Robert Smith to the United States Minister to France, General John Armstrong, cites the
Haitian Revolution in order to recall that the French forbade the U.S. from continuing
trade relations with Haiti under Toussaint’s increasingly independent authority.
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Recently, scholars of early American literature have complicated prevailing
representations of the Haitian revolution as a spectral threat to southern slaveholding
power. Such representations attempt to quarantine the circulation of Haitian revolutionary
imaginaries, which Anglo-Americans considered to be potential incitements to racial
anarchy. Rather, as Elizabeth Maddock Dillon and Michael J. Drexler point out, during
the Adams administration, “trade between the United States and St. Domingue reached
new heights as U.S. merchants supplied Toussaint with both foodstuffs and armaments”
culminating in a bill of 1799 that “included language known as ‘Toussaint’s Clause,’
authorizing the United States to trade and conduct independent diplomatic relations with
Toussaint, despite an embargo against doing so with the French.”147 Based on the
precedent of the Haitian Revolution and Toussaint’s Clause, U.S. officials at the outset
translate the political complications of an insurgent Spanish America through Haitian
precedents. Past and emergent revolutionary events in the hemisphere alike required a
careful balancing act that safeguarded U.S. interests often against the desires and
directives of longstanding imperial powers.
Smith’s letters addressed to the U.S. Ministers to France (John Armstrong) and
Great Britain (William Pinkney) consider the revolutions in Spanish America as
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recreating potential complications for the U.S. On June 13, 1810, Smith alerts Pinkney
that “according to present appearances a crisis is approaching which cannot fail to
dissolve the Colonial relation of Spanish America to their parent Country” (5). The
advent of a Spanish-American crisis demands that officials anticipate proposed
restrictions from Spanish authorities detrimental to U.S. trade and sovereignty as well as
strategies to circumvent those restrictions, given the precedent of Toussaint’s Clause.
Across the early communications about the Spanish-American revolutions, defining
political complications evolve over two questions. Initially, in 1809 and early 1810’s, the
correspondence lingers over whether the French (in power at the Spanish throne) will
forbid U.S. trade with the colonies in Spanish America like they once impeded economic
exchanges with Saint-Domingue in the midst of the Haitian Revolution. In the mid1810s, U.S. officials begin to wonder, will Britain assail “the two Floridas in whose
destiny [the U.S.] have so near an interest” (5)? The Haitian precedent of trade blockades
gives way to new Spanish-American conditions for an acute territorial problem in the
Floridas. Undeniably, the Secretary of State perceives the advent of Spanish-American
crisis in terms of transatlantic imperial relationships rather than as an explicitly
hemispheric cause, problem, or bond between the North and South Americas. During the
earliest communications about the upheavals in South American colonies, the political
will of Spanish-Americans register secondarily to U.S. diplomatic calculations of
European imperial powers and interests.
The beginnings of anti-colonial unrest in Spanish America intensify a territorial
dispute over the Floridas that shore up potential deficiencies in U.S. sovereignty, bringing
into question its continued independence. Ongoing, inter-imperial disputes over West and
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East Florida emerge in this archive of diplomatic correspondence as key sites for the
rearrangement of political relations impelled by the anti-colonial revolutions in South
America. On November 2, 1810, Secretary of State Robert Smith alerts the U.S. Minister
to France about “a great uncertainty prevailing with respect to the shape which affairs in
that quarter might assume if left to the uncontrouled current of a revolutionary impulse”
(8, emphasis mine). The “great uncertainty” Smith imputes to the revolutions in the
Spanish colonies provided a justification for encroachments of U.S presence in West
Florida; Smith explains this occupation to be “merely a change of possession and not a
change of right,” although he does not distinguish between the two terms in the letter
itself (8). Since the political uncertainties of the revolutions portend “a change of the old
established polity [of imperial Spain],” Anglo-American officials such as Smith seek to
circumvent similar fluctuations in what they deem, on behalf of the nation-state, to be
“our own immediate neighborhood” (8). Despite the omission of a distinction between a
change of “possession” and a change of “right” in West Florida, Smith suggests that the
impetus of necessity directs the act of occupation. As far as one can tell, the source and
the consequence of the “change” is the same. This indistinction suggests that future
occupations may also represent “the natural consequence of a state of things, which the
American Government could neither foresee nor prevent” (8). Finally, this act of illdefined possession becomes a territorial analogue to the French trade embargo that
Toussaint’s Clause circumvented in the prior context of the Haitian revolution.
But the unknowability of political futures in Spanish America generally and in the
Floridas specifically could also counteract U.S. interests as well as the imagined integrity
of its independence. This “uncontrouled current of a revolutionary impulse”—the
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imminent spillover of Spanish-American insurgency—prefigures and encodes the shared
incoherence, susceptibility, and porousness of U.S. sovereignty to upheavals in the
hemisphere. The enduring and proximate conflicts in Spanish America test the
boundaries of the U.S. nation state against its Old World rivals and reinitiate the looming
threat of reconquest by Britain. On December 10, 1815, the succeeding Secretary of State
James Monroe warns the U.S. Minister to Great Britain about the expansive and
multifocal implications of Britain’s potential acquisition of the Floridas through a
possible Spanish cession of East Florida.148 He produces an imagined cartography of
political threat in the littoral zones of the United States. British possession of East
Florida, he argues, would be tantamount to an armed invasion conducted “to
Philadelphia, or to Charlestown, as to New Orleans, or to any portion of Louisiana
Westward of the Perdido, knowing as it does the just title of the United States to that
Limit” (17). The rhetorical interchangeability of each city, region, and territory functions
in the correspondence as a way to restitch the union’s cities and territories together in
spite of the threat of its disintegration. Monroe clarifies the status of East-Florida in
British hands not only as a warlike possession of land, but as a dangerous port of entry
for further imperial disruption:
East-Florida in itself is comparatively nothing; but as a post, in the hands
of Great-Britain, it is of the highest importance. Commanding the Gulph
of Mexico, and all its waters, including the Mississippi with its branches,
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and the streams emptying into the Mobile, a vast proportion of the most
fertile and productive parts of this Union, on which the navigation and
commerce so essentially depend, would be subject to its annoyance, not to
mention its influence on the Creeks and other neighbouring Indians. (17)
Spanish American insurgency conditions new possibilities for the Union’s old colonial
rulers—the British—to renew warring hostilities with a catastrophic hemispheric reach
that would renew the troubles of the War of 1812 and before that, the initial contest for
Anglo-American independence. The turmoil of the South threatens to rend apart the
independence of the United States not only by empowering its former imperial relation,
but also by furnishing its racialized and colonized populations—“the Creeks and other
neighbouring Indians”—with opportunities to strike back against the current U.S. settler
colonial order. These settler colonial fears of indigenous-led revolution also had
antecedents; an alliance of free black peoples and Seminoles routed a previous attempt by
Anglo-Americans to transform East Florida into an Anglo-American colony in 1813.149
This cartography of Old World, inter-imperial threat ultimately offers a genealogy
for the geopolitical sensibility of hemispheric of commonality later developed in
Monroe’s Seventh Annual Address. When Monroe warns European empires in 1823 that
the United States “should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” past French imperatives
during the Haitian Revolution and potential British invasions through the contested
Floridas suture together the geographic determinism of “this hemisphere.”150 Although
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the Old World’s monarchical “system” was well-known to U.S. officials, and deemed
incompatible with the Americas, how would U.S. officials glean insight into the emergent
political arrangements in Spanish America?
II. “The destiny of those provinces must depend on themselves”
Early national U.S. officials sought to convince the world that the United States
could maintain a secure foothold on neutral ground amidst the ongoing hemispheric
revolutions in the Southern Americas. To do so, U.S. officials rewrote and revised the
concept of neutrality itself in their diplomatic correspondence in order to assert control
over precarious U.S. territories and interests as well as to manage the unknown
sociopolitical arrangements in the hemispheric South in the state’s favor. In what follows,
I read a span of diplomatic correspondence across nearly a decade and four secretaries of
state in order to reassess scholarly consensus in early American literary studies
concerning robust forms of republican empire that, as early as the decade of the 1810s,
could successfully exert forms of what political scientists call “soft power,” which LatinAmerican historian Greg Grandin defines as “the spread of America’s authority through
non-military means, through commerce, cultural exchange, and multilateral
cooperation.”151 Rather, I elaborate ways in which U.S. officials construct artful policies
of neutrality that insist on keeping the Spanish Americas an unknowable sociopolitical
quantity in order to better exploit it in the future tense; but this diplomatic calculation
continually unraveled against official statist designs and private citizens’ aspirations for
profit. Caught between the wide-ranging, unpredictable, immediate effects of political
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upheaval in the South Americas and the zealous apprehensions of imperial Spain, the
presumed prowess of the early United States became subject to, on the one hand,
Spanish-American insurgent maneuvers in collusion with nonstate actors and resources,
and on the other, the confinement of its subjects in the dungeons of imperial Spain.
Together, the counteractions of revolution in Spanish America devolved and co-opted—
in undesirable ways for U.S. officials—their own arts of neutrality.
When the willful factions of Spanish-American independence come into
diplomatic view of U.S. officials, they pose a significant problem for political
interpretation and recognition. As unknown sociopolitical possibilities, the independence
movements of the South motivate official U.S. planning of unprecedented intelligence
projects in South America that double as a performances of transamerican commonality.
On June 28, 1810, Secretary of State Robert Smith writes to Joel Roberts Poinsett, the
appointed special agent of the United States to South America, with an array of directives
that advance contradictory interests. The U.S. must present itself with “neutral character
and honest policy” to the independence factions in the colonies; at the same time,
Poinsett ought “to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good
will towards the people of Spanish America as neighbors, as belonging to the same
portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse”
(6). Smith’s letter repeats the idea of geographic and neighborly mutuality as he asks
Poinsett to ventriloquize the priority of “friendly relations,” “liberal intercourse,”
“common interest,” and “a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice,
and good will, which is the only source of happiness for nations” (7). This discourse of
hemispheric mutuality describes an abstract set of “principles and dispositions of the
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United States” that Poinsett must “inculcate” in the minds of revolutionary South
Americans as a tactic to preemptively circumvent the outside imposition of European
interests that would be unfavorable to the nascent Union. In effect, Poinsett must also
decipher whether the nations of Europe have already persuaded anti-colonial SpanishAmericans to favor European interests. U.S. special agents are consequently tasked with
gauging Spanish Americans’ “commercial and other connexions with [Europeans]” that
violate presumed hemispheric commonalities (7). In addition to the acquisition of general
intelligence about the revolutionary provinces, military force, demographics, and
resources, the priority of hemispheric mutuality emerges as a commercial one. At the end
of the letter, Smith writes, “the real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to
explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States, to promote liberal
and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject” (7). In
other words, the agents dispatched to South America—of which Poinsett was only the
first of several—is to transform the independence movements into opportunities for
profitable transactions unencumbered by Spain’s monarchical trade restrictions with
predictable outcomes, or at the very least, manageable risks.
U.S. diplomatic desires to exert control over and extract profit from the
independence movements in Spanish America nonetheless face the impossible challenge
of assessing the political formations taking shape in multiple sites at a distance from
Washington. James Monroe succeeds Robert Smith to the position of Secretary of State
on April 2, 1811, and by extension inherits the project of intelligence-gathering and
interpretation of the revolutions in Spanish America. Monroe appends a copy of the
instructions issued to Poinsett by the previous Secretary of State to a new letter of
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instructions addressed to Alexander Scott, the designated agent to Caracas on May 14,
1812. These official yet covert epistolary instructions become palimpsestic. While the
former Secretary of State’s letter to Poinsett emphasizes the communication of U.S.
pecuniary interests over an understanding of the political imaginaries developing in the
insurgent South American provinces, two years later Monroe flips the priorities. During
Monroe’s tenure, the acquisition of geopolitical knowledges override expressions and
investigations of commercial interests. Deciphering the direction and form of
Venezuelans’ political will informs the basis on which diplomatic and commercial
decisions will be determined:
It will be your duty to make yourself acquainted with the state of the public mind
in the Provinces of Venezuela, and in all the adjoining Provinces of Spain; their
competence to self-government; state of political and other intelligence; their
relations with each other; the spirit which prevails generally among them as to
independence; their disposition towards the United States, towards Old Spain,
England, and France: and, in case of their final dismemberment from the parent
country, what bond will hereafter exist between them; what form it will take; how
many confederations will probably be formed, and what species of internal
government is likely to prevail. (15-16)
This passage demonstrates the extent to which “the state of the public mind” not only in
the “Provinces of Venezuela” but in the whole of the revolutionary Spanish Americas
eludes U.S. officials four years into the conflict. Despite the rhetoric of geopolitical
mutuality—and ultimately, economic “common interest”—that Poinsett was directed to
perform in the region, Monroe’s letter discloses many dimensions of estrangement from
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the material realities and political imaginaries at play in Spanish America. Officials
cannot conceive of Spanish-American sociopolitical relations between “each other” as
well as those relations with contending foreign powers. In particular, Anglo-American
agents have yet to glean Spanish Americans’ relative dispositions “towards the United
States, towards Old Spain, England, and France.” This set of diplomatic instructions
concludes in the future conditional tense, which directs the agent sent to Caracas in an
impossible undertaking: to predict “what species of internal government is likely to
prevail” despite the current vacuum of knowledge. If the present forms of social and
political relation remain in flux and elude the understanding of current authorities, on
what basis can the agent offer predictions for the outcomes of political independence?
The office of the Secretary of State reiterates this desire for predictive knowledge
over the course of the 1810’s, eventually turning that desire into a basis for U.S. intrusion
and the expansion of discretionary powers.152 On April 25, 1817, Secretary of State ad
interim Richard Rush writes to the commander of the United States Frigate Congress,
Charles Morris. Rush directs the naval commander in a dual mission of intrusive
reconnaissance and neutral comportment:
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It is important that this government should possess correct information as to the
progress of the revolutionary movement in the Spanish Colonies, and of its
probable result. It is specially with a view to this object that you will cruise along
the Main, endeavoring to obtain, in every practicable way, all the information that
can be had upon this subject. It is thought best that you should go as far to the east
as Margarita and thence proceed westwardly as far as Carthagena, looking in at
Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, Guayra, and any other ports or places as you coast
along. The design however being to obtain as much and as precise information of
events as may be, comprehending not only the actual posture of the countries in
that quarter in relation to Spain but their known or probable dispositions, you will
not consider yourself as restricted to the highest importance to the above limits or
places. You will be at liberty to deviate from them as your own judgment, acting
upon circumstances and looking to the special object in view, may point out.
Wherever you may touch, you will take care to respect the existing authority, the
United States holding a neutral attitude between Spain and the colonies.
Morris’s maritime agency on behalf of the U.S. bears with it an ambiguous status in
comparison to the more official position of U.S. diplomatic consuls or ministers serving
at the same time in Europe. Here, Rush relies on an informal maritime agent to conduct
the interpretation and mediation of the Spanish-American independence movements on
behalf of the state. For the purposes of gathering “correct information as to the progress
of the revolutionary movement in the Spanish Colonies,” the interim Secretary of State
imagines setting Morris in motion along the Spanish Main, and points out the specific
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sites of “Carthagena, Cumana, Barcelona, Guayra” that open out onto “any other ports or
places” that Morris opts to coast along.
Already the sweep of Morris’s state-sanctioned probe into the revolutionary events
and relations of the Spanish Americas appears unlimited to any particular place. But the
letter continues to convert Morris’s maritime and coastal range—an imagined extension
of U.S. influence—into an inquiry that regards no limitations, neither between contested
polities or between land and sea jurisdictions. Rush empowers Morris with the “liberty to
deviate…as your own judgment, acting upon circumstances and looking to the special
object in view, may point out.” The special object in view here refuses exact definition,
much like the unofficial yet state-directed capacities of the special agent. As long as the
object refers to “the progress of the revolutionary movement in the Spanish colonies, and
of its probable result,” then it refers to an unknowable object from a peripheral AngloAmerican perspective; it is the unstable event of political revolution with unforeseeable
scope.
Rush invokes the “design” and the “special object” of Morris’s mission always in
relation to information as maximal quantity (“as much”) and exactitude (“as precise”) for
the unknown events of Spanish-American revolutions. These emphases on information in
quality and precision in Rush’s letter plays into “against-the-grain” interpretive
assumptions for the archives of colonial states. According to Stoler, reading against the
grain risks leaving “unquestioned the notion that colonial states were first and foremost
information-hungry machines in which power accrued from the massive accumulation of
ever-more knowledge rather than from the quality of it…. It takes as a given that colonial
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statecraft was motivated and fueled by a reductive equation of knowledge to power.”153
Reading along the grain in this archive of republican statecraft, the stakes do not revolve
around the acquisition of information. Instead, the correspondence is interested in
maintaining the stubborn unknowability of “the object”—the revolutionary Spanish
Americas—which expands Morris’s discretionary powers. As long as the SpanishAmerican revolutions remain amorphous and opaque, so too can U.S. special agents
exploit the illegibility of the region for the purposes of Anglo-American statecraft and
republican empire.
The “liberty to deviate” imputed to Morris is uneasily accompanied by another
imperative from the interim Secretary of State, which arrives like an afterthought in the
letter’s sequence of instructions: to “respect the existing authority” and hold “a neutral
attitude.” Morris’s state-sanctioned, unbounded discretion collapses any imagined
distinction between official state and informal non-state powers. While Morris’s mission
attempts to exploit what Doolen calls “the vicissitudes of neutrality,” the idea of
“plausible deniability” that depends on the apparent distinction between the official state
policy of neutrality and the illicit acts of private citizens begins to reveal the fault-lines in
the neutral ground on which the U.S. professes itself to stand. As I will later demonstrate,
these fault-lines along the official discourse of neutrality were apparent on all sides of the
struggle in Spanish America, whether royalist, republican, or otherwise. For a
preliminary example, historian Judith Ewell juxtaposes the earlier 1811 and 1812 visits of
two other special agents, Robert Lowry and Alexander Scott, which were characterized
by similar maritime informalities and unrestricted discretions. Ewell avers that the
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memory of these Anglo-American intrusive liberties lingers in the minds of increasingly
autonomous Spanish-American polities years later, where “in 1819 Venezuelan foreign
minister Juan German Roscio recalled the examples of Scott’s unauthorized entry into a
military zone and the discrepancy over Lowry’s [formal diplomatic] credentials as
examples of Venezuelan gullibility and U.S. duplicity.”154
A recurring feature of the diplomatic communications entails calculated conjectures
for the independence movements’ “known or probable” futures that, in turn, condition the
imperial imagination of U.S. officials. Rhetorically, U.S. diplomatic correspondence
continues to be conducted in the future and future conditionally tenses. In counterpoint to
the probability-oriented projection of U.S. imperial ambitions, diplomatic envoys from
Spanish America in Washington and Philadelphia leverage demands for immediate
recognition as independent polities on behalf of anticolonial governments in Buenos
Aires and Venezuela. Based on Monroe’s December 19, 1811 letter responding to the
Commissioner of Venezuela, Telésforo de Orea, copies of Venezuela’s declaration of
independence were conveyed to U.S. President James Madison, who “had received it
with the interest… so important an event was calculated to excite” (14). This proves to be
a noncommittal interest, however, as the U.S. continues to withhold official recognition.
The agent of Cartagena Manuel Palacio-Fajardo encounters the same frustration, when
Monroe replies in a letter that the “United-States being at peace with Spain cannot take
any step in relation to the contests between the different sections of the Spanish
monarchy, which would be of a character to compromise their neutrality” (16). Monroe
adds, “as inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the government and people of the United-
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States take a lively interest in the prosperity and welfare of their neighbors of SouthAmerica” (16). While U.S. agents’ activities abroad are justified for future-oriented
purposes, Spanish-American claims and demands made in the present meet obstinate
inaction.
According to Ewell’s analysis of Venezuelan agent Orea’s correspondence with
U.S. officials, the Venezuelan commissioner echoes the language of transamerican
reciprocity and mutuality to render legible appeals for recognition of Venezuelan political
independence. One significant way those among the Spanish-American elite understood
themselves to enact this reciprocity involved the aesthetic reproduction of political forms.
For instance, in Orea’s attempts to persuade Anglo-American authorities for concrete
support and recognition of the independence movements, he affirmed that “the peoples of
South America will also follow as far as possible the Constitution of North America.”155
We might therefore rethink characterizations of the Spanish American independence
movements not as failed copies of U.S. political forms and rhetoric but as compelling
strategies of translation that reorient the stakes of political commonality in favor of
anticolonial causes in the hemispheric South. In the Venezuelan Constitution to come as
well as in the extant, circulating declaration of independence Orea shares with U.S.
officials, these documents participate in a formal strategy to persuasively enlist U.S.
support by rendering Venezuela’s independence aspirations in a familiar proclamatory
form likely to call the attention of U.S. officials. This intention is not completely
mistaken. Over the course of various communications, especially by the time John
Quincy Adams assumes the post of Secretary of State, officials’ remembrances of the
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course of U.S. independence become precedents through which to conduct diplomatic
actions; in so doing, Quincy Adams constructs pre-Monroe Doctrine exceptionalisms.156
To be clear, however, the declaratory and constitutional translation of U.S. political forms
that Orea avows does not render Venezuelan political arrangements transparently legible,
nor does it seek to subvert U.S. political paradigms.
While the Venezuelan declaration of independence participates in a New World and
elite creole genre, it differs formally in some significant respects from the U.S.
declaration of independence. According to generic conventions of anticolonial
declarations, both documents must establish a justification for the dissolution of prior
political bonds. For instance, the U.S. declaration begins with a proclamation of
universal, natural, and self-evident rights derived from Lockean traditions of thought;
these universals are followed by a list of particular grievances against the king of Great
Britain and the “acts of pretended legislation” passed to manage North American
colonies.157 By contrast, the Venezuelan declaration refrains from “alleging the rights
inherent in every conquered country” perhaps due to an acknowledged history of
conquest that would authorize the insurrection of indigenous peoples and the raciallymarked castas of Spanish colonial society. Instead, this declaration redirects the problem
of conquest from the Americas to Europe through a Black Legend narrative of “inversion,
disorder, and conquest, that have already dissolved the Spanish Nation” in order to argue
the basis for independence. In effect, the inhabitants of Venezuela inherit the
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consequences of political inversions in Europe. The declaration laments, “[in] this
mournful alternative we have remained three years, in a state of political indecision and
ambiguity, so fatal and dangerous, that this alone would suffice to authorize the
resolution.” This political inheritance of protracted contingency and irresolution from a
marginal “Peninsular Corner of the European Continent” forms the basis of the
Venezuelan declaration of independence, the performative utterance of which concludes
the document rather than commences it. The hemispherism that the Venezuelan
declaration of independence stages in relationship to the genre’s precedent in the U.S. and
for a U.S. national audience involves an assertive attempt to convey differences in the
conditions of political upheaval and colonial legacies, albeit in a familiar declaratory
form. Despite the genre’s familiar protocols, even those political claims leveraged from
elite white creole vantage points remain illegible to—or more properly, unheard by—an
audience of U.S officials.
Despite Orea’s appeal to additional sources of hemispheric commonality with the
U.S., he encounters only disillusionment in the rhetoric rather than material investments.
According to Ewell, Orea also echoed U.S. notions of mutuality according to shared
geographical destiny, Old World political antagonists, and New World political projects
throughout his assertions “that nature, ‘the political state’ of Europe, and reciprocal
American interests dictated an ‘intimate union.’”158 But this idealized notion of uniquely
American affinities quickly faded in the face of U.S. neutrality and its extractive,
profiteering interest in the independence movements. The cartography of hemispheric
independence that Orea redrew in the wake of repeated deferrals of his appeals for

158

Quoted in Ewell, Venezuela and the United States, 20.

115
recognition dissolved into one of radical insularity: “Every day I am more persuaded that
it is necessary for each country to rely on its own resources; foreign aid always depends
upon the rewards that are expected…. I repeat to you that without money nothing can be
done.”159 Orea’s insight into U.S. officials’ pecuniary foreclosures of meaningful
hemispheric reciprocity finds its echo in Monroe’s April 30, 1811 letter to Joel Robert
Poinsett, then the consul general at Buenos Aires: “The destiny of those provinces must
depend on themselves” (11). As early as the 1810s, then, both U.S. officials and SpanishAmerican agents observed notions of hemispheric interdependence dissipate into a world
of sequestered interests and discrete political dilemmas.
I return to the May 14, 1812 letter by Monroe, then the Secretary of State, to the
U.S. agent dispatched to Caracas in order to examine the underpinnings of U.S. neutrality
as a discursive imaginary and power relation. With the knowledge of Venezuela’s
declaration of independence—a formal declaration that aligns with Anglo-American
emplotments of revolutionary progress—Monroe classifies the independence of the
“Provinces of Venezuela… [with] an essential difference between their situation and that
of the other Provinces of Spain in America” who have not issued formal declarations
(15). Despite the documentary formality and rhetorical legibility of the Venezuelan
declaration of independence, Monroe asserts, “nothing, however, would be more absurd
than for the United States to acknowledge their independence in form, until it was evident
that the people themselves were resolved and able to support it” (15). Here, Monroe
apparently affirms an early nineteenth-century revision of archaic Black Legend
representations that deemed Spanish rule in the New World illegitimate. In the context of
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the unfolding revolutions, this illegitimacy converts into Spanish-American inadequacies
for self-rule as independent polities. But in the following sentence, Monroe indicates that
the sociopolitical instability he perceives in South-American provinces reveal, in turn, the
early national vulnerabilities of the United States: “Should a counter-revolution take
place after such acknowledgment, the United States would sustain an injury, without
having rendered any advantage to the people” (15). At this stage, U.S. political neutrality
is forged in terms of delayed official recognition in order to protect itself on two sides: on
one side, from unfavorable economic and political resolutions that insurgent SpanishAmericans might entertain after an outright denial of recognition and, on the other, from
counter-revolutionary retaliations by the Spanish empire and its European allies after
formal recognition.
Five years later, interim Secretary of State Richard Rush grapples with
unanticipated geopolitical forces and contexts that corrode the U.S. policy of neutrality.
While in the April 25, 1817 letter, Rush posited that dubious U.S. maritime agents could
navigate the South American arena of conflict at their individual discretions, as the
revolutions persist the imagined capacity to rationally and willfully enact the bounds of
neutrality abroad comes undone. The official “duty to maintain the neutral character with
impartiality” in the armed opposition between what he calls “the colonists” and “the
government of Spain” proves a futile rhetorical guard against the hemispheric and
maritime scope of the Spanish-American independence movements themselves, which
rearrange anticolonial and imperial networks of power in ways that ensnare U.S.
interests, property, and citizens. A mere three months later from his confident
instructions, Rush admits that despite the best efforts of policy, the United States is
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“made to feel sensibly the progress of this contest” through the unruly participation of its
own citizenry in the conflict and of Spanish authorities’ suspicions of U.S. collusion.
“Our vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives and our lawful
commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of the war, been interrupted,” Rush
summarizes some of the ways in which the U.S. is folded into the unpredictable sweep of
Spanish-American political imaginaries and Spain’s hostile vigilance of potential U.S.
collusion (43). Rush presumes a stable location for the “theater of war” in the South
Americas, as though a safe distance from the conflict is possible during the entire
rearrangement of sociopolitical relations in the hemisphere.
Spanish imperial agents suspect that the U.S overtly aided and abetted insurgent
interests on a massive scale. Monroe responds to an accusation communicated by Luis de
Onís, Spanish Minister plenipotentiary to the United States in a January 19, 1816 letter:
You intimate that troops are levying in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and
Georgia, for the invasion of the Spanish provinces, of whom one thousand are
from Kentucky, and three hundred from Tennessee, to be commanded by
American citizens, but you do not state at what points these men are collected, or
by whom commanded, and as to the forces said to be raised in Louisiana and
Georgia, your communication is even more indefinite. (19)
Spanish imperial suspicions derive from the decade’s numerous filibustering expeditions
organized in U.S. ports and territories. Over the course of the 1810s, Anglo-American
factions declared “The Republic of Florida”; occupied West Florida (including the Baton
Rouge district, later becoming part of the state of Louisiana); participated in Gulf Coast
raids; and facilitated the short-lived independence of Texas in the 1812-1813 Magee-
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Gutiérrez expedition.160 Although Onís imagines a widespread raising of AngloAmerican troops in this particular letter—likely compounding an array of borderland
rumors—past filibustering efforts suggest the indistinguishability between conjured threat
and geopolitical reality. As Doolen observes, “the geographic isolation of the United
States from Europe opened the door to countless violations of Spanish sovereignty… the
usual checks on non state violence—like the threat of war or an international border
policed by rival states—were less effective in deterring cross border raids in North
America.”161 While “relatively weak colonies and states encircled the United States” in
Doolen’s mapping of the exceptional geographical advantages U.S. republican empire
enjoyed, the Anglo-American nation-state nonetheless dealt with ineluctable forms of
retribution.162 In cases where U.S. citizens were caught between the ambitions of
insurgency and the ire of the Spanish, U.S. officials were reminded of hemispheric
entanglements that they sought to continually unknot through a policy of neutrality. For
example, Monroe appeals to Onis in a February 21, 1816 letter for the release of “many
American Citizens [who] have been made prisoners at Carthagena, by order of the
Commander of the forces of His Catholic Majesty” that he has heard have “been treated
with the greatest severity” (23). Hemispheric entanglements brought about by the chaotic
arts of U.S. neutrality endanger captive U.S. citizens with tropes of taint, namely of
despotic Spanish punishment enacted on Anglo-American subjects and bodies.
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In order to best theorize the collapsing distinctions between state and non-state
arrangements across discursive practices and deceptive arts of U.S. neutrality, I hone in
on the polysemous qualities of the word “neutrality” and its etymological roots. From the
Secretary of State’s correspondence with Onís, the Spanish envoy, we can rethink the
meaning and political relationships constructed in the name of neutrality. In the adjectival
sense, to be neutral conveys a state of inaction or a middle position “in relation to
belligerent powers” and of being exempted “from the sphere of warlike operations.”
From the root word neuter of French and Latin origins, as a noun it means “not one or the
other,” of a verb “neither active nor passive; middle, reflexive, or intransitive,”
“belonging to neither party or side,” and in some cases, as “intermediate,” or of lingering
on “middle” ground. Rare usages of the word “neutral” dating from the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries indicate a condition of being indefinite or undefined: in
one sense, as “having no strongly marked effects, characteristics.” The senses of the word
that entail exemption from war, inaction from hostilities, and withholding between “either
side” of contending parties do not remotely align with the interventionist imaginary and
material effects of U.S. neutrality represented in the diplomatic correspondence from
Washington. Instead, U.S. neutrality attempts to play a part on multiple sides to its
increasing detriment when the distinction between the self-interest of the state and the
unruly, fortune-hunting actions of its private citizens begin to slip into one another. On
the one hand, private citizens not authorized by the state participate in the crossfire
between Spanish-American insurgents and Spanish royalist suppression of the
independence movements. On the other, U.S. authorities find it increasingly difficult to
extricate themselves from the implications of political unrest in the hemispheric South.

120
This dynamic exemplifies a form of Spanish-American entanglement that the United
States government sought to manage and control through successive revisions in the
policy of neutrality.
Among the number of U.S. citizens who participated in Spanish-American
insurgent projects—mostly as privateers—the case of William Davis Robinson stands out
in the correspondence as a figure for unwitting U.S. entanglement with the independence
movements.163 A focus on Robinson—taken as both a historical actor and metaphorical
figure for U.S. sovereignty—enables me to practice a non-comparative, non-binary, and
“entangled” method of interpreting U.S. arts of neutrality as rendered in official
communications. In an April 22, 1818 letter, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
writes to the Spanish minister Onís in order to request Robinson’s release from Spanish
custody. On April 1816, Robinson was captured by Spanish royalist forces “on the Coast
of Vera Cruz, at a place in the possession of the Revolutionists.” The letter comes two
years after Robinson’s first capture and denies his active collusion with insurgent
expeditions in order to maintain, by extension, the innocence of state-sanctioned
collusion with South-American revolutionaries. After all, when Quincy Adams dispatches
this letter as a petition to Onís to attest to Robinson’s innocence and appeal for his
release, Robinson’s status as a private citizen-subject is overwritten as an extension and
figure for the state. Quincy Adams complains that the Spanish did not honor the Indulto,
or royal amnesty for foreign accomplices of the insurgency; more precisely, Quincy
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Adams protests that Robinson’s documentary proof of U.S. citizenship—“a Certificate of
his birth at Philadelphia, and his Passport as a Citizen of the United-States”—was
violated in the failure to fulfill the promise of the Indulto. The sequence of
imprisonments that follow further abstract Robinson’s individuality into a figure of early
national powerlessness (62). Veracruz, Mexico marks the first locale in a long, seemingly
endless itinerary of Robinson’s imprisonments in infamous Spanish dungeons or aboard
wayward Spanish ships. Across the April 22 and the June 2, 1818 epistolary appeals
Quincy Adams sends to the Spanish minister, Robinson is thought to be held under a
guard of soldiers in “the City of Oaxaca” in a dungeon “Cell in the Convent of St.
Domingo”; transferred to “the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa” back in Veracruz; “embarked
as a prisoner in close confinement on board the Spanish Frigate Iphigenia” that became
stranded in “the Port of Campeachy”; “confined in the Moro Castle at the Havana”; and,
finally, expecting to be conducted across the Atlantic toward yet another enclosure in
Cádiz, Spain (62, 71).164
Robinson’s relentless sequence of confinements re-narrates intensified forms of
Black Legend unfreedom, backwardness, and irrational punishment that the revolutions
in Spanish America seem to proliferate hemispherically. Before U.S. private citizens
incur the consequences of Spanish imperial confinement, however, an inverse narrative of
the Spanish-American revolutions motivates the participation of numerous U.S. nationals
like Robinson. As García argues, “the freedom of the [Anglo-American] revolution had
been contained to a certain extent with the ratification of the Constitution. Hence, the
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aspirations for and possibility of American revolution were transported or transposed
southward onto Spanish America.”165 But from an opposing vantage point from within
the structures and strictures of constitutional institutions, state officials such as Quincy
Adams discern, at a distance in Washington, the disorder of the Spanish colonies as it
engulfs the freedoms—simultaneously private and national—of Robinson as a U.S.
citizen-subject. In this way, Anglo-American citizens’ participation in the dissolution of
the Spanish colonies potentially unmake—and taint—U.S. nationalism, statist
sovereignty, and the status of U.S. citizenship itself. While in his official capacity as the
Secretary of State, Quincy Adams uneasily confronts a form of statist powerlessness in
the face of unanticipated sociopolitical developments and entanglements in the South
Americas; he cannot directly intercede on behalf of Robinson (lest he produce an overt
act of war against Spain) nor can he officially repair the appearance of neutrality beyond
the written missive’s appeal. These hemispheric entanglements expose the United States’
geopolitical position not only to the retaliatory whims of Old World empires such as
Spain and Britain, but also to the allure of unsettled political orders that create new
opportunities for Anglo-American plunder well before the Gold Rush.
Given its increasingly undeniable imbrication in the independence movements, U.S.
officials begin to consider breaking the longstanding policy of neutrality. But they find
this measure impossible without first collecting input from established European powers.
On August 15 and 20, 1818, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams writes three identical
letters to Richard Rush (now United States Minister to Great Britain), Albert Gallatin
(United States Minister to France), and George W. Campbell (United States Minister to
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Russia) to probe the dispositions of Old World powers in favor of Spanish-American
independence. Adams writes:
I am now directed to enquire what part you think the British Government [or
France, or Russia] will take in regard to the dispute between Spain and her
Colonies, and in what light they will view an acknowledgment of the
Independence of the Colonies by the United-States? Whether they will view it as
an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare War against us, in
consequence, whether Great-Britain [or France, or Russia] will take part with her
in it. (74)
U.S. officials’ incessant appeals to the political inclinations and dictates of Old World
imperial powers undermine both the diplomatic and cultural rhetoric of U.S. fidelity to its
“own” hemisphere. Instead, Anglo-American officials continue to conceptualize forms of
political interdependence and reciprocity in terms of cautious transatlantic relationships.
Despite diplomatic uses of its own statist independence as the measure by which the U.S.
assesses the legibility of Spanish-American political declarations and formations, this
archive illuminates the ways in which U.S. action or inaction depends on the colonial
powers of Europe. It begins to appear that U.S. officials can only declare the recognition
of independence in “Buenos-Ayres, Chili, or in Venezuela” with the assent, at least, of the
majority among major European powers who receive exact copies of the Secretary of
State’s inquiry (87).
The Secretary of State desires to pronounce a formal recognition of independence
as a way to foreclose its citizenry’s participation in the insurgency as well as the piratical
siege of U.S. property and vessels. It remains unclear whether U.S. property losses take
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place under the guise of liberatory expeditions in the hemisphere or Spanish royalist
retaliations. While the declarations of independence sent to Washington’s upper ranks and
the appeals of diplomatic envoys from the revolutionary Spanish Americas fail to
motivate substantive, state-sanctioned support from the United States., the present
entanglement of revolutionary criminality begins to force the hand of U.S. officials
toward formal recognition. Continuing the January 1, 1819 missive to the United States
Minster to Great Britain, Quincy Adams suggests, “We particularly believe that the only
effectual means of repressing the excessive irregularities and piratical depredations of
armed vessels under their flags and bearing their Commissions, will be to require of them
the observance of the principles sanctioned by the practice of maritime Nations” (87).
Without formal recognition, Quincy Adams warns, “It is not to be expected that they [the
insurgents] will feel themselves bound by the ordinary duties of Sovereign States, while
they are denied the enjoyment of all their rights” (87). Here, the mode of inquiry into
Spanish Americans’ political imaginaries shifts; Spanish Americans’ unknown political
wills no longer entail inquiries into diplomatic arrangements, the extent of anti-colonial
upheaval, or potential forms of governance, but rather demand methods for enclosing its
perceived criminal modes of circulation.166 Based on the correspondence about
Robinson’s cyclic and global imprisonments, U.S. officials render spectacular enactments
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of “Spanish” enclosure while it creates its own practices of foreclosing political
possibilities in the hemisphere.
On May 20th, 1819, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams reverts to neutral
political schemes in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Smith Thompson. This time,
however, he explicitly reformulates neutrality into an active and coherent—as opposed to
inactive and dependent—political strategy when he avers, “Neutrality itself was a system
which operated altogether in favor of the South Americans; for it recognized them as
lawful Belligerents, and no longer as Spanish subjects” (105). Unlike prior secretaries of
state, and in a stylistic deviation from his previous correspondence, Quincy Adams writes
“Neutrality” with a capital letter and in the reflexive tense—as though it were a proper
noun referring to an entity imbued with its own political sovereignty.167 According to
Quincy Adams, “Neutrality itself” bestows a form of tacit sociopolitical recognition of
South Americans and their sought-after independence that the United States refrains to
acknowledge in any official capacity. The material consequences of the putative “favor”
or recognition that such Neutrality offers South American independence factions remain
unclear. Quincy Adams only specifies Neutrality’s conferral of an abstract recognition of
lawful belligerence, tantamount to a kind of acknowledged “right” to war, and its
influence in creating the global conditions for a strategic deadlock between Europe and
the Americas. The neutral stance of the United States, Quincy Adams writes, “has
effectually neutralized Europe, whose principal Governments have invariably avowed
that their wishes, are in favor of Spain; as freely as the United States have avowed theirs
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to be in favor of South America” (105). The counterintuitive, transatlantic neutralization
Quincy Adams speaks of here amplifies—rather than annuls—the range of activity and
freedom of the “principal Governments” of Europe and that of the United States in
apparent proportion to one another through the ongoing conduct of the independence
movements. As much as Quincy Adams insists that, “as neutrals it has been in the power
of the United States, to render services to South America, which they could not have
rendered them as co-belligerents,” Neutrality instead empowers all other nation-states at
the expense of the South Americas.
Quincy Adams’s imagined consolidation of the United States’ neutral policy
continually relies on state-authorized yet unofficial maritime agents. Indeed, it now
integrates these ambiguous U.S. agents as an essential part of its coherence, and in this
newfound coherence it creates a form of “shadowed” sovereign acts that the United
States cannot openly sanction. After all, the May 20th letter communicates instructions
from President James Monroe (also a former Secretary of State) intended for Captain
Oliver H. Perry of the U.S. naval ship John Adams. Perry disembarks at Venezuela and
Buenos Aires in order to carry out multiple functions as a point of hemispheric contact,
communication, and information: “[Perry] will place himself in such relations with them
[the respective Governments of Buenos Ayres and Angostura] to enable him to
communicate with them freely, and to inform them that he is authorized, on the part of
this Government, to give and receive, in return, explanations upon certain points highly
interesting to the Friendly intercourse, between the United Sates and them” (102).
According to the letter, the President anticipates South American critiques of Perry’s
naval character and the absence of a legitimate consular agent; nonetheless, the President
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insists on conveying the rationale behind the naval appointment to South America
“precisely because [the U.S. President, James Monroe] thinks the communication may be
the more Friendly and Confidential for being entirely informal” (102). Such friendly
confidentiality made possible through unofficial channels also cloaks another mission
that works in tandem with Perry’s: the naval vessel under Perry’s command, John Adams,
is given free reign during Perry’s diplomatic disembarkations to go “on a cruise between
that Island and St. Domingo, for the purpose of protecting the commerce of the United
States in those waters, under the special instructions from the Navy Department, in
execution of the acts of the last session of Congress, relating to Piracy & the Slave trade”
(102). Finally, the conveyance of these instructions entail multiple degrees of separation
than in prior commissions, presumably to make any consequences exponentially
deniable: President James Monroe communicates with the Secretary of State Quincy
Adams, who then writes to Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson, who in the end
transmits the instructions to Captain Oliver H. Perry.
Quincy Adams’s prior epistolary citations of the 1818 congressional piracy and
slave trade acts impel the ship’s intrusion into foreign spaces and unsettled, unruled
political arrangements. Curiously, the epistolary directions for the mission do not instruct
the John Adams to directly quell the illicit conduct of piracy or the slave trade in
particular. “The act, which became a law April 20, 1818,” W.E.B. Du Bois writes in The
Suppression of the African Slave-Trade (1896) of the very same piracy and slave trade
proposals referenced in the Quincy Adams letter, “was a failure from the start” and “a
poorly constructed compromise, which virtually acknowledged the failure of efforts to
control the trade, and sought to remedy defects by pitting cupidity against cupidity,
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informer against thief.”168 Instead, the acts Quincy Adams cites function here to chart a
cartography of disorder according to tropes of unfreedom and illegality that, in turn,
mobilizes the United States’ unprecedented naval reach into the foreign shores and waters
of the “Spanish Main.” While these extensions of power held true for previous
deployments of maritime agents, this time Quincy Adams (on behalf of Monroe) converts
prior national vulnerabilities to acts of piracy and insurgency—figured by Robinson—
into an additional pretense for forcible intrusion into the South Americas.
Despite the stability a consolidated discourse and policy of “Neutrality”
imaginatively asserts, the “informal” overreaches by naval Anglo-American agents
proposed in the May 20th missive are reactionary responses to the perceived dissolution
between nascent U.S. independence and undetermined Spanish-American political
arrangements with the capacity to erode the sovereignty and boundaries of the Northern
states. Quincy Adams derives the current version of U.S. neutrality in response to
Venezuelan exile and active agent Lino de Clemente’s activities on U.S. soil, namely
Clemente’s coordination and outfitting of a pro-independence expedition in Philadelphia
in collaboration with the Scottish privateer Gregor McGregor on Amelia Island, a
smuggler’s and privateer’s nest off the coasts of Florida and Georgia. Indeed, Clemente
held direct correspondence with well-known independence leader Simón Bolívar from
Philadelphia.169 While in the office of Secretary of State, Quincy Adams recalls
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Clemente’s troubling of official neutrality through the organization of hostile anticolonial
activity in the United States:
As a consequence of this neutrality, [the United States] could not permit either of
the parties to fit out equip and arm ships within their jurisdiction, to cruize against
the other. Neither could they permit any Agent or Officer of either party to issue
Commissions, or enlist men within their Territory for purposes of War against the
other. The act of Mr. Clemente, in issuing such a Commission at Philadelphia,
was an outrage upon the neutrality and Sovereignty of the United States, which
had he been a regularly accredited Agent of a recognized Government, would
have been highly offensive—It was for acts of the same character that President
Washington had demanded and obtained the recall of a French Minister, at an
early period of the existence of this Government; and nothing but an
unwillingness to exercise any severity which might bear unfavorably upon the
South American cause, could have justified the forbearance of the Government, to
cause Mr. Clemente to be prosecuted for the violation of the Law.170 (Emphasis
mine, 104)
A central tenet of U.S. neutrality, Quincy Adams explains, involves forestalling “either of
the parties”—the Spanish royalists or advocates of independence—from preparing or
otherwise waging war from a base on U.S. territory. Clemente’s commission for AngloAmerican expeditionaries in Philadelphia violates all versions of U.S. neutrality, in past
and current policy, intended in these successive modifications to work toward the
unequivocal advantage of the United States. Given Quincy Adams’s citation of
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Washington’s demand that the French government withdraw their envoy “for acts of the
same character… at an early period of the existence of this Government,” Clemente also
transgresses known precedent for the conduct of foreign agents in territories under U.S.
jurisdiction. Although Clemente’s issuance of commissions in Philadelphia produce “an
outrage upon the neutrality and Sovereignty of the United States,” the letter conveys a
curious powerlessness to punish Clemente and prevent other unrecognized agents for
similar violations “of the Law” precisely because they lie outside of it and beyond official
recognition. In his unofficial agency, Clemente can seemingly commit further outrages on
the very “Sovereignty of the United States” while the consequences of such hostilities
remain deferred in the conditional: “had [Clemente] been a regularly accredited Agent of
a recognized Government, [his actions] would have been highly offensive.” For all of its
performances of knowledge-gathering in the foreign lands and shores of South America,
Clemente’s whereabouts are unknown to the Secretary of State as the letter instructs
Perry to request from the Venezuelans his recall, “unless he should already have left this
Country” (104).
III. Conclusion: Casta Dilemmas in Resurgent Filadelfia
While U.S. officials sought to exploit informal searches for first-hand knowledges
of Spanish-American political imaginaries, nearby Philadelphia was a hub for insurgent
activity and seditious publications. As literary scholar Rodrigo Lazo observes, “Writers
regarded Philadelphia as an opportune place to publish materials that could be deployed
in debates over the political and social future of emerging nations.”171 It seems U.S.
officials did not need to travel far to ascertain the debates about the political directions
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and conditions of South America. In this sense, Philadelphia functions as a site for the
overlap of Spanish-American dissidence with established Anglo-American orders. In the
current scholarship for early Latinx print cultures, Philadelphia names multiple
sociopolitical and textual entanglements: its print culture produces a shared “anticolonial
mentality” that spans the U.S. and South America; a temporal portal that collapses “the
1770s with the 1820s”; a “borderland” of sorts dislocated from conventional geopolitical
paradigms; a merging “of the physical city and the cultural imaginary of the city in
Spanish American circles”; and the birthplace of a “Hispanic Vogue,” among others.172
The ongoing scholarly conversation also experiments with various terms for
hemispheric convergence that shape the city’s political and cultural dynamics. Rodrigo
Lazo refers to Cuban revolutionary José Maria Heredia’s alliterative coinage, “la famosa
Filadelfia” to refer to Spanish-American insurgent efforts in the city while Emily García
uses the fused Spanish-Anglo “Filadelphia” to name a locus of cultural interdependence
across hemispheric revolutions and timelines. Again, I am less interested in notions of
“mutual” mingling, merging, and interdependence, than in the possibility of South-toNorth asymmetries and transformations. For instance, I am intrigued by Emily García’s
unprobed metaphor of “Philadelphia (and Filadelphia) [becoming] an offshore capital of
sorts for the Spanish American independence movement” although here the geopolitical
asymmetry has more to do with “U.S. Americans’ need to continue to have cultural and
revolutionary relevance.”173 Leaving aside the misfitting implications of surplus capital
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and corrupt tax-evasion inscribed in the metaphorical figure of “offshore capital,” I am
interested in this figural communication of illicit excess, geopolitical irregularity, and
lack of oversight.
Within Anglo-American contexts, Philadelphia begins to lose prominence culturally
and politically in the first decades of the nineteenth-century. In 1800 the governing
capital of the United States relocated to Washington (and with it, direct governmental
patronage for publishing) while New York and Boston commercial publishing houses
began to outpace Philadelphia.174 Spanish-American encounters with and adaptations of
the city’s political heritage produces in my account a resurgent Filadelfia that takes
advantage of the city’s relative descent into the shadow of U.S. national politics and
cultural secondariness. I conclude this chapter with the anonymously published pamphlet
The Friend of Men: To All the Inhabitants of the Islands and the Vast Continent of
Spanish America (1812) under the titular pseudonym of El Amigo de los Hombres.175
This political pamphlet takes the form of a letter and is addressed to “Americanos,”
which capaciously refers to all the inhabitants of “the islands and the vast continent of
Spanish America.” I want to focus on this pamphlet’s incendiary professions of a decided
“general will” for Spanish-American independence that is undercut by its own discussion
of racial schisms and managing racialized blackness.
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Literary historians attribute the pamphlet to José Álvarez de Toledo who led a
political career of many twists and turns.176 Born in Havana, Cuba to peninsular parents,
he eventually served as a delegate to the first Spanish national assembly in Cádiz, Spain,
on behalf of Santo Domingo. Afterwards, he became an early advocate of Spanish
American independence. At the same time, he co-organized a plot with U.S. agent Shaler
of an insurrection and annexation plot on Texas.177 In the end, Toledo defected from the
independence cause, reconciled himself with Spain, and became advisor to the formerly
deposed King Fernando VII. The pamphlet’s publication dates from Toledo’s advocacy
for independence. As a part of a larger body of seditious literatures published in the
United States, the Spanish minister plenipotentiary Luis de Onís singled it out for
restriction and destruction.
Previous studies of the pamphlet attend to its Enlightenment-era constructions of
republican fellowship and mutuality. Raul Coronado summarizes the intended
inflammatory effect of the pamphlet, which “embraces (and models for [Toledo’s]
readership) the new language of amity and equality, of mutual love and respect” that
departs from “the hierarchical, servile, affective language of belonging based on a
patriarchal monarchy, that of the patria.”178 It also “turns less to an emotional language
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and more toward the rational, historical claims of political sovereignty.”179 Toledo’s
insurgent activity in Texas provides an insightful point of connection to the other special
agent missions the U.S. conducted throughout the South Americas. But as the preceding
chapter 1 builds on methodologically, my interpretation here retains the pamphlet’s
condition of anonymous publication. From its original publication in Philadelphia, and
despite Spanish royalist orders to destroy its copies the pamphlet circulated as far as
Texas and potentially to other sites throughout the insurgent Spanish Americas. The
pamphlet’s anonymous publication might have expanded its potential audience of readers
and auditors (in the likely possibility that such documents were read in clandestine
meetings) as well as the range of interpretations and uses for its ideas in varying local
contexts.
Despite its invocations of “rational” Enlightenment-era amity and commonality in
the making of independent political communities, the author develops an incoherent
theory of racial relation in the Spanish Americas. Pre-existing Spanish colonial
hierarchies of racial difference known as the sistema de castas or casta system imply
questions about the reordering of socioracial relations in the Spanish Americas after
independence. In order to avert the dissolution of the independence effort, the text
mandates a pre-existing conformity to creole whiteness. First, the political pamphlet
responds to a series of six propositions for the fated failure of Spanish-American
independence printed in the newspaper editorial The Spaniard, none of which directly
mention racial schisms and inequalities as primary causes for failure. The pamphlet offers
“an impartial reply to these propositions” that nonetheless addresses at length the
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“prophecy” of black-led revolution provided by “the example of the French side of the
island of Santo Domingo.”180 This pamphlet hinges on the question of racial dissension in
the Spanish Americas, perhaps, because it cannot circumvent racial difference as it
addresses the concerns of the first two propositions: (1) “There is no legitimate
representation in the governments, nor is there any work undertaken that is willed by the
general public” and (2) “Spanish America cannot be organized into independent states,
imitating the Anglo American nation, because conditions there are absolutely different
and will necessarily encourage her ruin.”181 It becomes clear that Spanish-American
racial formations and colonial legacies potentially obstruct the desired coalescence of a
Rousseauean and representable “general will.”182 Ideologies of mixed races in Spanish
America are the apparent source for the region’s “absolutely different” set of social and
political conditions that forewarn revolutionary ruin, the impossibility of successful
political independence.
The pamphlet omits a discussion of the role of indigenous nations in the SpanishAmerican upheavals, but it consistently identifies arguments concerning forms of
blackness—“los negros y los mulatos” (blacks and mulattos) or “los morenos y los
pardos” (Casta terms for variations of African descent)—as incompatible with the
independence of Spanish America.183 The pre-existing casta system poses a problem for
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Spanish-American political imaginaries that I discuss in more depth in Chapter 3, but for
now I want to point out that when “El Amigo” mentions casta distinctions, he does not
speak to the purported addressees of the pamphlet, “AMERICANOS.”184 Rather, he acts
as an informant for Anglo-Americans, European foreign powers, and outsiders from the
Spanish Americas generally. For example, the pamphlet provides a series of demographic
calculations that would be useless for local insurgents in Spanish America, who live
amidst the material realities of Spanish-American socioracial relations: “Firstly, there are
only large numbers of slaves and people of color on the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico,
in Santo Domingo, the Spanish part of Hispaniola, in Caracas, and in the capital of Peru.
But there are less than what has been exaggerated.”185 He even cites the calculations of
the German-born naturalist, Alexander Von Humboldt, “for each 100 inhabitants there are
54 whites and 46 colored; subtracting from this last figure the number who were born to
free parents, who identify with the purposes and interests of the whites.”186 These
demographic calculations and theories of racial difference attempt to render uniform the
different parts of Spanish America, and above all to make it a palatable socioracial
context for foreign European and U.S. intervention in independence projects.
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“El Amigo” furthermore imagines a kind of assimilable blackness for the SpanishAmerican body politic. The anonymous author attests to the existence of opposed
interests “between the pardos and the morenos in the countries where they are
populous.”187 Out of this opposition, he discerns a paradoxical possibility in taking “very
useful advantage of what seems to be a dismal evil,” that is, of intra-racial conflicts of
interest.188 Out of this conflict, the “pardos” are deemed to be assimilable because they
“aspire to the esteem of the whites, they want to be mistaken for them and in the second
or third generation they are already tied together by blood and interests in such a way that
they form one caste with the whites.”189 The pamphlet rehearses and ultimately intensifies
the Spanish colonial racial logics of the casta system, which is defined by a telos of
generational deracination into whiteness. According to this sociopolitical rationale of
whitening, the pamphlet posits that “the influence of the morenos is null,” which would
be counterbalanced by the future demographic integration of pardos.190 Given the
immediacy of revolutionary turmoil in the Spanish Americas, this solution cannot depend
on the duration of generational timelines; the pardos’ intent to presently align with creole
interests alone seems to suffice. El Amigo therefore retains Spanish colonial racial logics
but attempts to dispense with generational delay. This independence-era racial schema
also omits a discussion of other colonial holdovers, such as slavery in Spanish America,
the status of indigenous nations, and the unsatisfied political interests of the moreno,
creating new difficulties for El Amigo’s elite creole imagination of a unified general will.
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If this story of racial resolution into whiteness is predicated on the assimilable
logics of the casta system, then the unanticipated return of non-white difference, racial
taint, and ultimately—of anti-creole dissent—continues to surround the pamphlet’s
sociopolitical answer to the quelling of social disorder in the midst of revolution. In the
casta system, the return of taint is usually characterized as a reversal in social condition,
taking the figure of the tornatrás, which I elaborate in the Coda of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, the pamphlet’s argument sublimates the recursive appearances of taint into
the basis for the legitimacy of creole anticolonial claims. In answer to the fifth
proposition, that Spanish-Americans owe Spain filial gratitude, El Amigo writes:
America owes Spain the same gratitude that the innocent slaves owe those who,
armed with destructive weapons, stripped them of their freedom and burdened
them with heavy and humiliating chains; the same debt that those who enjoyed a
wealthy estate in peace owe those from which it was stolen, and who were not
satisfied with this and have oppressed them more and more, considering them to
be nothing more than animals. Nevertheless, the Americans would have forgotten
three centuries of despotism, violence, theft, and other evils, only implicating the
Spanish government, if the new despots, who have usurped Peninsular authority
since the revolution, had not proceeded contrary to the interests of the
Americans.191
The castas’ generational assimilation also becomes the basis for the incorporation of anticolonial, creole claims. Histories of slavery and conquest are familiarly reduced to liberal
tropes for the transgressions of monarchical tyranny. The pamphlet exemplifies the ways
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in which the unsettling materiality of colonial legacies—whether North or South—
become reincorporated into creole aspirations for the “regeneration” of the Americas.
Narratives of independence are penned as narratives of regeneration; narratives of
revolutionary failure are told as rumors of indelible or recursive taint.
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Chapter 3
Conspiring the Américas:
Literary Afterlives of the Black Legend and Bolívar in Haiti
In Herman Melville’s 1855 novella Benito Cereno, Captain Amasa Delano
encounters the San Dominick, a derelict Spanish slave ship, off the island coast of Santa
María near Chile. From the perspective of this New England-born, Yankee captain, the
signs of conspiratorial intrigue are everywhere yet intangible. “The very word Spaniard
has a curious, conspirator, Guy-Fawkish twang to it,” goes one of many suspicious turns
in Delano’s perception of the foreign captain, the titular Benito Cereno, who is frequently
referred to as “the Spaniard.”192 Captain Delano discerns alternating degrees of danger
and deficiency in Benito Cereno by obsessing over his seemingly erratic behaviors,
psychosomatic ailments, and tarnished nobility. On rare occasion, Delano’s misgivings
venture past Cereno’s individual disorder to consider a widespread conspiracy aboard the
ship, where the enslaved roam freely on deck. For example, Delano’s hesitant question,
“Could then Don Benito be any way in complicity with the blacks?” quickly becomes
overwritten with a second question: “Who ever heard of a white so far a renegade as to
apostatize from his own species almost, by leaguing in against it with negroes” (201)?
The danger and deficiency Cereno poses to Delano’s early U.S. subjectivity are linked to
Spanish-American racial relations that are themselves transformed by anti-Spanish
discourses known as the Black Legend.
In the afterlife of the Black Legend as Delano rehearses it, the Spaniard lingers
uneasily between enacting a rival, more efficient mode of racial governmentality, or
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pronouncing a word of warning about the risk of racial degeneracy that awaits illmanaged New World empires. The first interpretation of the figural Spaniard anticipates
recent analyses of the Black Legend’s relation to genealogies of race. According to
historian María Elena Martínez in Genealogical Fictions (2008), “[contemporary]
scholarship on the history of race and racism has been casting early modern Iberia as the
site of a precocious elaboration of racial concepts and practices” (9).193 Strikingly, the
precocity of early Spanish racial concepts derives from complex histories of the forcible
conversion and expulsion of Jewish and Muslim populations on the peninsula. Delano
distorts this history by representing Cereno’s imperial degeneracy as coterminous with
racial defection when he imagines the foreign captain’s association with the blacks as the
“apostasy” of a white. For this chapter’s analysis of the Black Legend’s seditious trace in
U.S. imaginaries of Spanish America, I hone in on the implication that Spanish-American
societies extended “racial concepts and practices” to the hemisphere, which granted to the
global Spanish empire a rather perverse “claim to modernity” that unsettled AngloAmerican paradigms for racial hierarchies in early republican society.194 The “Spanish”
cultural traces of racial mingling become proofs of sociopolitical degeneracy,
illegitimacy, and backwardness in Anglo-American revisionist accounts of SpanishAmerican colonies.
Deemed the “most overtly hemispheric text” of contemporary nineteenth-century
Americanist scholarship by Susan Gillman and Kirsten Silva-Gruesz, analyses of Benito
Cereno in hemispheric studies engage two main critical currents.195 Scholars often read
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the novella as an allegory of, on the one hand, U.S. triumphalism after the 1848 MexicanAmerican War, or on the other, the Haitian Revolution’s threat to U.S. racial
governmentality and slaveholding interests.196 The historical and intertextual density of
the novella demands and formalizes what Gillman and Silva Gruesz call “a strategy of
translation by which history can be read back into the novel.”197 The first allegorical
framework posits a teleology of Spanish-American sociopolitical downfall that draws on
the Black Legend to explain the concomitant disintegration of Spain’s empire in the
Americas and the violation of Spanish-American independence via the U.S. annexation
of Mexican territory. Other approaches to the work’s “translation” of hemispheric
relations take the “unthinkable” Haitian Revolution as a pivotal historical context.198 In
conversation with the work of C.L.R. James, Michel-Rolph Trouillot, and David Scott,
among others, literary and inter-disciplinary critics study revolutionary Haiti in relation to
modern epistemological conditions and power structures to elaborate the revolution’s
implications for the production of history, the problem of modernity, and the
contradictions that inhere in “colonial enlightenment.”199 In the context of this
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conversation, studies of Benito Cereno decipher the occlusions and misinterpretations
produced by Captain Delano’s failure to recognize the slave revolt aboard Cereno’s ship.
In our current critical moment, however, Toussaint-centric “translations” of the Haitian
Revolution overshadow other relevant hemispheric contexts in need of critical attention
and, indeed, strategic translation.
I review these paradigmatic interpretations of Benito Cereno to connect these
coordinates of hemispheric inquiry, which treat separately U.S. representations of
Spanish(-American) downfall and Haitian revolutionary threat. This chapter reads Benito
Cereno alongside creole independence leader Simón Bolívar’s informal alliance and
epistolary correspondence with officials of the Republic of Haiti during Alexandre
Pétion’s presidency (1815-1816). Where a previous generation of scholarship sought to
read the Haitian Revolution as exemplary of the problems and promise of modernity, my
reading of Benito Cereno alongside Bolívar’s Haitian correspondence considers foreign
political imputations of racial anti-modernity seriously. In other words, I attend to the
ways in which Spanish Americans read along the ideological grain of the Black Legend
to cull from the process unexpected political possibilities. I do so not to make a case for
an alternative or divergent modernity theorized from the Spanish Americas, as various
Latinx and Latin American scholars have already undertaken such important intellectualhistorical work.200 I ask instead: What sort of emancipatory struggle might we read in and
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beyond Benito Cereno through the very language of anti-modernity or degeneracy? This
language is no less constitutive of epistemological conditions or terms of struggle than
the rubrics of “modernity” or “enlightenment,” but is perhaps more unfamiliar, and
certainly more resistant to our current critical and translative methods.
In the first of three sections, I examine the ways in which Delano’s imperial
imagination proliferates discursive seams of blackness and racial impurity aboard the San
Dominick to justify an interventionist takeover. However, as the Yankee captain traffics
in an array of foreign racial concepts necessarily detached from their lived contexts and
from the historical development of Spanish-American colonialism, the profusion of Black
Legend-inflected racial discourse eludes his own dictates. These renegade discourses of
racial degeneracy thwart the clean-cut, black-white binary racial order Delano maintains
as integral to U.S. racial governmentality. Such errant imaginaries of blackness, racial
taint, and creole racial defection, I argue, become available for repurposing as the very
seams of cross-racial collaboration in the Spanish-American littoral.201
The following two sections read Simon Bolívar’s correspondence with British
colonial and Haitian officials (1814-1816) in order to trace the afterlife of Black Legendinflected racial imaginaries in early nineteenth-century struggles for Spanish-American
independence.202 In the second section, I close read Bolívar’s correspondence with
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British officials and the British colonial press during his exile in Kingston, Jamaica, as he
sought to recruit financial and political backing for the independence struggle from Spain
under his leadership. The formal and rhetorical features of Bolívar’s epistolary appeals to
British and U.S. diplomats unravel a contradictory creole counterargument to the imputed
unruliness of racialized Spanish-American subjects—known as the castas—that frustrated
the possibility of Spanish-American association with dominant political powers. British
officials’ enduring neglect of Bolívar’s political plights led to the creole’s alliance of last
resort with the Republic of Haiti. This problem of ungovernable castas, I suggest, persists
as a productive condition of and contradiction in Bolívar’s informal alliance with the
Republic of Haiti.
Alexandre Pétion succored Simón Bolívar’s leadership of the independence cause
with the following condition: the emancipation of all slaves would be decreed wherever
Republican forces advanced in Spanish-American territories. The social and anticolonial
emancipations imagined throughout the lifespan of the alliance between pre-national
Spanish America and post-revolutionary Haiti assume a revolutionary potency derived
from foreign discourses of undisciplined racial impurity. No treaty or contract was ever
drafted to formalize the terms of alliance between Spanish-American insurgents and the
Republic of Haiti; rather, the letters Bolívar exchanged with Haitian officials and the
multiple decrees for slave emancipation comprise the alliance’s main informal archive.

Bassi, “Simón Bolívar’s Caribbean Adventures,” in An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies
and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean World (Durham: Duke UP, 2016). For the
alliance’s connection to early developments in Haitian international diplomacy and free-soil, see
Ada Ferrer, "Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” The American
Historical Review 117, no. 1 (2012): 40-66. I initially learned about the alliance in the recent
translation of Émeric Bergeaud, Stella: A Novel of the Haitian Revolution. 1859. Trans. and eds.
Lesley S. Curtis and Christen Mucher. Rpt. New York: NYU Press, 2015.

146
The epistolary negotiation and non-contractual textuality of this South-South alliance
allows me to theorize its political possibility beyond the historical precedent it offers for
the suspected yet unrealized cross-racial conspiracy aboard the San Dominick. Enslaved
and racialized subjects in the hemisphere acted on their own interpretations of the
alliance and its resultant emancipation decrees, often with irreverence for elite creoles’
political imperatives and established imperial interests alike.
Overall, this chapter studies the language and conditions for a hemispheric, crossracial alliance that could only be cognized from the perspective of an early U.S. national
subject as a generalized conspiracy. Beyond the malevolent contemporary connotation of
“conspiracy,” I emphasize etymological roots of the term’s literal Latin meaning
(conspīrāre), where to conspire means “to breathe together,” from which its associated
senses “to accord, harmonize, agree, combine or unite in a purpose” emerge.203 To be
clear, the mode of inter-American political affiliation that my analysis of these texts
foregrounds—conspiracy—builds on Sara Johnson’s concept of “transcolonial
collaboration.” Although such collaborations often “contained an idealistic impulse to
imagine another world that could result in improved material circumstances,” Johnson
notes such idealisms often waned and gave way to more expedient consolidations of
political power, as it happened, no doubt, for Simón Bolívar after his year of exile, crisis,
and alliance with the Haitians.204 My focus here, however, is to discern the ways in which
colonial histories of blackness and race in Spanish America made it possible for its
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racialized peoples and Haitians to conspire an Américas in which both could imagine
living in subversive association.
I. Currents of Blackness: Renegade Racial Discourses in Benito Cereno
Set in the littoral geographies of Spanish America and structured by the temporal flux
of overlapping colonial histories, the narrative of Benito Cereno unfolds through multiple
discourses of blackness forged in the crucible of contending colonial projects in the
Americas. Yet the ways in which Spanish-American histories of blackness register in
Benito Cereno are at best underexamined and at worst overlooked. Literary critic María
DeGuzmán, for instance, offers one of the most sustained analyses of the novella’s
representations of blackness—as a marker of racial and imperial taint—in her booklength study, Spain’s Long Shadow (2005). Drawing from Dana Nelson’s passing remark
on the function of Spanishness in “‘For the Gaze of the Whites’: The Crisis of the Subject
in ‘Benito Cereno,’” DeGuzmán’s analysis extends a reading of the titular captain’s
“Spanishness as ‘an unstable marker, semiotically balancing between light/fellow
Westerner and dark/Other.’”205 Paradoxically, Cereno’s benighted “Spanishness” is an
“unstable marker” that does the work of “balancing”: the racial taint accorded to the
Spanish captain provides a fungible yet convenient backdrop for Delano’s Manichean
worldview, which perceives all social relation as a manifestation of slave and master
relations, racially coded in black and white, dark and light. Delano’s self-fashioning as
morally (and racially) superior to the “off-white” Spaniard justifies his Anglo-American
intervention in the foreign space of the San Dominick. The supposedly unstable thirdterm of Cereno’s Spanishness renders readily legible the subordination of various foreign
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colonial subjects (the sailors, enslaved Africans, the “Spanish” captain himself) under an
early U.S. national subject. Captain Delano’s manipulation of the Black Legend’s
discursive resources culminates in an exceptional ideological weapon for the incursion of
U.S. political priorities in the “other” Americas.
This section moves away from prevailing understandings of Cereno’s racial “taint”
as an affirming “instability” for nascent Anglo-American imperial imaginaries, and out
toward more complex histories of blackness that became available for unpredictable—
perhaps radical and emancipatory—reconfiguration of social relations in the
revolutionary Spanish Americas. My analysis builds on the cultural history of “limpieza
de sangre” (purity of blood) discourses in Genealogical Fictions by historian María Elena
Martínez. Originally a multivalent discourse of religious and cultural difference in Iberia
during the (15th century) reconquest of Spain from the Muslim Kingdom of Granada and
the expulsion of Jewish people, purity of blood discourse was transplanted to the Spanish
Americas and thereby transformed as a technology for the racial differentiation and
ordering of New World society. I understand Delano’s co-optation of blood purity
discourses in Benito Cereno as an antagonistic response to South-South political
networks—such as the Bolívar and Pétion alliance examined in later sections—that
emerged in the thick of Spanish America’s nineteenth-century upheavals. Delano
therefore constructs Benito Cereno’s Spanish-American creoleness in volatile relation to
representations of racial degeneracy, backward authoritarianism, and inscrutable
contagion all bearing the black mark or “shadow” of illegitimate, corrupt power. But
these Black Legend representations of Cereno’s intrinsic Spanish-American impurity
backfires. With Captain Delano’s every attempt to nullify the rival politics he senses
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aboard the San Dominick, he inadvertently proliferates discourses of blackness that draw
from multiple colonial histories and that connect intractable forms of racial difference in
the Spanish-American littoral. This reading of Benito Cereno traces the very ponderable
possibilities for putatively anti-modern, cross-racial solidarities that Delano struggles to
put out of mind.
The narrative projection of Delano’s perceptions and thoughts—which takes the
form of free indirect discourse—calls the titular captain “the Spaniard” so often that the
term bestows a typological and nationalist stability to Cereno’s character. Such stability
belies the term’s history, in which populations designated as español (Spaniard) varied
according to Spain’s ever-changing imperial imaginary at different points in time.
Spanish America’s territorial definition was similarly indeterminate. María Elena
Martínez writes, “the incorporation of the Indies into the Crown of Castile in 1523
precluded the possibility that Spanish America might enjoy a legal identity analogous to
that of Aragón, Navarre, Naples, or Milan, and the uncertainty of the territory’s political
standing extended to creoles.”206 (192). The displacement of the territory’s organizational
ambiguities to creoles placed them in a political limbo that influenced their claim-making
during the independence struggles. As Martínez explains, creoles’ lack of official
privileges pertains to an unresolved question of political belonging:
And since creoles could not hold civil office in Spain, they did not enjoy the full
prerogatives of nativeness on either side of the Atlantic. Underlying their
predicament was the problem that if by lineage they were ‘natives of the kingdoms
of Spain,’ by birthplace (or integration) they were natives of the jurisdiction. But
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what were the boundaries of that jurisdiction? Was the relevant unit the ‘Indies,’ the
viceroyalty, or the audiencia?207
As we will see, the competing imperial and geopolitical units of “the ‘Indies,’ the
viceroyalty, or the audiencia,” among others, also scramble Delano’s understanding of
Benito Cereno as the archetypal “Spaniard” in question.
As I remarked earlier, the colonial temporalities that influence the narration of
Benito Cereno are generatively dense, entangled, and uneven. Just what sort of
“Spaniard,” then, might we read Cereno to be? Let us briefly turn to the historical Benito
Cerreño from Chapter 18 in Amasa Delano’s A Narrative of the Voyages and Travels in
the Northern and Southern Hemispheres (1817), an eyewitness account of the slave
revolt aboard the Spanish merchant ship named Tryal and the source text from which
Melville reimagines his novella.208 In Empire of Necessity (2014), Latin American
historian Greg Grandin delves into the historical circumstances of the slave revolt aboard
the Tryal that Amasa Delano belatedly recognizes and, ultimately, violently quells. Of
interest here, Grandin notes some key biographical details of the Tryal’s captain, Benito
Cerreño, who “was born in Calañas, Spain, a small orchard and goat town outside of
Seville, into a gentry family that had begun to come apart as agricultural prices in Spain
steadily declined throughout the late 1700s”; the economic downturn in the metropole
prompted Cerreño’s arrival in Lima and his maritime participation in Spanish America’s
increasingly liberalized commerce.209
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Readers encounter the Benito Cereno of Melville’s story to be a “Spaniard” with
quite a different backstory. He is initially marked by this variance in multiple terms for
his appearance: in “style,” “fashion,” “toilette,” “costume” (177). Cereno’s origins are
conveyed by the narrative’s infamously slippery free indirect discourse that mediates
Delano’s perceptions and reflections. The narrative’s densely mediated account of
Cereno’s Spanishness is first represented in a catalogue of the commodities that comprise
his attire:
The Spaniard wore a loose Chili jacket of dark velvet; white small-clothes and
stockings, with silver buckles at the knee and instep; a high-crowned sombrero, of
fine grass; a slender sword, silver mounted, hung from a knot in his sash—the last
being an almost invariable adjunct, more for utility than ornament, of a South
American gentleman’s dress to this hour. (176)
Delano assesses Cereno’s apparel—bedecked in silver accessories and colonial
handicrafts—as an indicator of the potential payoff for his humanitarian intervention.
Literary critic Paul Downes’ analysis of the novella’s humanitarian rhetoric and Greg
Grandin’s historical work both provide nuanced insights of the historical Delano’s
economically disastrous sealing enterprise; the resultant economic pressures register only
fragmentarily in Melville’s version of the narrative. Nonetheless, this early U.S. subject’s
own economic misfortunes incentivize his intrusive performance as “the American in
charity” aboard the distressed ship (170). He engages in a range of charitable acts that
rescript the threat of racial disorder with “good-natured authority” and that manage social
relations through the distribution of necessities such as water, “this republican element”
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(206, 207).210 Nonetheless, Downes offers a helpful comparison of the humanitarian
protocols that characterize Delano’s published 1817 account of the revolt aboard the
Tryal and Melville’s 1855 reimagining of the account in Benito Cereno.211 In the first
case, Delano’s 1817 narrative “represents the relationship between Western crisis and
humanitarian intervention as a temporal one (the American is struggling before the
opportunity for humanitarian intervention arrives to help him out).”212 In the second case,
“Melville’s story presents Delano as the site of a persistent oscillation between
vulnerability and humanitarian reassurance (he reassures himself by recalling his
humanitarianism).”213
Yet Delano’s unfavorable economic circumstances would be an incomplete theory
of his disavowed yet afflicted mentality of “Western crisis” and early Republican
“vulnerability.” Cereno’s commodified dress not only functions as a sight/site for the
New Englander’s calculation of interventionist profits, but also Cereno’s outward
“fashion” yet ill-fitting malaise participates in an economy of power and proof of
(il)legitimacy that provides the U.S. captain with oscillating interpretations for the
disordered relations between races, as well as the chain of command and political
organization aboard the San Dominick. While Delano imagines his own economic
restitution through coercive acts of Anglo-American humanitarianism aboard the ship, I
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suggest that his vulnerability is also bound to a stubbornly opaque sociopolitical
arrangement aboard the San Dominick.
Throughout Delano’s varied attempts to pinpoint the Spanish captain’s essential
character as a crucial heuristic for the disorder on the ship, he acknowledges a facet about
Cereno's potential geopolitical and cultural locus that often goes unnoticed in scholarship
on the novella. The Cereno of Melville’s novella might not be, after all, a peninsular
Spaniard decked out in the lucrative textiles and ornaments of the colonies, indications of
the kind of compensation Delano might expect from his humanitarian encroachments. To
the extent that the traditional version of the Black Legend refers to the cruel ambition of
Spanish conquest—a violently insatiable lust after gold, silver, and other riches—Delano
may be read as drawing on its precedent to impugn the so-called Spaniard’s opulent
appearance. This opulence, after all, mismatches his frail likeness to “an invalid courtier
tottering about London streets in the time of the plague” in an image of contagion and
imperial degeneration (177). In turn, however, the U.S. captain’s retaliatory reliance on
the Black Legend scripts also produces in him a fleeting sense of his own inadequate
fortunes, his burdensome accountability the shareholders of his sealing ship, and his
vulnerability to imperial competitors with well-stocked colonial coffers (221). I suggest
instead, however, that Delano’s sense of rivalry stems from Cereno’s creole situation
rather than any power exerted or title authorized from the Iberian metropoles. The socalled Spaniard “avowed himself a native and resident of Chili, whose inhabitants had not
so generally adopted the plain coat and once plebeian pantaloons; but, with a becoming
modification, adhered to their provincial costume, picturesque as any in the world”
(emphasis mine, 177). The oblique syntax characteristic of the novel’s equivocating free
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indirect discourse renders this sentence difficult to parse as it presents Cereno’s apparel
as one shade of his creole provincialism. Presumably, the sartorial markers of Delano’s
New England republicanism appear in relief against Cereno in this tortuous passage, as
the likely wearer of “the plain coat and once plebeian pantaloons” of Republican humility
that are overshadowed by Cereno’s “picturesque” colonial splendor.
The archaic, inter-imperial version of the Black Legend that made a defamatory
exception of the Spanish conquest—overshadowing all other European colonial ventures
in avarice and violence—loses some of its critical urgency here. But how does Delano’s
perception of a creole, Spanish-American captain in the figure of Cereno pose a threat to
his early U.S. republican subjectivity? Much like the British West Indians that Sean X.
Goudie focuses on in Creole America (2006), the figure of a creole Spanish American
also introduces “the shadowy presence of creole American identities [that] underlies
anxious efforts to the construction of exceptional U.S. ‘American’ identities and literary
and cultural traditions.”214 Taking another glance at Cereno’s appearance, Delano casts
shadows of doubt on Cereno’s legitimacy, and by extension his sovereign “right” to the
potential wealth encapsulated by the cargo ship:
[Cereno’s] strange ceremoniousness, too, at other times evinced, seemed not
uncharacteristic of one playing a part above his real level. Benito Cereno—Don
Benito Cereno—a sounding name. One, too, at that period, not unknown, in the
surname, to supercargoes and sea captains trading along the Spanish Main, as
belonging to one of the most enterprising and extensive mercantile families in all
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those provinces; several members of it having titles; a sort of Castilian
Rothschild, with a noble brother, or cousin, in every great trading town of South
America. The alleged Don Benito was in early manhood, about twenty-nine or
thirty. To assume a sort of roving cadetship in the maritime affairs of such a
house, what more likely scheme for a young knave of talent and spirit? (186)
Given the New England captain’s accusation of Cereno “playing a part above his real
level,” he follows this imputation of falsity through to play the part of inquisitor. Delano
draws on the long and contradictory histories of a characteristically Spanish racial
discourse of blood purity (limpieza de sangre) to disempower and illegitimate the
extravagance of Cereno’s creole fashion, and to taint the perceived remnants of his
nobility. Yet Delano’s inquisitorial efforts abide by an inevitably faulty procedure.
Historically, the advent of blood purity inquiries for creoles in Spanish America were
often protracted bureaucratic affairs with transatlantic extension that staged a return to a
“community of origins” in the provinces of peninsular Spain to investigate the creole
subject’s “nativity,” or a creole’s genealogical purity from the religious taint of heresy
that distinguished “Old Christian” families from “New Christians.” These genealogical
distinctions instantiated an imaginary of human difference specific to Iberia’s shifting
social and political contexts during the Reconquista (a period of Christian war against
Muslim kingdoms of Granada, expanding colonialism in the Americas, and population
surveillance by the inquisition) imbuing a divisive logic to the inquisition’s persecution
of crypto-Judaism and crypto-Islam to preserve and protect “Old Christian” bloodlines.215
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In Delano’s inquiry, however, the locus of authentic lineage and title is limited to Spanish
America, or more accurately, to the collective name for all the trade towns and routes of
this colonial zone: “the Spanish Main.”
The oddity of Delano’s inquisitorial probing of Cereno’s lineage is not just its
apparent misplacement to the “wrong” hemisphere; it is also heightened by the multiple
temporalities that impinge on the narrative’s unfolding. With the narrative’s diegesis
dated in 1799, on the verge of the nineteenth-century, purity of blood discourses had
already developed into a more secular racial caste system [sistema de castas]. In contrast
to earlier formations of limpieza de sangre, the casta system’s conceptual formation of
blackness contrasted with limpieza frameworks that emphasized religious difference as an
organizing principle for social relations, ideologies, and cultural practices in the colonies.
As Martínez shows, the discourse of genealogical taint had been retooled to manage the
Spanish American slave population as an indelible blackness manifest in somatic
features. The relationship between racial and religious difference in the casta system,
then, was adapted to manage black slaves’ potentially insurgent, Afro-diasporic religious
and cultural practices. The uneven temporal contexts and palimpsestic versions of
limpieza discourse that Delano extrapolates from the Spanish Americas eventually
entraps him in a plot made of his own mistranslations of a foreign racial and imperial
construct. Yet these very mistranslations of actual social relations aboard the San
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Dominick—the slave uprising—also glimpse an alternate sociopolitical arrangement
conditioned by distortions of the Black Legend.
I want to focus here on the centrality of the concept of “nativity” in blood purity
discourses in order to grasp the complex significance of Cereno’s supposed avowal of
creoleness as “a native and resident of Chile.” Martínez notes that within sixteenthcentury investigations of blood purity in Spanish America, “nativity” was a densely
layered concept that informed notions of interiority and natural essence. Yet verifying
one’s nativity was anything but a natural process, where its proof took the form of
communal and documentary constructions of “genealogical memory”:
Thus, to describe someone as ‘a native of Toledo’ (natural de Toledo) was to
imply that she or he had been born and had kinfolk in that city and that the
person’s ‘nature’ originated or was somehow located there…. The strong
emphasis on conducting investigations in native towns rested on the assumption
that the most reliable source of information about a lineage’s limpieza de sangre
was the community of origins. It was in that community that commissioners
expected to find elders who could speak with authority about the family’s
religious behavior, kinship ties, and public reputation beyond a few generations
and that was also the most likely to have written and visual sources for
reconstructing its history, such as baptismal and marriage records, genealogical
books, and sanbenitos. In short, the native or ‘natural’ community—its elders and
archives—was the privileged repository of genealogical memory.216
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Delano’s apparent search for proof of Cereno’s genealogy along the “Spanish Main” does
not return to the Iberian peninsula. To further complicate the matter, the Spanish
Americas are defined by the very uncertainty of their territoriality; as I noted earlier, this
ambiguous territoriality became irrevocably associated with the “impure” or otherwise
suspect characteristics of its creole inhabitants. The New England republican’s pursuit of
what we might call a paradoxical “creole authenticity” poses an endless problem for his
reworking of an antiquated set of questions for inquisitorial investigation: the question of
“nobility,” the verification of “titles,” and the implication of Cereno’s crypto-Judaism in
the figure of a “Castilian Rothschild.” Indeed, the multivalence of limpieza de sangre
discourses—especially once transplanted from its uses in medieval Spain to the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Spanish American colonies—rendered it productive
of competing interpretations and contradictory levels of evidence that impel Delano’s
oscillating judgements of Cereno. According to conceptions of lineage within this
territorial context, a convincing, sustained performance within the colonial community
could attain the status of proof. It was not unheard of, for instance, for commoners to
“[add] a don to their names, and just as many conversos and other prohibited categories
altered their surnames in order to erase all traces of their past” upon arriving in the ports
of Spanish America from Iberia.217
The “Spanish Main” is also, conceptually and territorially, a manipulable space of
genealogical memory. With means, “tainted” Spanish Americans and migrants
(conversos, moriscos, confesos) alike could purchase favorable testimonies and forged

217

Martínez, Genealogical Fictions, 176. Late in the Spanish colonial era, members of mixed
races could purchase the privileges of whiteness in a document known as the gracias al sacar.
See Ann Twinam, Purchasing Whiteness: Pardos, Mulattos, and the Quest for Social Mobility in
the Spanish Indies (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2015).

159
documents. Yet it seems that playing a well-regarded part in the community could suffice
for proof in the realm of common opinion, which inquisitors consulted in their
investigations. Delano’s distrust weaves together this entire array of possibilities for a
multifaceted representation of creole counterfeit. Cereno’s “sounding name” is itself
likened to a proper name (“a sort of Castilian Rothschild”) associated with anti-Semetic
conspiracy theories and tainted wealth. Together with a “common” knowledge of the
surname as synonymous with a powerful creole mercantile family, all combine to
delegitimate the Spanish captain by insinuating an impossible status: that of creole
legitimacy, a de facto paradox by the ideological scripts of the Black Legend.
If at first Cereno’s legitimate imperium over the San Dominick poses a problem for
Delano’s early republican self-assurance and self-interest in a sufficiently “justified”
humanitarian takeover the ship, the U.S. captain unwittingly conjures new forms of
danger through his constructions of Cereno’s inherent creole illegitimacy. Given the
unknowable and performative status of creole “nativity” in the Spanish Americas,
Delano’s inquisition arrives at the possibility of Cereno’s disguised piracy, a roguishness
cloaked not only in the Chile-made jacket of dark velvet but also in the “sounding name”
of Don Benito Cereno that resonates with the “conspiratorial twang” of the piratical sort
of “Spaniard” he might turn out to be. Because the New England captain’s protracted
investigation of Cereno takes suspicion as its mode of interpretation and its only
incontrovertible yet equally unsubstantiated “proof,” Delano reconciles Benito Cereno’s
disordered surroundings, physical appearance, and temperament in one of two, mutually
exclusive and equally valid ways: as the product of “innocent lunacy or wicked
imposture,” in other words, as irrational impotence or political calculus. “Innocent
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lunacy,” on the one hand, effaces Cereno’s sovereignty through a diagnosis of the
captain’s incapacity for rule when Delano perceives him as an example of monarchical
obsolescence. “Wicked imposture,” on the other hand, attributes to Cereno a pernicious
and motivated theatricality, which tacitly acknowledges a contending modality of
sovereign rule with which Delano must reckon. Between these two probabilities for
Cereno’s defunct political constitution, it is the wicked impostor who wields a potent
sovereign power at the head of a cross-racial, piratical syndicate aboard the San
Dominick. Yet the logic of political organization implied by the second interpretation
remains thoroughly illegible for Delano, although it is spectacularly form-shifting. He
elaborates Cereno’s “roving cadetship” by affixing his attention to the velvet jacket
Cereno wears and by refiguring the rogue political arrangement with which it is
associated into latent, albeit brutish force: “To think that, under Cereno’s aspect of
infantile weakness, the most savage energies might be couched—those velvets of the
Spaniard but the silky paw to his fangs” (8).
The various assemblages of racialized degeneracy that Delano proliferates in his
weaponization of limpieza discourses culminate in his apprehension of a mode of
political affiliation entirely antithetical to his own republicanism and racial
governmentality. The New England captain’s dread of Cereno—the threat of his “roving
cadetship” or “savage energies”—arises not from Cereno’s individual authority or “dark
despotism” on the archaic model of the Black Legend that equates Spanish imperial rule
to a morally degenerate despotism. Delano’s dread is instead spurred by the wider
implications of cross-racial and piratical collusion made possible by the multivalence of
Cereno’s creole impurities. The volatility of these creole impurities create new seams of
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political affiliation that may instantiate what Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker call
“freedoms of the hydrarchy,” an insurgent mode of sociopolitical association that arose
from inside the workings of early transatlantic capitalism.218 As Rediker and Linebaugh
write, the “pirate ship was a ‘world turned upside down’… Pirates distributed justice,
elected officers, divided loot equally, and established a different discipline. They limited
the authority of the captain [and] resisted many of the practices of the capitalist merchant
shipping industry.”219
In contrast to Linebaugh and Rediker’s social history of Atlantic piracy’s horizontal
anarchies, Delano’s starkly binary conceptualization of human difference cannot fully
imagine such a sociopolitical arrangement. Therefore, he cannot express his fears of
piratical, cross-racial conspiracy without reference to Cereno. Yet this leads to a more
dramatically perilous conclusion for Delano: if Cereno’s explanation for the unfortunate
circumstances of the ship’s calamitous voyage from Buenos Aires to Lima was falsified,
along with his account of the haggard condition of both the Spanish crew and slaves,
Delano concludes: “Then every soul on board, down to the youngest negress, was
[Cereno’s] carefully drilled recruit in the plot: an incredible inference. And yet, if there
was ground for mistrusting his veracity, that inference was a legitimate one” (emphasis
mine, 192). Insofar as stagecraft is tantamount to statecraft aboard the San Dominick,
Delano’s attribution of imposture to Benito Cereno by extension requires imputing an
active, participatory stagecraft/statecraft to the slaves as well.220 Until the climactic
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unveiling of the racial and political performance aboard the San Dominick, in which the
slaves are perceived “in ferocious piratical revolt,” there is always “ground for
mistrusting” Cereno’s veracity and the possibility of cross-racial collusion cannot be fully
disavowed.
In order to contain the threat of cross-racial conspiracy, Delano reworks the
discourse of blood purity again, this time into a seemingly dependable plantation
technology. When he meets the mulatto, Muslim steward named Francesco, Delano
reworks the discourse of blood purity. This time the perception of blackness and taint
does not operate as an analysis of Cereno’s creole dysfunction, but instead as a
mechanism of management and division among forms of slave labor, black culture, and
racialized distinctions imputed to skin color. At this point, the so-called Spaniard’s slaves
become the New Englander’s discursive target. This seeming switch in target is also
related to the mismanagement Delano observes aboard the ship in the lack of sailors and
social discipline; he characterizes this state of affairs as “absenteeism,” a term that
gestures toward trans-imperial fears of absentee proprietorship of West Indian slave
plantations as a condition for socioeconomic debasement in the colonies (172).221 For the
first and likely only time that Delano’s consciousness registers an interaction among the
slaves without Cereno as a primary determinant of a scene of social relation, the Yankee
republican places a boundary of antagonistic difference between Francesco and Babo.
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Delano’s reading of Francesco’s cultured deportment “quite completed the insignificance
of the small bare-headed Babo, who, as if not unconscious of inferiority, eyed askance
the graceful steward. But in part, Captain Delano imputed his jealous watchfulness to that
peculiar feeling which the full-blooded entertains for the adulterated one” (219). By
attempting to divide blackness antagonistically in Cereno’s virtual absence, Delano
discursively usurps Cereno’s rule and seizes control of the ship’s space and subjects. To
pit Francesco and Babo against one another also defuses the urgent threat of cross-racial
solidarity that Delano recurrently senses.
At first sight, Francesco is described as an orientalist stereotype, seemingly out of
place and otherworldly from the Spanish American littoral that surrounds all. Another
instance of spectacular apparel seizes Delano’s attention, when he describes “the
steward—a tall, rajah-looking mulatto, orientally set off with a pagoda turban formed by
three or four Madras handkerchiefs wound about his head, tier on tier—approaching with
a saalam, announced lunch in the cabin” (218). Francesco appears as an anachronistic
remnant of medieval Spanish Moorish culture, or as a pattern of representation that Jacob
Rama Berman theorizes as an “arabesque,” a romantic engagement with foreign cultural
traditions and transnational phenomena of “Barbary captivity, Near Eastern Travel, and
Orientalist romance” that defined “the racial parameters of American citizenship.”222 Yet
as Grandin shows in Empire of Necessity, these exterior, cultural markers of Francesco’s
faith are not out of place in the context of the Spanish American slave trade, which
brought incalculable numbers of African Muslims to its shores and who subsequently
mingled with creole colonial society. Grandin further argues that the slaves’ practices of
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resistance aboard the Tryal were encoded by their Islamic faith. Historian Herman
Bennett also reminds us, “the African diaspora—a lived experience—also constituted a
field of identities made possible by the complexity of Spanish imperial ideology and
Christian political thought, which assigned Africans to discrete juridical identities” (45).223 To further complicate the forms of blackness that taunt Delano’s perceptions on the
ship, the “field of identities” Bennett mentions were not just juridical categories, but as
we’ve seen, products of the highly plastic cultural discourse of limpieza de sangre.
Delano’s citation of a Barbados planter’s race science demonstrates the
permeability of blood purity logics among Spanish and English colonial complexes. As
Delano studies Francesco’s appearance, he reiterates a blood purity reasoning that posited
a cyclical return to “whiteness,” so long as that return was not permanently barred by
“black” blood. The New Englander begins:
“Don Benito,” whispered he, “I am glad to see this usher-of-the-golden-rod of
yours; the sight refutes an ugly remark once made to me by a Barbadoes planter;
that when a mulatto has a regular European face, look out for him; he is a devil.
But see, your steward here has features more regular than King George’s of
England; and yet there he nods, and bows, and smiles; a king, indeed-the king of
kind hearts and polite fellows. What a pleasant voice he has, too?… But tell me,
has he not, so far as you have known him, always proved a good, worthy
fellow?’” (219)
Here, Delano extends his purity inquiry to black populations in the Spanish American
colonial world. Delano confers with the dubitable yet highest ranking officer—the creole
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Cereno—to verify Francesco’s character; but for Cereno himself, no peer of comparable
or higher sociopolitical status is available onboard to attest to his integrity, whether
genealogical or dispositional. Delano seeks on this faulty premise to determine or debunk
the truth of the Barbados planter’s “ugly remark.” When Cereno unsurprisingly confirms
the “goodness” of Francesco, “like a phlegmatic appreciator” whose own inward humors
are forebodingly off-kilter, Delano replies with his most overt figuration of blood purity
(219). According to Delano, it would “not [be] creditable to us white-skins, if a little of
our blood mixed with the African’s, should, far from improving the latter’s quality, have
the sad effect of pouring vitriolic acid into black broth; improving the hue, perhaps, but
not the wholesomeness” (219). The Yankee’s response to Cereno’s affirmation of
Francesco’s character gleefully participates in the ugly race science—specifically, of the
one-drop rule—of the Barbadoes planter’s remark that he initially condemns. In this case,
the moral essence and economic return of “creditable” whiteness is the main point of
disagreement. The anonymous Barbados planter and the republican Delano share the
notion that ideologies of blood purity could provide a calculated strategy for suppressing
black insurgency within the colonial plantation complex, of which the San Dominick is
simultaneously that complex’s maritime extension and subversion.
Cereno redirects Delano’s dislocation of the blood purity discourse from a colonial
British plantation back to the Spanish Americas, where he links the “planter’s remark” to
reanimations of the Black Legend in the region. Cereno’s interruption of Delano’s Angloimperial elaboration of blood purity logics is prompted by a glance at Babo. This glance
indicates the slave’s puppeteering of Cereno’s conversational redirection: “‘Doubtless,
doubtless, Señor, but’—glancing at Babo—‘not to speak of negroes, your planter’s
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remark I have heard applied to the Spanish and Indian intermixtures in our provinces. But
I know nothing about the matter,’ he listlessly added” (220). What is intended to be a
deflection of any conversation between the two captains approaching the question of
black insurgency ultimately reactivates a potential seam for cross-racial affiliation
conditioned by paradigms of racialization that cut across the colonialisms of the British
West Indies and the Spanish Americas. This affiliation is made manifest by the
treacherous archetypes of mulatto and mestizo. That Cereno’s own genealogy cannot be
verified leaves his own character an open-ended, Spanish-American analogue to
Francesco, the mulatto steward; Cereno’s lingering unverifiability leaves its trace in
Delano’s resurgent suspicions of “some iniquitous plot” between slaves and creole
captain being devised against him (229).
In this reading of Benito Cereno, I do not suggest that a horizontal collaboration
between the Spanish American creole and the enslaved ever takes place aboard the San
Dominick. Rather, I foreground that even cross-racial interaction articulated within the
language of conspiracy and degeneration threatens to overturn Delano’s preconceptions
of normative political and social orders that characterize his liberal theories of racial
governmentality. Ultimately, the renegade racial discourses produced by Delano’s own
protracted elaboration of blood purity ideologies overwhelm his imperial and settler
colonial maneuvers on the San Dominick, resulting in his tactical and discursive failure to
eclipse potential South-South political networks in the hemisphere.
II. Shadowed by the Castas: Bolívar’s Exile in Kingston and the Colonial
Conundrum
On the 19th of December 1815, the creole independence leader Simón Bolívar
addressed the following appeal in a letter to Alexandre Pétion, the first President of the
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Republic of Haiti: “I hope and fancy, Mr. President, that our affinity of sentiments in
defense of the rights of our common homeland [patrie commune] will gain by Your
Excellency the effects of inexhaustible benevolence towards all those who never sought
recourse to it in vain.”224 When Bolívar penned these words positing a “common
homeland” between Haitians and Spanish Americans, he was living in exile in Kingston,
Jamaica. Spanish royalists—with fresh reinforcements from the Iberian peninsula—had
exacted bloody retribution on creole patriots across South America, sending hundreds
into exile throughout the Caribbean. Disagreements and strife among factions for
independence also expelled Bolívar from the mainland.225 While no other European or
American power acknowledged the Republic of Haiti as a sovereign state, how did
Bolívar imagine a shared political project—in the name of a “common homeland”—
between a rogue independence movement in the Spanish Americas and an ostracized
black republic?226
Diplomatic impasses with dominant foreign powers forced Bolívar to imagine
political possibility elsewhere and otherwise in collaboration with the Republic of Haiti.
During his preceding, year-long exile in Kingston, Bolívar initially attempted to enlist
British and U.S. support for Spanish-American independence. An unpublished letter to
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the editor of The Royal Gazette of Jamaica—attributed to Bolívar, signed “El
Americano,” and written sometime after September 28th, 1815 and before the first letter
to Pétion—indicates that foreign officials linked Spanish America’s sociopolitical
instability to the inhabitants’ excess of racial difference.227 In Bolívar’s summary, these
foreign political analyses conclude “the main difficulty to achieve [independence]
consists in the differences among the castas that comprise the population of this immense
country.”228 This section elaborates an elite creole’s counterargument to the ascribed
social and political problem of intractable castas as it produced equivocal representations
of Spanish-American society.229 Initially, Bolívar launched an epistolary counterpropagandist project that posited a naturalized fiction of bloodless order among the castas
in Spanish America. In his efforts to make Spanish-American racial assemblages legible
to foreign powers, the region’s social configuration under independence appeared either
indistinguishable from colonial orders under the old Spanish regime or a newly available
target for Anglo colonial annexation. For an unconsolidated independence movement, I
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argue, the last way out of this colonial conundrum involved an insurgent reading along
the grain of the casta problem to ally with the Republic of Haiti.
In what ways did the gazette’s British colonial audience imagine “the differences
among the castas” as obstructions to Spanish-American independence? How were foreign
and creole apprehensions of casta insurgence represented in the midst of SpanishAmerican political upheaval? In the unpublished letter to the editor of The Royal Gazette,
Bolívar responds to foreign consensus concerning the castas’ intrinsic disorder by
reiterating a familiar settler colonial myth. This myth establishes a natural and therefore
absolute boundary between the whites and the remaining castas in Spanish America.
Writing under the pseudonym “El Americano,” he begins:
Of the fifteen to twenty million inhabitants that are found scattered in this vast
continent (populated) by (different) indigenous nations, Spanish africans
[“africanas españolas”], and mixed races [“razas cruzadas”], the minor part is
certainly of whites [“de blancos”]; but it is also true that these [the whites] possess
intellectual qualities that grant them a relative equality and an influence which
would seem hypothetical to those who have not been able to judge, for
themselves, the moral character and material circumstances that compose a most
favorable opinion toward unity and harmony between all of the inhabitants;
despite the numerical disproportion between one color and another.230
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El Americano provides a demographic overview of Spanish America that affirms foreign
apprehensions surrounding the majority constituted by the region’s racialized subjects. In
addition to a preponderant population, the castas also denote an unruly profusion of
differences among themselves that encompass the multiplicity of indigenous nations, the
varied status and ethnicities of “Spanish africans,” and the gradations of racial impurity
circumscribed by the phrase “razas cruzadas” (literally, “crossed races” but meaning
“mixed races”) (figure 1). To suppress this population problem and its apparent diffusion
of racial stain, Bolívar imposes a white supremacist and colonial division between the
minority of whites and the inhabitants of color, wherein the relative “influence” and the
“intellectual qualities” of the whites counterbalance the unknowing multitude of the
castas. He essentially translates the black-white binary into a casta-white binary to render
the independence of “this vast continent” favorable to foreign diplomatic collaboration.
In so doing, the letter aims to defuse the foreign assumption that the motley castas will
taint or otherwise overthrow creole whiteness in the midst of revolution, making that
whiteness illegible and therefore defunct.
Bolívar’s propagandistic defense of Spanish-American creoles stages an opposition
between Anglo and Spanish colonial ideologies defined by the Black Legend. Rather than
critique the very premises of foreign diplomatic dismissal, Bolívar incorporates these
foreign terms of debate in a mirror discourse known as the “White Legend,” an
exculpatory representation of racial governmentality in the Spanish colonies.231 For
example, Bolívar affirms “the truth” of Francois de Pons’s observation in Voyage a la
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partie oriéntale de la Terre Ferme, dans l’Amérique méridoniale (1806).232 He quotes
from de Pons’s travel narrative, “The Spanish American has made his slave the
companion of his indolence.”233 According to Bolívar, de Pons states a “truth” of Spanish
American slavery but misunderstands the mutual “indolence” of the Spanish American
and the slave as a symptom of cross-racial mingling and therefore indistinction. Contrary
to modern Latin American nationalisms that draw on ideologies of mestizaje, Bolívar
refuses again to blur the category of “the white” or, interchangeably, “the Spanish
colonist” with any of Spanish America’s racialized inhabitants: the enslaved, the mixed
races, its diverse indigenous nations.234 Instead, Bolívar contorts de Pons’ version of the
Black Legend into a grotesque justification of slavery in Spanish America and white
creole settlement that upholds the stereotypical Spanish slaveholder’s domestic
paternalism over the stereotypical Anglo colonist’s physical mastership: “The Spanish
colonist does not oppress his domestic with excessive labor; he treats him like a
companion; he educates him in the moral principles and humanity prescribed by the
religion of Jesus.”235 This untenable comparison between Anglo and Spanish imperial
formations denies ongoing social strife in Spanish America fueled by the racializing
processes of the casta and slave systems. In his translation of the black-white binary for
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the Spanish-American context, he depicts “the white” who cannot be stained by profuse
castas; in contrast to the “excessive” slave labors driven by the exigencies of Angloimperial commerce, he invokes the Spanish colonist’s Catholic paternalism and intimate
subjection of the domestic slave in Spanish America.
The figural Spanish colonist Bolívar invokes in his defense of Spanish-American
slavery collapses the social, legal, and moral distinction between an independent and
colonial Spanish Americas. For example, the Spanish-American domestic’s bondage
echoes aspects of the old Spanish imperial rationality of forcible conversion that impelled
the conquest and enslavement of indigenous peoples. Nancy E. van Deusen reminds us in
Global Indios, “Although the indios of America could not automatically be enslaved as
infidels, the legal document known as the Spanish Requirement (‘El Requerimiento,”
1513) validated violent Spanish military action, especially when authorities could
demonstrate the unwillingness of indios to succumb to Catholic rule.”236 The figural
Spanish colonist in Bolívar’s letter echoes the Requirement’s tripartite imposition of
paternalist authority, religious conversion, and domestic incorporation. Here, strangely,
the figural subject of Spanish colonial power is not the “indio” vassal, but instead the
domestic slave who remains unspecified by any casta category.237 This indeterminacy
encodes a cross-casta subjection of indigenous nations, “Spanish Africans,” and mixedraces within the imagined consolidation of white creole power. Bolívar’s creole
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propaganda paradoxically repeats longstanding defenses of Spanish colonial ideology in
the sovereign voice and signature of “El Americano,” an archetype and political
placeholder that excludes all non-white castas from post-independence political power. El
Americano’s defense of past and present Spanish-American unfreedoms extends the
racialized violence inaugurated by the conquest to the stateless independence
movement’s apprehension of nineteenth-century casta disorder. So far, the letter’s appeal
for foreign political collaboration on behalf of Spanish-American independence depends
on a superficial rearrangement of Spanish colonialism’s sociopolitical contradictions and
violences.
In the present cycle of Spanish-American revolutionary upheaval, new
contestations of slavery, settler colonial regimes, and legal restrictions on the castas’
ways of life and opportunity transpired. Even Bolívar acknowledges the “free black and
enslaved soldiers who contributed so much, albeit by force, to the triumph of the
royalists” in the letter’s reflection on the initial phase of the independence wars.238 Both
royalists and, eventually, advocates of independence recruited enslaved, free black, and
pardo (meaning mixed-race) participation in the wars of independence as part of the
internecine conflict’s biopolitical calculus and conduct: fewer white creole and
Peninsular lives would be risked if more soldiers could be recruited from the castas. But
fugitive and free black peoples acted on their own incalculable strategies to interrupt both
royalist and patriots’ desired outcomes. From the perspective of the enslaved population,
historian Peter Blanchard notes that “declaring allegiance to the [Spanish] king provided
a legal justification for slaves to strike back at their owners, many of whom were
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supporters of the revolutionary cause.”239 Early on in the conflict, the royalist faction—
with their transatlantic allegiance to Peninsular Spain—were incentivized to incorporate
slaves into their ranks unlike the local patriot slave-owning classes, “but the violence
quickly exploded out of royalist control, producing very real fears of a Haitian-style
social revolution.”240
By the time Bolívar drafted his epistolary fiction of a harmonious, natural hierarchy
among the castas, the conditions for free black and enslaved recruitment had shifted
significantly under the royalist banner. Along with the letter’s primary lie of harmony
among the castas, Bolívar insists that the free black recruits and self-liberated individuals
who once decimated the propertied classes under the command of the nominally royalist
caudillo (rogue militant leader), José Tomás Boves, “have returned to the party of the
patriots, who had not offered absolute liberty, as did the Spanish royalist guerillas. The
truest defenders of independence are those same followers [partidarios] of Boves, united
now with the white creoles, who have never abandoned this noble cause [of
independence]” (emphasis mine).241 After their inexplicable deviation from “this noble
cause” of independence, free black and fugitive soldiers just as mysteriously return to
their proper and naturalized place to serve the creole-led struggle.
What explains the sudden defection of free black and self-liberated soldiers from
the royalists to the patriots? By Bolívar’s own admission, the white creole leadership
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among the patriots had never promised “absolute freedom” as did, purportedly, the
Spanish royalists. The letter argues that free black and fugitive soldiers renounced their
allegiance to the royalists upon realizing the self-evident good of Spanish-American
independence. Of course, Bolívar’s resort to such propagandistic discourse allows him to
temporarily, if unconvincingly, circumvent any mention of ongoing racial repression,
slavery, and settler colonialism in Spanish America. The letter, in short, extends its
investment in portraying the white creoles as inheritors of a bloodless empire. Contrary
to Bolívar’s account of black recruitment, the material and political opportunities
available to enslaved, black, and pardo soldiers vanished under the Crown’s banner when
the royalists were newly supplied with reinforcements from the peninsula in 1815 to
pacify the colonies. African-descended castas laboring within royalist battalions were no
longer compensated. In response, they switched allegiances and looked to join the open
ranks of the patriots for new opportunities to maneuver their freedom, compensation, and
social mobility in response to changing political conditions.
In the broader context of the creole leader’s diplomatic correspondence in
Kingston, Bolívar averted discussions of interior strife among creoles and castas to focus
on putatively exterior diplomatic dilemmas. Above all, Bolívar resented the isolation of
creole political power by foreign, especially Anglo-imperial authorities. In addition to the
unpublished letter to The Royal Gazette, a prior letter to the editor that did find its way to
publication in the same gazette—dated 28 September 1815, signed “Un Americano,” and
also attributed to Bolívar—depicts the isolated character of the region’s independence
movements.242
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According to this letter, Spanish America’s diplomatic isolation is twofold. On the
one hand, Spain’s colonial legacy impedes the development of creole political thought,
and on the other, the Spanish-American independence movement’s recourse to foreign
collaboration contrasts sharply with those of its North American predecessor:
Our discords originate from the two most fertile sources of public calamities—
ignorance and weakness. Spain has fomented the former by superstition, and has
perpetuated the latter by tyranny… We were absolutely deprived of all knowledge
of passing events—strangers to the contemplation of the political world, and
separated from all which could possibly produce the exertion of our intellect,
riches, or power. The South-Americans [americanos del Sur] have passed through
centuries as the blind travel among colors. They found themselves on the scene of
action, but their eyes were blindfolded—they have seen nothing—they have heard
nothing… Besides which we were abandoned by the whole world—no foreign
Power had guided us by her wisdom and experience—has defended us with her
arms, or protected us by her resources. This was not the case with North-America
during her struggle. Although possessing so many advantages over us in every
respect, the three most powerful colonial nations in Europe succoured that
independence, and yet Great-Britain has not had recourse to reprisals toward that
same Spain, which formerly waged war against her, in order to deprive her of her
colonies.
Bolívar reiterates a typical, anticolonial creole narrative of Spanish imperial
“superstition” and “tyranny” in this passage. Benighted by centuries of Spanish
governance and censorship, the “South-Americans” discover their paucity of political
knowledge and praxis when, after Napoleon’s invasion of Spain overturned Spanish
colonial order in 1808, they suddenly “find” themselves upon the revolutionary “scene of
action.” In Bolívar’s creole anticolonial version of the Black Legend, the politicalintellectual backwardness of South America’s populace derives from imperial policies
akin to the illegitimate dominion of a foreign power. South-American unreason or
backwardness is therefore an extrinsic function of imperial governance, the handiwork of
a foreign agent, rather than any inherent condition of the inhabitants’ brutishness: “their
eyes were blindfolded—they have seen nothing—they have heard nothing.” Two
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seemingly opposing discourses for the relation between Spanish America and the history
of Spanish colonialism—the White and Black legends, in short, the myths of benevolent
conquest and backward overlords—coexist as two elements in an untenable defense of
creole political subjectivity that eventually ensnares Bolívar in contradictions of his own
making. These ensnaring contradictions derive from his elite creole interests and the
limited anticolonialism those interests define. Bolívar deploys whitewashed Spanish
colonial history—the White Legend—as a useful narrative resource when foreign powers
smear the racial character of creole Spanish Americans. In turn, the Black Legend
provides a convenient account of Spanish America’s sequestration by unenlightened
Spain that can only be corrected through the illuminating cooperation of Spain’s political
rivals in the independence struggle.
Spanish Americans’ untaught darkness—their colonial blindfold—also figures a
political condition wrought by inter-imperial neglect beyond the exemplary effects of
Spanish tyranny. Abandoned “by the whole world,” creole Spanish Americans not only
lack material support to sustain a war against the Peninsular and local creole royalist
forces, but they lack a sense of orientation and belonging in relation to other world
powers that have failed to “guide,” “defend,” and “protect” the Southern hemisphere with
material and political support. This political vacuum leaves Spanish Americans to fend
for themselves in a relentless spin of revolutionary violence. Bolívar narrates the
internecine strife among the isolated patriots thus: “The Chiefs subdivide the cause [Los
jefes subdividen la causa] into as many parts as they themselves consist of… As no
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nation has yet entered into a formal Treaty or officially communicated with us, we are
consequently without relative political relations, which attach us to other Powers.”243
The Royal Gazette’s striking translation of the extant Spanish draft’s term for the
creole leadership—los jefes, meaning leaders, military commanders, bosses—into figures
of warring “Chiefs” redoubles the racial and settler colonial entanglements of the Black
Legend toward creole insurgents such as Bolívar (RAE). Although Bolívar leverages
Black Legend tropes against the Spanish colonial administration as a typical creole
anticolonial strategy, in the eyes of foreign empires the creole patriot and the Spanish
royalist cannot be disaggregated in the legend’s hegemonic framework for Spanish
colonial degeneracy. There is little distinction to be made. While the Spanish royalists are
aligned with a recognized, if degenerate empire in the script of the Black Legend, the
overwhelmingly creole patriot leadership are somehow more illegitimate: they are
factional “Chiefs” in a state of political disorder “without relative political relations,” and
lack by extension the formal political order and legibility such relations would bestow. In
this view, patriot creoles linger in an informal and therefore apolitical situation akin to
savagery.
As Bolívar maneuvers this diplomatic impasse with the British, he acts out the trope
of creole derangement most familiar to hemispheric studies scholars in Benito Cereno. In
a May 27, 1815 letter to the former Governor-General of India and British Foreign
Secretary Richard Wellesley, Bolívar describes his homeland on the brink of desolation:
This is the final moment of our existence, if a powerful nation does not lend us
assistance of all manner; oh, agony! we possess a mass of power that ought to
collapse on its own, if strong and sound supports do not uphold the edifice of our
liberty…. all shall be stricken by Spanish maleficence. Entire provinces are
243

Documento 1303. “Artículo de Simón Bolívar fechado en Kingston el 28 de Septiembre de
1815, dirigido al editor de “The Royal Gazette,” sobre la lucha por la independenicia.”
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transformed into desert; others are terrible theaters of a bloody anarchy. The
passions have been incited by all kinds of stimuli; fanaticisms have corrupted
minds, and oblivion shall be the result of these disorderly elements.
I saw, my friend and gentleman, the insatiable flame that rapidly consumes my
unfortunate country.244
Bolívar’s prophecy for an Américas on the cusp of unsalvageable ruination draws again
from Black Legend tropes for the Spanish empire’s corruption of the “passions,” states of
mind, and provincial tranquility of the Américas and its peoples. As the creole leader
depicts scenes of destruction that have both already and not yet happened, he asks the
British administrator to “indulge… these transports, that would seem the exaggerations of
a madman [un delirante], rather than expressions of true events and justified
anticipations.”245 In these sentences, Bolívar finds himself trapped by his own use of
whitewashed and defamatory forms of Spanish colonial propaganda—the White and
Black legends—as sources for the ideological justification of creole-led independence.
Even when Bolívar relies on the Black Legend’s longstanding critique of colonial
Spanish derangement to explain the urgency of Spanish-American independence from
Spain, his own eyewitness testimony appears irrationally suspect to potential foreign
collaborators.
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Documento 1293, “Carta de Bolívar a Ricardo Wellesley, fechada en Kingston el 27 de Mayo
de 1815, por la que solicita el auxilio de Inglaterra para la independencia,” Archivo del
Libertador. The original Spanish reads: “Este es el ultimo período de nuestra existencia, si una
nación ponderosa no nos presta auxilios de todo género; ¡qué dolor! temenos una enorme masa de
poder que por sí misma debe desplomarse, si artifices Fuertes y hábiles no construyen el edificio
de nuestra libertad… todo será anonadado por la maleficencia Española. Provincias enteras están
convertidas en desiertos; otras son teatros espantosos de una anarquía sanguinaria. Las pasiones
se han excitado por todos los estímulos; el fanatismo ha vulcanizado las cabezas, y el exterminio
será el resultado de estos elementos desorganizadores. Yo vi, amigo y señor mío, la llama
devoradora que consume rápidamente a mi desgraciado país.”
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Documento 1293, the passage in the original Spanish reads: “Vea Ud. Con indulgencia, señor,
estos transportes, que parecerán exageraciones de un delirante, más bien que expresiones de
hechos ciertos y de previsions justas.”
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Yet Bolívar’s wariness of being perceived as a madman by Richard Wellesley—a
career British diplomat and colonial administrator—is also linked to the dangers an
alliance with the British might pose. Among the numerous ways in which the creole
leader often speaks for “América” as a personified entity in his diplomatic
correspondence with foreign officials, his epistolary ventriloquism of América’s speaking
destiny, its “imperious” demand for “the favor of all those generous souls who know the
price of liberty and glory in defense of justice,” preemptively carves out a rhetorical
space in which América speaks as an imperium in order to be heeded by an Angloimperial audience, without avowing to be an empire in reality.246 More precisely, this
conceptual “América” also makes itself heard as an empire to assert a form of
sovereignty legible to the British and to foreclose its potential incorporation into the
British empire as a new mainland territory to add to its possessions in the West and East
Indies. Put simply, then, Bolívar’s apparent creole delirium not only emerges as a
function of naturalized Black Legend discourses of Spanish degeneracy, but it also
characterizes the impossible necessity of choosing among treacherous political strategies.
First, if Bolívar refuses to pursue an alliance with the British, he risks a total dissolution
of the weakened and waning independence struggles deprived of foreign reinforcements.
Second, Bolívar risks trading one imperial master (the Spanish) for another (the British)
by seeking out that very alliance, which may turn out to be another form of colonial
subjection. The creole patriot’s equivocal portrayal of América and the contradictory
voices and demands he relays on its behalf are therefore crucial for negotiating an
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Documento 1293, the passage in the original Spanish reads: “Sí, señor, la suerte de la América
reclama imperiosamente el favor de cuantas almas generosas conocen el precio de la libertad y se
glorían de defender la justicia.”
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undesirable matrix of contending imperial claims and ideologies. Let us also keep in
mind that the term “América” is at this point something of a placeholder to be fiercely
protected from foreign imperial intrusion, a name for a mutable ideal, and an as yet
unrealized and undefined political arrangement.
More than a month after the letter addressed to Richard Wellesley, Bolívar wrote a
letter on July 16, 1815 to Luis Brión—Curaçao-born patriot collaborator and acting
Admiral for Bolívar’s forces—who had anchored in Les Cayes, the Republic of Haiti,
after the fall of Cartagena, a key patriot stronghold in present-day Colombia.247 At this
date, Bolívar does not yet imagine any practical collaboration with the Haitians because
ongoing diplomatic efforts with the British forbids it:
Regarding me, I find myself disposed to do everything for my country; for this
same reason I am seeking to obtain succor from this government [the British],
which I hope will be lent me, if not today, perhaps tomorrow or another day.
Meanwhile, I am living amidst incertitude and misery. I myself do not go to that
island [Haiti] because I do not want to lose the confidence I have gained in these
gentlemen, since, as you know, their aristocratic manias are terrible.248
A departure from Kingston to Haiti is not, however, an unthinkable political option here.
Bolívar understands that choosing to go “to that island” could incur damaging
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Documento 1298, “Carta de Bolívar fechada en Kingston el 16 de Julio de 1815, dirigida a
Luis Brion, con informes sobre la situación en Costa Firme, el anuncio del envió del coronel
Miguel Carabaño como su comisionado y la ratificación de la resolución del Libertador de
proseguir en la lucha por la independencia.”
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The Spanish reads: En cuanto a mí, yo me hallo dispuesto a hacer todo por mi país; por la
misma razón estoy procurando obtener socorros de este gobierno, que espero me serán prestados,
si no hoy, será mañana u otro día. Mientras tanto, estoy viviendo en la incertidumbre y en la
miseria. Yo mismo no voy a esa isla porque no quiero perder la confianza que hacen de mí estos
señores, pues, como V. Sabe, las manías aristocráticas son terribles.
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consequences on his attempted diplomatic relationships with the British, or outright
foreign retaliation. Although he plays the part of a creole madman in his correspondence
with the British, from whom he still hopes “to obtain succor,” the creole independence
leader knowingly weighs the choice to find refuge in Haiti against British officials’
“aristocratic manias.” Of course, the “mania” Bolívar mentions is an Anglo-colonial one
that stakes the figural aristocrat’s legitimate power on his ability to safeguard his lineage
and associates from stains of many forms, but especially those that convey the “taint” of
racial stigma that signals, in Bolívar’s case, a form of racial defection to the political
blackness that Haiti represents. If Bolívar ventured to Haiti, then, he would violate the
“confidence [he has] gained in these gentlemen,” renounce all claim to an alliance
legitimated by Anglo imperial power, and give credence to foreign diplomatic discourses
about Spanish-American creoles’ capricious racial constitution. Bolívar defers a potential
Haitian alliance in favor of Britain’s imperial legitimacy to avoid these manifold
repercussions. However, this genteel economy of British diplomatic “confidence” had so
far abandoned the creole leader to live penniless in Kingston “amidst incertitude and
misery.”
I return now—shifting forward in time from the Brión and Wellesley letters—to the
conclusion of Bolívar’s unpublished letter to the editor that refutes foreign theories of
Spanish America’s intrinsic casta disorder. After at least two more months of languishing
in Kingston, Bolívar warns of unanticipated measures that would appear to be “the most
pernicious” to the British colonial readers of The Royal Gazette:
The abandon in which we have been left is the motive that may, at some time,
exasperate the party of independence, to the point of making it proclaim
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demagogic maxims to attract popular acclaim, this indifference will force the
weakened party in some parts of América to adopt measures, the most pernicious,
but the most necessary for the salvation of the americanos who presently find
themselves committed to the defense of their patria [homeland], against a
persecution unknown in every country other than Spanish America. Desperation
does not choose the means that remove it from danger.249
What kind of demagoguery or “pernicious, but… necessary” measures does Bolívar
threaten in this drafted letter? The letter’s overarching counterarguments to the casta
problem unravel in this final paragraph, where Bolívar envisions a final resort to
dangerous political measures “to attract popular acclaim” for independence. Nowhere in
the letter’s conclusion does Bolívar specify the “demagogic maxims” or “pernicious
measures” that might be proclaimed to reinvigorate the independence project. It is
implied, however, that exasperated creoles would eventually seek out the popular acclaim
of Spanish America’s numerous castas. Let us recall that Bolívar’s initial framing of the
casta problem links the notion of the popular and populous to the unruly racial superfluity
of the castas in comparison to the demographic minority of white creoles. In contrast to
Bolívar’s prior missive to Admiral Brión, then, the potential Spanish-American alliance
with Haiti now presents itself as a risky yet necessary measure given the circumstance of
protracted British imperial neglect toward Bolívar’s political cause. If we read Bolívar’s

249

The Spanish reads: “El abandono en que se nos ha dejado es el motivo que puede, en algún
tiempo, desesperar al partido independiente, hasta hacerlo proclamar máximas demagógicas para
atraerse la aura popular, esta indiferencia forzará al partido débil en algunas partes de la América
a adoptar medidas, las más perniciosas, pero las más necesarias para la salvación de los
americanos que actualmente se hallan comprometidos en la defensa de su patria, contra una
persecución desconocida en todo otro país que la América española. La desesperación no escoge
los medios que la sacan del peligro” (Documento 1304).
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potential alliance with the Republic of Haiti as a factor in this passage’s circumlocution,
then the alliance poses a double peril: such an alliance would not only agitate the
“aristocratic manias” of British colonial officials and planters, but it would also be
incompatible with the continued subjection of Spanish-American castas.
While Bolívar runs the double risk of unleashing foreign diplomatic backlash and
internal casta dissension for the “pernicious measure” of allying with Haiti, he also
absolves himself of potential consequences by inhabiting the “abandon in which we
[americanos] have been left.” The condition of “abandon” refers to Spanish America’s
desertion by foreign imperial priorities that expose the region to danger from within and
without, as well as deprive it of “relative political relations” with the rest of the world.
This abandon is, moreover, an outcast condition that “North America” did not endure
during its own struggles for independence. But this condition of “abandon” is also,
curiously, a “motive” that derives from the contradictory French etymology of the term:
“Complete freedom from constraint or convention; surrender or abandonment to natural
impulses; lack of inhibition or restraint” (OED, RAE indicates the Spanish word,
abandono, shares the same French root). Whether the alliance with Haiti stems from an
“abandon” freed from political conventions linked to “aristocratic manias” or surrender to
the desperate circumstances of foreign political indifference, Bolívar considers engaging
with the infamous discordance ascribed to the castas, figured here as the unmanageable
force of “popular acclaim.” The casta problem is, by the end of the letter, repurposed
rather than disavowed. The concluding paragraph deploys the castas’ threat of popular
and social discordance to defy the satisfaction of—or management by—Anglo-imperial
priorities. By extension, the letter’s return to the threat of unruly castas negates prior
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attempts to render legible Spanish-American social and political relations to Angloimperial powers.
As we will see in Bolívar’s correspondence with Haitian officials, the significance
of the informal alliance with Haiti goes beyond a mere affront to the aristocratic
sensibility of British officials. First, the process of collaborating with Haiti requires that
Bolívar undo his tenuous fiction of the castas as an uncontested, naturalized racial
hierarchy in Spanish America. Secondly, foreign imperial powers would likely perceive
the formation of such an alliance as a cross-racial conspiracy to overthrow extant political
orders by directly reanimating the Haitian Revolution’s legacy within a renewed struggle
for Spanish American independence.
III. Contingent Collusions: Bolívar’s Haitian Correspondence and Hemispheric
Antislavery
The December 19, 1815 Kingston letter where Bolívar introduces himself to
Alexandre Pétion with an appeal to a “common homeland [patrie commune]” between
Haitians and Spanish Americans marks the first letter of their correspondence.250 The
twelve total letters exchanged between Bolívar and Pétion from December 19, 1815 to
October 12, 1816 organize the entirety of this South-South alliance since no treaty or
contract was ever drafted to formalize it. To materialize Bolívar’s introductory
declaration of a “common homeland” between Spanish Americans and Haitians, Pétion
supplied and supported two expeditions from Haiti on the condition that Bolívar would
declare the liberty of all slaves in Spanish America (figure 2). An estimated 20 Haitian
volunteers and a donation of 6,000 rifles with ammunition supplied the first expedition;
Pétion also equipped the initial exploit with a printing press and type that was
250

Archivo del Libertador, Documento 1313.
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accompanied by the Haitian “Printer of the Liberating Expedition,” Jean Baillot.251 The
press, type, and printer provided the means with which Bolívar dispersed various
emancipation decrees throughout the South Americas in fulfillment of Pétion’s
antislavery condition. This section reads Bolívar’s extant correspondence with Haitian
officials alongside multiple versions of the expedition’s emancipation decrees as
elements of the alliance’s ongoing negotiation, textual production, and hemispheric
circulation.
Based on Bolívar’s Haitian correspondence and other archival traces of this SouthSouth alliance, historians acknowledge the alliance’s significance in shifting the tide of
victory for the Spanish-American independence movements. Historical analyses of the
alliance commonly dispute the authenticity of Haiti’s influence on Bolívar’s political
thought and action. For example, historians Ernesto Bassi and Sibylle Fischer disagree
whether Bolívar suppressed his fears of what he called pardocracia (in other words, rule
by the castas) out of necessity for Haitian resources or whether this transamerican
alliance exemplified genuine South-South republican solidarity irreducible to Bolívar’s
racial anxieties.252 The alliance has also achieved a folkloric and foundational status in
Venezuela’s national imaginary. In the aftermath of Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in
2010, for example, former President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez invoked its memory:
“Haiti: that of Bolívar, of the Expedition from Les Cayes (1816), who counted on the
unconditional backing of the illustrious Pétion, who only asked for the liberty of the
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Aid estimates from Paul Verna, Pétion y Bolívar (1970).
See Ernesto Bassi, “Simón Bolívar’s Caribbean Adventures,” in An Aqueous Territory (2016);
Sibylle Fischer, “Bolívar in Haiti: Republicanism in the Revolutionary Atlantic” in Haiti and the
Americas (2013); and Paul Verna, Pétion y Bolívar (1970). On the imaginary and consequences
of pardocracia, see Aline Helg, “Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of Pardocracia: José Padilla in
Post-Independence Cartagena” (2003).
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slaves. It was not in vain that our Liberator [Simón Bolívar] called him ‘the author of our
liberty.’”253 Chávez’s contradictory claim that Pétion offered “unconditional” support to
Bolívar’s leadership of the independence movements, wherein Pétion “only asked for the
liberty of the slaves,” illuminates the alliance’s antislavery condition as one of the central
tensions in both the popular-nationalist recollection of the alliance and the historical
scholarship that grapples with its legacy.
The emancipation of Spanish America’s slaves becomes the very basis on which
Bolívar’s introductory proposition of a “common homeland” between Haitians and
Spanish Americans could begin to be realized. The informal, non-contractual textuality of
the alliance and the Haitian condition of antislavery produced a taut sociopolitical
entanglement in Spanish America’s revolutionary movements. Bolívar’s last-ditch
decision to forgo an impossible diplomatic situation in Kingston and to forge political
commonality with the Republic of Haiti transformed the stagnant Spanish-American
independence movements into an open-ended political possibility no longer defined by an
isolated question of white creole freedom from foreign imperial intervention. Instead, it
rendered inextricable creole Spanish-American aspirations for colonial emancipation with
the liberty of the enslaved. Anticolonial struggles against European rule could not be
disarticulated from the decolonial emancipation of the enslaved in the Haitian
revolutionary tradition from below.254 Contrary to Chávez’s representation, Pétion’s
antislavery condition is therefore not a mere request that Bolívar blithely obliged. Critical
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See ¡Haití, Haíti! in Líneas de Chávez, 17 January 2010,
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=350642&CategoryId=13303. The Spanish reads:
“Haití: la de Bolívar, la de la Expedición de los Cayos (1816) que contó con el respaldo sin
condiciones del ilustre Petión, quien sólo le pidio la libertad de los esclavos. No en vano nuestro
Libertador lo llamo ‘el autor de nuestra libertad.’”
254
See CLR James, “The San Domingo Masses Begin” in The Black Jacobins (1938).
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engagements with this correspondence cannot sidestep Spanish America’s particular
histories of race and colonialism that coexisted, in contradictory friction, with the
alliance’s antislavery condition. This section foregrounds the informal and uncodifiable
dimensions of this South-South collaboration as a way to theorize the decolonial
struggles it made possible. I argue that the emancipatory potential of this Haitian and
Spanish-American collaboration in the name of a “common homeland” exceeds the
sanction of established imperial powers and creole elites’ political priorities that included
attempts to instrumentalize the alliance’s emancipation decrees into a form of racial
military conscription. By close reading the alliance’s epistolary archive, emancipation
decrees, and non-contractual informality, I break from the loop of historical debates about
the “true” political agendas of two national founders (Bolívar and Pétion) to theorize
possible political movements of the hemisphere’s enslaved that did not neatly align with
the pursuit of statist independence or the territorial sovereignty of Haitian antislavery. In
the relay of Bolívar’s Haitian correspondence and in successive revisions for the
expedition’s emancipation decrees, we glimpse unruly mobilizations of the alliance’s
informal textuality as the conspiracy of racialized and enslaved peoples in the
hemisphere.
Pétion’s exact proposition for the emancipation of the enslaved in Spanish America
remains unavailable to us today. In a January 29, 1816 letter, Bolívar references an
unrecovered letter by Pétion in which the Haitian leader articulates the condition of
emancipation. The absence of this letter in the epistolary archive of the alliance marks a
constitutive silence in the dialogic relation between Bolívar and Pétion’s politics, as well
as our possible interpretations for the alliance’s open-ended, informal arrangement.
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We do not know the specific directives that accompany Pétion’s proposition of
Spanish-American emancipation, if any. Nor does Bolívar refer to Pétion’s emancipatory
proposition beyond his own representation of América’s abstract, patriotic volition in
accordance with it:
My appreciation is unlimited, for the honor that Your Excellency has just given
me, with the letter that you have deigned to write me, and the goodness that has
fulfilled me. From the depths of my heart, I declare Your Excellency the foremost
benefactor of the world! One day América will proclaim Your Excellency its
liberator; above all those who still groan even under the republican yoke [du joug
républicain]. Accept in advance, Mr. President, the vow [voue] of my patria!255
Bolívar’s reply to Pétion once again performs the incipient will and voice of an América
yet to come. This “América” for which Bolívar speaks remains conceptually incipient
and unbounded, but he replaces its imperious cry from the Kingston correspondence with
an indebted declaration of renown for Pétion. The letter enacts a rhetorical shift in the
independence project’s political priorities since the creole leader’s exile in Kingston.
América no longer safeguards white creole interests from Anglo-imperial intervention by
speaking in the familiar imperatives of sovereignty and imperium. Instead, América will
“one day” utter its recognition of Pétion, but only when those who “still groan even under
the republican yoke” are free to speak, be heard, and form a part of that very “América.”
Its voice is indebted and interdependent. Whatever the wording of Pétion’s condition for
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Documento 1318, “Carta de Bolívar fechada en Los Cayos el 29 de enero de 1816, dirigida al
Presidente de Haití.” The original French reads: Ma reconnaisance est sans limite pour l’honneur
que V. E. vient de me faire, par la letre qu’elle a daigné m’ecrire et par les bontés dont elle vient
de m’accabler. Je le dis dans le fond de mon coeur; vous êtes le premier des bienfaiteurs de la
terre! un jour l’Amérique vous proclamera son libérateur, surtout ceux qui gémissent encore,
même du joug républicain1. Acceptez d’avance, Monsieur le Président, le voeu de ma patrie!”
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the emancipation of Spanish America’s slaves, Bolívar cannot speak of SpanishAmerican liberty without referencing the freedom that awaits the region’s enslaved,
including those presently shackled under his own republican banner. Given the present
system of republican slavery, however, Bolívar asks Pétion to accept in advance his
patria’s abstract will to bring about this deferred “América,” which operates as a proper
name for the “common homeland” to which the creole leader appeals. At the time of this
letter, the proposed political and antislavery commonalities between post-revolutionary
Haiti and revolutionary Spanish America remain to be worked through, tested, and
materialized.
There are two other letters that shed light on the unsettled and rather clandestine
relation between Bolívar’s insurgency and Pétion’s Republic of Haiti. First, Bolívar’s
February 8, 1816 letter asks Pétion permission to name him in the emancipation decrees
to be circulated during the expedition and, second, Pétion’s February 18, 1816 reply
instructs Bolívar to maintain the secrecy of Haitian involvement. “In my proclamation to
the inhabitants of Venezuela and in the decrees that I must dispatch for the liberty of the
slaves,” writes Bolívar, “I do not know if I would be permitted… to name Your
Excellency as the author of our liberty.”256 Pétion replies to Bolívar’s request for
authorial disclosure, “You must understand how much I wish to see all those who still
suffer leave the yoke of slavery; but, for reasons that pertain to a nation [imperial Spain]
who has not yet declared an offensive against the Republic, I am impelled to ask that you
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Documento 1320, “Carta de Bolívar dirigida al General Alejandro Petion fechada en Los
Cayos el 8 de febrero de 1816.” The original French reads in full: “Dans ma proclamation aux
habitants de Venezuela et dans les décrets que je dois expédicir pour la liberté des esclaves je ne
sais pas s’il me sera permis de témoigner les sentiments de mon coeur envers Votre Excellence, et
de laisser á la postérité un monument irrecusable de votre philantropie.”

191
do not proclaim anything regarding the Republic nor that you mention my name in any of
your acts.”257 In a climate of global political strife and ongoing threats to Haitian
sovereignty by former and potential Euro-imperial conquerors, Pétion seeks to avoid the
wrath of the Spanish empire and potentially, other political powers with a vested interest
in blockading the spread of abolition in the Americas.258
The alliance’s epistolary secrecy and informal arrangement not only protected the
Republic of Haiti from foreign reprisals for aiding Spanish-American insurgents, but it
also created opportunities to redraw the geopolitical map of antislavery in the
hemisphere. In “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,”
historian Ada Ferrer locates the alliance’s political afterlife within a later moment of
international crisis over Haiti’s expansion of legal free soil in the hemisphere. Ferrer,
quoting Sue Peabody and Keila Grinberg, describes the genealogy of free soil’s legal
formation in the hemispheric Americas by tracing it to the “freedom principle,” an Old
Regime concept with a long, albeit fitful history in European legal systems that posited
“‘simply setting foot on a particular territory was enough to confer freedom upon a
slave.’”259 The republic’s alliance with Spanish-American insurgents influenced Pétion’s
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Only the Spanish translation of Pétion’s reply is available and it is sourced from Paul Verna’s
text, Pétion y Bolívar: “Ud. debe estar penetrado de cuanto deseo ver salir del yugo de la
esclavitud a los que todavía padecen; pero motivos que se relacionan con las reservas para con
una nación que aún no se ha pronunciado de una manera ofensiva contra la República me llevan a
rogarle que no proclame nada en la extensión de la República y tampoco que mencione mi
nombre en ninguno de sus actos” (537).
258
Although Pétion urges Bolívar to keep their political coordination a secret, Spanish officials
nonetheless suspected that the Haitian republic was aiding its enemies. Spanish officials never
obtained definitive proof of antagonistic Haitian collaboration, since Pétion’s assistance of
creoles could always be construed as granting humanitarian rights of “anclage” and refuge.
Source: Archivo General de Indias (AGI, ESTADO, 57, n.33).
259
Ada Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” 47. Ferrer refers
to Sue Peabody’s usage of the “freedom principle” in “There Are No Slaves in France”: The
Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Regime (New York: Oxford UP, 1996) and

192
free soil rationales when he refused slaveowner James McKowen the extradition of seven
men who, in 1817, escaped from maritime slavery by commandeering the JamaicanBritish schooner on which they served to the southern Republic of Haiti. Their escape to
Haiti resulted in a global juridical dispute over the legal grounds on which the Haitian
state could “act more expansively on the freedom it represented” beyond its island
territory.260 As Ferrer argues, the ramifications of this international dispute involved yet
exceeded the question of freedom for the seven runaways from Jamaica, “identified by
name as Dublin, Kingston, Archy, Quashie, Robert, James, and Jem.”261 Haiti’s claims to
legal free soil implied the inspiration of future performances of fugitivity throughout the
hemisphere as the first state-based free-soil territory in the Americas. Such a legal
precedent and tangible instantiation of the freedom principle in the slaveholding
Americas threatened to legitimate other “movements of resistance and rebellion for black
and brown slaves and free peoples across the hemisphere.”262
Ferrer reads Article 44 of the revised 1806 Haitian Constitution, published in
September 1816, as the republic’s primary grounds for legal free-soil.263 It framed the
Haitian Republic as an antislavery territory open to peoples of all possible racialized
genealogies, and therefore all possible casta formations in the hemisphere. Article 44
states: “All Africans and Indians, and the descendants of their blood, born in the colonies
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or in foreign countries, who come to reside in the Republic will be recognized as
Haitians, but will enjoy the right of citizenship only after one year of residence”
(emphasis mine).264 The Republic of Haiti’s constitutional provision addresses entwined
histories of racialization, settler colonialism, and slavery in its expansive offer of asylum
to all racialized, dispossessed, and enslaved peoples of the world. It effectively subverts
the violently exclusionary discourses of blood purity in both Spanish and Anglo colonial
formations of race—such as the casta categories of Spanish colonialism and the one-drop
rules of Anglo-imperial enslavement—into the very basis of political belonging “as
Haitians.” In contrast to Sibylle Fischer’s key analysis of the 1805 Haitian constitution
during Dessalines’ command, the term “black” does not appear in the 1816 constitution
as the performative basis of “a political rather than biological category.”265 Here, the
political performativity of blackness takes the particular form of Afro and indigenous
descent as its invective of trans-imperial structures for racialization and slavery; in the
same conceptual move, forms of blackness within and in excess of transnational
productions of blood purity regimes become the basis for political belonging in the
Republic of Haiti.
Despite the article’s extension of asylum “to the black and colored population of the
colonies or foreign countries,” which menaced the stability of foreign slave regimes, the
constitutional policy alone “did not represent the literal exportation of [Haitian]
revolution” elsewhere in the Americas.266 Ferrer elaborates this fundamental restriction
on official Haitian conceptions of freedom, whereby “[the revised Haitian constitution]
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did not purport to send revolutionary agents to instigate slave rebellions in neighboring
colonies, something that every Haitian foundational document since the Haitian
Declaration of Independence had shunned.”267 Although Article 44 in the 1816 Haitian
constitution expanded the political scope of free-soil in the Americas by putting freedom
within reach of enslaved sailors and black captives in the circum-Caribbean, it
nonetheless tethered the freedom principle to the Haitian republic’s territorial boundaries
and statist sovereignty.
In addition to Article 44, Pétion’s argument against McKowen’s case for reclaiming
the seven fugitives was further emboldened by broad references to Bolívar’s abolition of
slavery in Spanish America as their political correspondence’s secret consequence.
According to Ada Ferrer, “[Pétion] even hinted that he was thinking of Latin America as
up for grabs, and potentially as the hemisphere’s second free-soil territory” (emphasis
mine).268 Ferrer summarizes Pétion’s refutation of McKowen’s representation of Haiti’s
antislavery asylum as a singularly aberrant national policy:
[Pétion] wrote to McKowen, ‘Every country has its Laws, as you must know Sir,
and fortunately for the cause of humanity, Hayti is not the only one where Slavery
is abolished.’ His confident assertion that abolition was already a reality in at
least one other country was a bold and unexpectedly public reference to the
revolutionary abolition of slavery in Venezuela by Simón Bolívar in July 1816.269
(emphasis mine)
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Without publicizing his direct correspondence and coordination with Bolívar, however,
Pétion is able to technically maintain Haiti’s longstanding policy of non-intervention in
the hemisphere. Pétion’s insistence on Haitian non-intervention is purportedly affirmed
by the abolition of slavery in Venezuela by means of its own sovereign “Laws,” an
instance of antislavery legislation independent of Haitian or other foreign imposition. The
epistolary—rather than contractual—conduct of the alliance between the Republic of
Haiti and Spanish-American insurgents allows Pétion to circumvent Haiti’s
internationally-mandated conformity to hemispheric non-interference, lest it face direct
retaliation from agitated imperial powers who find their profits disturbed by slave unrest
attributable to the Republic. According to Pétion, then, the illicit, epistolary secrecy of the
Haitian Republic’s alliance with Bolívar’s insurgent forces produces the appearance of an
autonomous, formal-legal resolution for the abolition of slavery elsewhere in the
Americas.
Nevertheless, the context, form, and content of the correspondence between Bolívar
and Pétion belies this account of autonomous legal decisions, hemispheric nonintervention, and desire for inevitable progress toward universal declarations of general
emancipation in the Americas. Pétion cannot establish Haitian free-soil as a triumphant
legal precedent precisely because Spanish-American political upheavals remain
unresolved. The supposed “Laws” of this “other country” at stake in Pétion’s address to
McKowen—one that Ferrer refers to as “Venezuela”—was not yet a consolidated or
independent nation-state in 1817, and it refers more properly to a Spanish Americas still
in flux, with unfixed boundaries and deeply contested political futures.270 For this reason,
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a critical reliance on the “laws [Haiti] enacted and the policies it pursued” to illuminate
“the politics, meaning, and character of antislavery” at this critical moment of
transamerican political upheaval prove insufficient.271 I ask instead: In what ways did the
alliance’s informal coordination through epistolary and proclamatory texts create
opportunities for unofficial emancipatory movements to develop in tandem and in tension
with the unpredictable routes of creole Spanish-American struggles for selfdetermination?
Complicating Pétion’s legalistic arguments for antislavery further, the confidence
Ferrer imputes to the Haitian president “that abolition was already a reality in at least one
another country [Venezuela]” by 1817 is contradicted by the qualifications on freedom
inscribed by Bolívar’s 1816 emancipation decrees, which were both printed and orally
recited. Bolívar, as Ferrer also points out, initially bound the promise of emancipation
with a requirement for mandatory military service. Ferrer briefly notes Bolívar’s
gradualist abolition of slavery after his expedition’s departure from Les Cayes in March
1816. As she explains, Bolívar began in May, “freeing those who were willing to serve in
the liberation army. By July 6th, in Ocumare de la Costa, he had proclaimed general
emancipation: ‘Nature, justice, and politics call for the emancipation of the slaves. From
here forward, there will only be one class of men in Venezuela: all will be citizens.’”272
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This straightforward chronology from gradual to general emancipation leaves
unexamined the friction between Bolívar’s anticolonial restrictions on the enslaved’s
liberty, on the one hand, and the decolonial—if territorially delimited—freedom that
Pétion extends to “all Africans and Indians and their descendants” who escape to Haitian
soil, on the other.273 At least one of the emancipation proclamations—dated May 23,
1816, addressed to the “inhabitants of the mainland,” and issued in Juan Griego, the
northernmost port of Venezuela on the island of Margarita—was published by Jean
Baillot, the designated “Printer of the Liberating Expedition,” on the mobile printing
press with which Pétion equipped Bolívar’s expedition for the purpose of dispersing
copies of the emancipation decrees throughout the hemisphere.274 Bolívar announces in
this first decree a conditional freedom: “There will no longer be, then, more slaves in
Venezuela than those who wish to be so. All those who prefer liberty to repose, will take
up arms to sustain their sacred rights, and shall be citizens.”275 Another decree, dated
June 2, 1816 in Carúpano, reiterates this contingent freedom in more detail, as a form of
mandatory military conscription applicable to “all robust men, from the ages between
fourteen to sixty” (Article 1). Strangely, the morality of the creole-led independence
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struggle depends on an affirmation of the slaves’ absolute liberty in order to distinguish
itself from the rule of prior colonial masters. However, Bolívar defines this “absolute
liberty” in the strict sense of colonial emancipation. He only guarantees freedom from
“the Spanish yoke”: “Considering that justice, politics, and the Patria imperiously
demand the inalienable [imprescreptibles] rights of nature, I have come to announce, as
an order [he venido a decretar, como decreto], the absolute liberty of the slaves who have
groaned under the Spanish yoke in the past three centuries.”276
As soon as Bolívar lifts the centuries-old yoke of Spanish imperialism from those
enslaved in Venezuela, he imposes a new set of restrictions enumerated in four articles.
The rationale for these restrictions reads: “Considering that the Republic needs the
service of all her sons, we must impose on these new Citizens the following conditions.”
More precisely, these ensuing conditions reinforce forms of unfreedom through the
enslaved’s imperiled kinship relations, which were already vulnerable to the violences of
Spanish colonial slavery. If this “new Citizen,” a conceptually incoherent, male-gendered
subject, refuses to serve Bolívar’s military in exchange for his freedom, he then faces the
following penalty: “The new Citizen… will remain subject to servitude, and not only
him, but also his children less than 14 years old, his wife, and his elderly parents.”277 This
third article of the decree, Bolívar concludes, “will have the force of law.” This
emancipation decree merely transfers the Spanish colonial yoke to elite creole-republican
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masters who alone assume the power to bestow or deprive the promise of “absolute
liberty.”
Despite Bolívar’s denouncement of three centuries of Spanish colonial slavery—
and the anticolonial conceit that denouncement entails—the creole leader once again
draws on the Spanish Requirement’s old colonial rationale for forcible conversion. This
marks a continuation from Bolívar’s Kingston correspondence that attempts to explain
naturalized white creole control over unruly casta populations. This colonial mandate is
reworked, in secular terms, for the conscription of “new Citizens” into a creole
Republican order that annexes their extant kinship relations. This new order imposes on
the enslaved a filial duty to an abstraction of creole political power, the “Republic,”
which demands potentially interminable service since Bolívar does not specify a duration.
Meanwhile, the decree holds captive prior kinship formations until this paradoxical “new
Citizen” pays their ransom in the form of martial servitude. In short, Bolívar weaponizes
this emancipation decree into an instrument of pre-statist racial governmentality and
biopolitical management.
Despite the restrictions, qualifications, and tautologies of Bolívar’s emancipation
decrees that mandate new forms of unfreedom through martial servitude, the
emancipation decrees’ language and circulation create new opportunities for the formerly
enslaved to make their own meanings and enactments of “absolute liberty” incompatible
with Bolívar’s directives. Eventually, the creole republican realizes that he only wields a
tautological rhetorical force (“he venido a decretar, como decreto,” literally, “I have come
to decree, as a decree”) to compel the formerly enslaved to labor in his army. This
rhetorical performance is, after all, the same force that declares the so-called “absolute
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liberty” of the enslaved and that tenuously claims to have the “force of law” in a prestatist context. In a letter dated June 27, 1816, Bolívar reports in dismay to Haitian
General Igniac Marión at the failed recruitment of former slaves for the SpanishAmerican republican cause:
I have proclaimed the absolute liberty of the slaves. The tyranny of the Spanish
has put them in such a state of stupidity and has imprinted on their souls such a
great sentiment of terror, that they have even lost the desire to be free! Many of
them have followed the Spanish or have embarked on English ships, who have
sold them to neighboring colonies. Only about a hundred of them have presented
themselves, when the number of free men who have voluntarily taken up arms is
considerable. The Spanish use all their might to foil our operations and reconvene
all their forces, but our small army animated by the sentiment of liberty will be
enough to destroy them!278 (emphasis in the original)
The situation that Bolívar bemoans in this letter to Marión offers a hemispheric
antecedent to the “general strike” that W.E.B. Du Bois theorizes in the context of the U.S.
Civil War in Black Reconstruction (1935).279 Granted, there are vast historical, social, and
geopolitical differences between the U.S. Civil War from 1861-1865 and the global

278

Documento 1669, “Carta de Bolívar al general Ignacio Marión, fechada en Carúpano el 27 de
Junio de 1816.” The Spanish reads: “He proclamado la libertad absoluta de los esclavos. “¡La
tiranía de los españoles les ha puesto en tal estado de estupidez e imprimido en sus almas tan
grande sentimiento de terror, que han perdido hasta el deseo de ser libres! Muchos de ellos han
seguido a los españoles o se han embarcado a bordo de los buques ingleses, que los han vendido
en las colonias vecinas. Se ha presentado apenas un centenar de ellos, cuando el número de
hombres libres que voluntariamente tomaron las armas es considerable. Los españoles hacen
todos sus efuerzos para trabajar nuestras operaciones y reunir todas sus fuerzas, pero nuestro
pequeño ejército ¡animado del sentimiento de libertad bastará para destruirlos!”
279
See W.E.B. Du Bois, “The General Strike” in Black Reconstruction in America, 1860 – 1880
(Reprint, New York: The Free Press, 1998), p. 55 – 83, originally published 1935.

201
Hispanic Civil War in which Bolívar found himself embroiled in 1816. In both cases,
however, ruling factions’ desire to revamp slavery into a source of military labor
dislodged a movement that resembles a “general strike against the slave system on the
part of all who could find opportunity.”280
Bolívar accounts for the scant numbers of former slaves in his ranks by
representing their absence as their slavish fidelity to imperial power. I do not dismiss the
possibility that some enslaved peoples followed Spanish slave masters or embarked with
English enslavers for motivations unknown to us, but which we might speculate as efforts
to keep their hemispheric and circum-Caribbean kinship ties intact. I also want to
consider, however, the implications of Bolívar’s failed recruitment of enslaved subjects
for alternate interpretations and performances of “absolute liberty” or “common
homeland.” Alternate engagements with these antislavery and hemispheric scripts allow
us to imagine black-led movements that register in this epistolary archive as fugitivity
from the conscriptions of warfare and as political waywardness in relation to creole
demands.
I suggest instead, then, that Bolívar’s depiction of the slaves’ lost “desire to be free”
more precisely refers to fugitive performances of “absolute liberty” that countervails its
narrow expression as colonial emancipation. The formerly enslaved likely recognized
creole command—whether at the head of a household or republican army—to be part of
the same system of racialized servitude from which they sought escape. We might
transpose Du Bois’s conclusions for the “general strike” to the time and place of this
internecine conflict: by the time Bolívar began pronouncing his emancipation decrees,
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“the truth was not simply that [the enslaved] ought to be free; it was that thousands of
them were already free” throughout the unmaking of colonial social relations amidst the
irresolution of the independence wars.281
Notably, the language of Bolívar’s letter maintains a conceptual separation between
“the slaves” whose absolute liberty he had proclaimed and “the number of free men” not
previously subject to slavery. This rhetorical distinction between free men and “the
slaves” in Bolívar’s complaint of scant recruitment among the formerly enslaved is a
jarring feature of this letter, given its putative irrelevance for describing the liberated
“América” the alliance with Haiti imaginatively fulfills. The binary categorization of all
Spanish Americans into free men and “the slaves”—instead of, for instance, creoles and
mixed races, blancos and pardos—also circumvents the ongoing complexity of social and
racial differences in Spanish-America. Through this non-casta specific bifurcation of the
region’s populace, Bolívar again avoids reckoning with the colonial histories that
undergird the independence movement’s social contradictions. The specters of the “casta
problem,” then, continue to haunt Bolívar well beyond his exile in Kingston to resurface
in his attempts to meet Haiti’s antislavery condition.
Not all of the formerly enslaved acted on the liberty decreed on May 23, June 2,
and July 6, 1816 as performances of fugitivity from creole-dominated institutions.
Evidently there were “about a hundred” who shaped their futures and fortunes from
within the formal ranks of the Spanish-American independence movement. Those
formerly enslaved who ultimately “presented themselves” for recruitment were also,
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however, creating their own multiple meanings of “absolute liberty” that exceed the
singular “sentiment of liberty” that Bolívar dictates against the enemy Spanish.
After the first expedition’s failure, these unsanctioned enactments of “absolute
liberty” by the formerly enslaved influence Bolívar’s second appeal to Pétion for Haitian
succor. Bolívar returned to the port of Jacmel, Haiti in defeat aboard the brig Indio Libre
on September, 4, 1816.282 In a letter penned from the ship on this date, Bolívar appealed
once more to Alexandre Pétion for Haitian refuge and resources. As though to authorize
his reentry to the Haitian littoral, he announces his return to Haiti along with an
announcement of his fulfillment of the alliance’s condition, in his words, of “having done
what depended on me to grant the liberty of the inhabitants of the mainland [Costa
Firme].” In contrast to Bolívar’s representation of absolute authority in the emancipation
decrees, his agency in this letter appears partial and dependent. The letter predicates
Bolívar’s return to Haitian soil and second appeal for succor on his expedition’s delayed
declaration of general emancipation. This predication makes explicit not only the link
between colonial emancipation and antislavery in the Spanish Americas, but also the role
of the informal alliance in fusing these two concepts of freedom within the mainstream
political upheavals in Spanish America. The letter’s account of the expedition’s failure is
a far cry from the performance of sovereign will and martial force we read in the three
emancipation decrees, where the bestowal of “absolute liberty” was sourced from
Bolívar’s authority as well as his claim to speak for the demands of the patria
[homeland]. Writing aboard the Indio Libre, however, Bolívar explains that “a chain of
circumstances almost inexplicable have reduced [him] to the situation of returning to the
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asylum of free men [the Republic of Haiti], and place myself under the projection of one
of the most magnanimous, republican leaders of the New World.” More urgently, this
“chain of circumstances” beyond his control is linked to foreign investments in
adjudicating the failures of Bolívar’s leadership, of the campaign, and of the political
project for an independent “América” more broadly.
To deflect from foreign assessments of his expedition’s failure in Spanish America,
Bolívar represents the abolition of slavery as the expedition’s true, transamerican telos.
He begins the first half of the letter’s conclusion by reiterating Pétion’s condition of
general emancipation and its fulfillment:
I declare to Your Excellency, Mr. President, and by my word of honor, that I have
made the best use possible of the support with which you have favored me for my
fellow countrymen, and above all in favor of that wretched portion that groaned in
chains. The general liberty of the slaves has been proclaimed without the least
restriction, and in all places where our arms have reached, the yoke has been
broken, nature and humanity have reclaimed their rights. Even if our expedition
has not produced more than this eminently beneficent work, it would deserve the
most just praise, and the sacrifices that we have consecrated would not be totally
lost. We have set a great example for South America. This example will be
pursued by all the pueblos [peuples] who fight for independence. Haiti will not
remain isolated among its brothers. The generosity and the principles of Haiti will
be found in all parts of the New World.283

283

The passage in the original French reads: “Je proteste á V.E., Monsieur le Président, et sur ma
parole d’honneur, que j’ai fait le meilleur usage possible de vos bienfaits en faveur de mes
concitoyens, et surtout en faveur de cette partie malheureuse qui gémissait dans les fers. La
liberté genérale des esclaves fut proclamée sans la moindre restriction, et partout oú nos armes

205
Bolívar’s assertion that “Haiti will not remain isolated among its brothers” posits a nonnational political association that runs counter to Amasa Delano’s language of imperial
fraternalism that enables his intervention aboard the San Dominick. Bolívar also implies
here that the Spanish-American independence movements will be the vehicle for
revitalizing and rerouting the “generosity and the principles of Haiti” throughout the socalled New World. As we’ve seen, the claim that “general liberty has been proclaimed
without the least restriction” holds true only after the July 6th emancipation decree
promulgated in Ocumare. His emphasis on the lack of restrictions on abolition suggests
that Pétion may have intervened to demand general liberty over the course of their
epistolary exchanges, especially after Bolívar included copies of the conditional
proclamations in a June 10, 1816 letter to Pétion.284 Beyond Pétion’s likely insistence on
the abolition of restrictions on liberty, the formerly enslaved’s multiple meanings of
liberty incompatible with creole anticolonialism also impelled Bolívar to declare general
emancipation. Bolívar is nonetheless careful to obscure the subversive activity of the
formerly enslaved by crediting the accomplishment of “general liberty” to the reach of
creole republican “arms.” He also veils the amplification of freedom through their
fugitive performances of “absolute liberty” as the universalist reclamations of “nature and
humanity.”

ont penetré, le joug a été brisé, la nature et 1’humanité ont recouvré leurs droits. Quand notre
expédition n’eut operé que ce grand bienfait, elle mériterait les éloges les plus justes, et les
sacrifices que nous lui avons consacrés ne seraient pas tout á fait perdus. Nous avons donné un
grand exemple á l’Amérique du Sud. Cet exemple sera suivi de tous les peuples qui combattent
pour l’indé-pendance” (Documento 1710).
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Although Bolívar distracts from the formerly enslaved’s practices of freedom, the
unpredictable scope of the independence struggles also aids and abets the circulation of
unruly forms of liberation throughout the globe. The emancipatory potential that the
informal alliance unleashes follows the trajectory of Bolívar’s own diplomatic translation
to other territories in his renewed search for political support. He concludes his renewed
appeal to Pétion:
In the state that I find myself, may I aspire to Your Excellency’s protection? Yes,
Mr. President! I trust that Your Excellency will not abandon me to the destiny that
overwhelms me. Your Excellency is sufficiently magnanimous to continue his
generosities towards my Patria. And if my Patria cannot obtain anything more
from Your Excellency, at least I dare to trust that Your Excellency will enable the
means within your reach so I can transpose myself [me transponer] to the United
States of America, or to London, or to Mexico, or to Buenos Aires, to solicit some
protection with the aim to liberate Venezuela and New Granada. I abuse without a
doubt the goodness with which Your Excellency has deigned to honor me. But if
you knew my situation you’d not find my importunity strange. I am forced to it by
an invincible imperium: that of necessity. I regard here the response by Your
Excellency as the final decree of my political existence.285
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ou au Mexique, ou á Buenos Aires, pour solliciter une protection quelconque, á l’effet de délivrer
Venezuela et la Nouvelle Grenade. Jabuse sans doute des bontés dont vous avez daigné
m’honorer. Mais, si V.E. connaissait ma situadon, elle ne serait pas étonnée de mon importunité.
Elle est forcee par un empire invincible: celui de la nécessité. J’attends ici la réponse de V.E.,
comme le dernier décret de mon existence politique. J’ai l’honneur de prier Monsieur le
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The letter’s syntax proliferates a striking variety of reflexive and self-referential
structures. Finding himself in a dire state of necessity, the call and response of a
rhetorical question permits Bolívar to hope for a second chance of Haitian collaboration.
If he is denied the assistance he seeks for a second expeditionary attempt from the black
republic, he alternately hopes for refuge in Haiti until he can “transpose himself” to
another port of departure. In the name of liberating “Venezuela and New Granada,”
Bolívar imagines himself to venture from post-revolutionary Haiti to territories as diverse
and politically antagonistic as the US, London, Mexico, or Buenos Aires to recuperate an
independence project now linked to antislavery proclamations. The reflexive pronoun that
accompanies the original French verb “transponer” constitutes the only semblance of
sovereignty Bolívar is able to exercise on the margins of Haiti’s shores. Despite his selfreferential rhetorical performance, Bolívar admits that all of his political power and its
potential translation to other territories depends on the extent of Haitian collaboration
permitted by Pétion, who pronounces “the final decree of [his] political existence.”286
The textual traces of the informal alliance between Spanish America and Haiti
register multiple senses of translation, which according to Gillman and Gruesz refers to

Président, d’agréer l’assurance des sentiments respectueux avec lesquels je suis de V.E., le tres
humble et obéissant serviteur” (Documento 1543)
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Pétion agreed to facilitate Bolívar’s second expedition from Haiti, although I’ve not been able
to find additional letters or emancipation decrees associated with the second expedition. A final
letter penned by Bolívar to a Haitian official under Pétion’s administration is dated in Port-auPrince, December 4, 1816. It is addressed to the Governor of the Department of Les Cayes, Igniac
Marion. The first half of the letter is particularly noteworthy: “Señor general: Próximo a
emprender la marcha para mi patria a fin de consolidar su independencia, faltaría a la gratitud si
no me apresurara a tenera la honra de dar a V. las gracias por todas las bondades que ha
prodigado V. a mis compatriotas. Siento en extremo no poder despedirme de V. personalmente,
para ofrecer a V. mis servicios en mi patria en todo aquello en que V. tenga a bien ocuparme. Si
los favores atan a los hombres, no dude V., general, que yo y mis compatriotas amaremos siempre
al pueblo haitiano como a los dignos jefes que lo hacen feliz.” Source: Archivo del Libertador,
www.archivodellibertador.gob.ve, Documento 1726, “Carta de Bolívar al General Ignacio
Marión, fechada en Puerto Príncipe el 4 de diciembre de 1816.”
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“both a material practice and a metaphor for the constant and multidirectional movement
of texts through channels that are not officially sanctioned.”287 As we’ve seen, the
political coordination between the Republic of Haiti during Alexandre Pétion’s
presidency and the independence faction led by Simón Bolívar navigated a complex
matrix of foreign geopolitical pressures, creole political priorities, and the Haitian
republic’s national interests. Through an analysis of the alliance’s resultant letters and
emancipation decrees, I venture beyond the alliance’s constitutive conditions to theorize
unofficial and unsanctioned transactions from which the alliance was also made and
envisioned, as well as the fugitive interpretations of this collaboration that circulated
among the formerly enslaved. I ultimately read the alliance’s epistles and decrees not as
the covert background to the accomplishment of Spanish-American independence or even
the (mistaken) legislation of abolition in “Venezuela,” but rather as textual conditions of
possibility for mutable, incendiary claims on “absolute liberty” and imaginaries for
common homelands that fueled emancipatory movements led by enslaved and racialized
peoples in the hemispheric South. These movements cannot be confined to extant
historical analyses of the alliance’s connections to territorial “free-soil” in Haiti or the
independence of national territories in South America. This fragmentary archive allows
me to speculate about the social relations and scope of cross-racial conspiracy in the
hemisphere that so thoroughly torments the early U.S. republican imaginary in Melville’s
novella.
IV. Redrawing a Hemispheric Text-Network
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I’ve read Bolívar’s textual and political exchanges in Kingston and Haiti as vectors
of what Kirsten Silva Gruesz and Susan Gillman call a “text-network roughly bounded by
the Western hemisphere—and by the babble of incompletely understood conversations
that have taken place within it.”288 The text-network analytic attends to literary and
cultural texts as “the product of more than one author, belonging to more than a single
national literary tradition, that elevates the role of translation to active participant in,
rather than mere footnote to, the production of literary and cultural meaning” (emphasis
mine).289 Text-network emphases on translation enable Gillman and Gruesz to shatter the
canonical singularity of Benito Cereno (1855) by orienting us toward multiplicities and
movements that arise from the novella’s adaptation of the source text, its thematization of
translation, and its transnational staging at the juncture of inter-imperial conflict and
hemispheric revolution. If the text-network’s recurrent dislocation of linguistic and
national “centers” allows us to distort familiar literary geographies, then we must linger
with connections among fragmentary archives that resist reattachment to canonical
literatures, authors, or even traditional literary forms such as the novel. The following
reading engages with various forms of “textuality” that—as scholars of nineteenthcentury Latinx studies theorize—encompasses other forms of inscription and thought
beyond the novel, or even the written word.290
By way of conclusion, I scope outward from the primary correspondence between
Bolívar and officials of the Republic of Haiti to trace its translation into second-hand
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knowledges, rumors, and transactions. These knowledges bring the racial and geopolitical
assemblages of New Orleans, Philadelphia, Cuba, Haiti, Amelia Island (off the coast of
Georgia), the two Floridas (U.S. and Spanish), and the patriot-privateer-pirate ports of
Galveston and Boquilla de Piedras (Texas and north of Veracruz, Mexico) into volatile
proximity. To do so, we must understand Bolívar’s embarkation from Haiti to promote
Spanish-American independence in a broader context, as one faction among many others.
Expeditions led by Louis-Michel Aury, Gregor MacGregor, Javier Mina, and others from
1815-1818 also sailed between Haiti, Amelia Island, the Gulf of Mexico, and the British
West Indies.291 These figures prioritized related yet distinct independence projects to
liberate Mexico or Spanish Florida, and often, avowed independence agendas that
masked investments in arms and slave smuggling. Declarations in the name of SpanishAmerican liberty therefore coexisted with various smuggling, privateering, and
filibustering enterprises. Pétion’s condition of emancipation for the informal alliance
between the Haitian republic and Bolívar’s independence faction unusually links their
political collaboration to South-South antislavery. Many other creole and foreign-born
insurgents, by contrast, trafficked slaves to fund military expeditions and to profit from
rising demand for slave labor in the U.S. South. Sara Johnson also reminds us about the
participation of black privateers in these slave-trafficking insurgencies, who constituted a
distinct class formation: “free people of color and slaves belonged to distinct social castes
and that they were often in conflict.”292

291

For more on these expeditions, see David Head, Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American
Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic (Athens: U of Georgia Press, 2015).
292
Sara Johnson, The Fear of French Negroes, 92.

211
Spanish, U.S., and British officials and citizens failed to discern differences in
political motivation and affiliation among the numerous independence expeditionaries. In
the words of the Spanish General Pablo Morillo, these contending expeditionary projects
amounted to an indistinguishable, maritime infestation of “rebels who do not belong to
any society.”293 The political illegitimacy of this rogue mass of political-economic
interests in the Gulf and circum-Caribbean nonetheless attracted “legitimate” U.S.
citizens who cast their fortunes with many of these expeditions.294 Likewise without
qualms, Spanish forces contracted privateers to advance the Crown’s agenda and to
meddle with the plans of other insurgents. This entanglement among U.S., Spanish, and
insurgent political agendas, I suggest, also propagated insurrectionary rumors about
Bolívar’s informal alliance with Haiti. Second-hand knowledges about Spanish-American
antislavery circulated throughout these illicit hemispheric circuits, even as the majority of
expeditionaries were heavily invested in the illegal U.S. slave trade and in maintaining
imperial systems of slavery in the hemisphere.
One of the most striking examples of the uneasy entanglement between Bolívar’s
political association with Haitian antislavery and other expeditionaries’ expansion of
illegal slave-trafficking unfolds in a letter penned in Philadelphia on August 3, 1816 by
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“Carta de Pablo Morillo al Secretario de Estado y del Despcacho, remitiendole copia de una
carta que dirigió a Alejandro Pétion” (AGI, ESTADO 57, n.33). The original Spanish reads:
“…faciosos que no corresponden a sociedad alguna.”
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Letter from Luis de Onís in Philadelphia to the Captain General of Cuba, 22 November 1816
(AGI, CUBA, 1898): “Llegan diariamente á este pais americanos de los que se engancharon con
Mina, y todos aseguran que mas de la mitad le han abandonado en Puerto Principe, y regresarán á
este Pais, á medida que encuentren proporciones. Esto ha hecho disminuir la confianza en este y
otros Aventureros, y son ya muy pocos los que se atreverán en adelantarle dinero, aunque nunca
faltarán Cabezas exaltadas que se determinen a engancharse, sedientos de hacer fortuna, á pesar
de que ven con sus ojos, las desgracias de sus Paisanos, y lo quimerico de la idea de revolucionar,
ó hacer independiente, las Provincias de S.M. en este Continente. Seria sin embargo muy
oportuno á mi parecer que V.E. se quexase à Petion de su conducta hostil contra la España, en
recibir en sus Puertos los Buques Ynsurgentes, y en darles auxilios como lo hace.”
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Luis de Onís, Spain’s Minister Plenipotentiary to the U.S., addressed to the Captain
General of Cuba, José Cienfuegos.295 Onís urgently conveys to Cienfuegos news of a
rumored insurgent plan. This plan involves Bolívar’s cooperation “para revolucionar los
Negros de todas las colonias Españolas / to revolutionize the Blacks of all the Spanish
colonies” with Cuba as a key target. The letter’s report relies on a densely mediated
summary of the dialogue between the Spanish Crown’s Consul in New Orleans, Diego
Morphy, and an undercover privateer for the Spanish Crown who “discovers” the plot,
named Lorenzo Maire. Maire, it should be noted, also worked as a double-agent for the
infamous Lafitte brothers (Jean and Pierre Lafitte) during their period of self-interested
service to the Spanish Crown.296 Historian William C. Davis argues in The Pirates Lafitte
that during Maire’s sham mission for the Spanish Crown, he worked as a gunrunner and
slave-trafficker for the Lafittes, who profited from the conflict between royalists and
insurgents.297
Maire’s mission under Spanish directives aimed to deprive Gulf-based insurgents of
their weapons by, presumably, playing the role of privateer for insurgent hire. He departs
from New Orleans as captain of the Spanish-commissioned ship Dos Hermanas to the
insurgent port of Boquilla de Piedras. Once there, Maire meets with the Mexican colonel
José María Villapinto who accordingly outfits the vessel with a cargo of arms and
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munitions, renames it the “Victoria,” and puts it under the Mexican flag. Dispatched from
there as an insurgent privateer, the newly-dubbed and bannered Victoria under Maire’s
command captures two Spanish ships as prizes and flees the assault of a third Spanish
vessel. After this encounter, the Victoria suffers heavy damages and is eventually
recaptured by the Spanish. Facing the Spanish Consul’s reprimands for the stunt of
seizing two Spanish vessels and for damages to the Spanish-owned ship Dos Hermanas,
Maire replies in his defense that his actions were necessary to preserve his cover as an
insurgent privateer, and that moreover, he’d dutifully informed Spanish authorities of his
location so the ship could be recaptured. Perhaps to distract from his flimsy fidelity to the
priorities of the Spanish Crown, Maire tells the Consul of a large-scale plan for a racial
uprising in the Spanish colonies that Villapinto discloses to him.
Maire’s testimony is the New Orleans Consul’s main source for the insurrectionary
plan to “revolutionize the Blacks,” along with a list he hands over of those allegedly in
cahoots.298 The letter also mentions other registers and sealed documents exchanged
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AGI, CUBA 1898. The legajo contains a transcribed copy of the list without any replication of
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between insurgent agents based in U.S. and borderland territories (named in the letter as
“Gual,” “Herrera,” and “Toledo”). It remains unclear, however, whether Maire simply
mentions the existence of these certified documents to the Consul, or whether the Consul
sees any manuscript or printed trace of them. Given Maire’s underlying loyalty to the
Lafittes, the tale he spins is a likely fiction and any documents he hands over to the
Consul are prop forgeries.
Both the Spanish Consul (Morphy) and Minister Plenipotentiary (Onís) deem
Maire’s testimony credible enough to alert the Captain General of Cuba. Onís
summarizes the Consul’s interrogation of Maire, who divulges the following details for
the coordination of a transamerican slave uprising:
The rebel General Bolívar had offered his protection to all of the Agents of this
barbarous project: that to this effect he had commissioned the pirate Schooner the
“Popa” to take to the leaders of Boquilla de Piedra, among other things, the list of
names of the aforementioned agents, a copy of which I have the honor to send to
Your Excellency, to order all of the captains of the Ships that navigated under his
banner, to respect and succor them [the individuals listed] if they asked, even
when they should be found in Spanish Ships; and that in fulfillment of his duty
Villapinto had handed said list to the Captain of the Schooner Victoria, Lorenzo
Maire, having assured him at the same time that shortly he expected to see the

J.F. Wilkins
John Dobel
A la tripulacion del Corsario se le suplica tenga la debida consideracion por estas personas, si
las encuentran abordo de qualquiera Buque que fuese; aunque sea Español, y de asisterlas si lo
necesitasen.
Es copia.”
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Island of Cuba in insurrection, because in addition to these said Agents, they had
in their favor many free men of color who worked to accomplish it; that this news
had been confirmed by what Gual wrote to Toledo over the particular, sending
him at the same time various Certified and stamped originals of the mentioned
list, with the addition of some more Agents, asking him to distribute them among
the Captains of the Ships that sailed out of the Port of New Orleans; and that in
consequence of this he [Villapinto] had already handed an original to each one of
the Captains of the three privateers [including Maire] who were to leave with the
commissions above expressed. (emphasis mine)299
Maire’s account of this insurgent plot presumes an astounding degree of coordination
among discrete rebel factions that historically competed against one another for political
alliances, resources, and power.300 The “rebel General Bolivar” appears as the guarantor
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of this many-sided insurrectionary project. Allegedly, he deploys the Popa—the very ship
that transported him from exile in Kingston to refuge in Haiti—to disperse the list of
agents who need insurgent backing among other rebels. These agents, it is also suggested,
might even be encountered working covertly aboard Spanish ships or openly aboard
captured Spanish vessels. Morillo’s condemnation of the rebels as outcasts of all society
is overturned in this rumor; the insurgents form instead a widespread, decentralized
organization among themselves. The named “agents” of this insurrection may benefit
from insurgent assistance in the region, but the plot to incite a black revolution in all of
the Spanish colonies appears to rely on no one in particular, on no individual’s direction.
In addition to the listed agents, an unidentified multitude of free men of color are said to
abet Cuba’s racial revolution. In Maire’s rumor, the cross-racial, anti-slavery conspiracy
encoded by Bolívar’s alliance with the Republic of Haiti is generalized to all SpanishAmerican insurgencies.
What are the implications for this translation of the informal alliance between
Spanish America and Haiti? Practically, for Maire, the smoke and mirrors of its fiction
provided a getaway from royalist punishment for skimming profits off the stolen
insurgent weapons and even, as Davis speculates, from the sale of those possibly
shackled in the two captured Spanish ships. In that case, a rogue slave trader steals from a
slave-trading empire, and, in all likelihood, contributes to the “illegal” expansion of the
U.S. plantation economy.
But Maire also produces a rumor that dangerously envisions the entanglement of
Spanish-American independence with decolonial, black-led revolution. Like the

mediados de Marzo de 1816.”

217
unrealized cross-racial conspiracy aboard the San Dominick, this script about the everpresent potential of black revolution takes a life of its own through its wide-ranging and
unknown dispersal throughout the hemispheric Americas. The rumor attests to
clandestine channels of knowledge that imperial powers can do little to impede, and
which the Spanish misread in their search for secret yet official “certifications,”
“stamps,” or “seals” from known insurgent generals. Instead, Maire undoubtedly weaves
his story from the preexisting circulation of unofficial, unmarked knowledges about the
informal alliance between Bolívar and the Republic of Haiti, as well as its resultant
emancipation decrees. By the autumn of 1816, knowledge of those emancipation decrees
circulates well beyond mainland South America, and not only as rumors: Bolívar’s
proclamation of general emancipation (issued from Ocumare de la Costa on July 6, 1816)
was translated into French and printed in at least one New Orleans newspaper, the
Courrier de la Louisiane, on Wednesday, September 20, 1816.301
The text-network I trace from Bolívar’s political correspondence with the Republic
of Haiti brings together unverifiable rumors of black revolution, fabricated documents
that populate imperial fears with ubiquitous anticolonialists, and translated reproductions
of South American emancipation decrees, all of which circulate in unpredictable and
masterless ways throughout the hemispheric Americas. We may never verify connections
from these elusive text networks to a spectacular instance of the violent overthrow of
slavery in either the Spanish Americas or the U.S. South. Nor should spectacular slave
revolts be the sole outcome or telos through which to engage with these texts. In the
Spanish Americas, as we saw, Bolívar’s emancipation decrees mostly incited fugitive
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movements of the formerly enslaved who refused his demands for racialized conscription
into the republican army. Maire’s rumor, meanwhile, gestures toward subaltern
communication networks that crisscrossed imperial, national, and littoral zones; these
collective and anonymous networks ceaselessly imagined the overthrow of slaveholding
powers. Written traces of transamerican, antislavery rumors in the Onís letter direct us to
ungoverned, contradictory scenes in which these clandestine text-networks and
knowledges thrived: the slave-trafficking Gulf was also traversed by decolonial narratives
of anarchic plots and black revolutions newly animated by political upheavals in the
Spanish Americas.
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Figure 1: Juan Rodríguez Juarez, De Negro y de India produce Lobo (ca. 1715).
This casta painting depicts the form of racial intermixture most hostile to elite creole
interests in the nineteenth-century.
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Figure 2: Anonymous, Portrait of Simon Bolívar in Haiti (1816).
Source: Fundación John Boulton, Caracas, Venezuela
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Chapter 4
Outcast from the Patria:
Tocqueville, Zavala, and the Speculation of U.S. Democracy
Critical and literary theories of democracy in relation to the nineteenth-century
Americas develop in countless directions and forms, constellating a capacious set of
social, cultural, and political questions. Perhaps the only scholarly consensus that can be
declared is this: Democracy names a spectacular concept of social and political life that is
endlessly at odds with itself. In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005), Jacques Derrida
summarizes Alexis de Tocqueville’s description of the sovereignty of the people in
Democracy in America (1835) as a “circular identification of the cause with the end….
As the effective fulfillment of a democracy that, up until then, had been presented only as
a project, an opinion, a claim or allegation, a deferral to later, a utopia, indeed the fiction
of a democracy to come.”302 Despite the term’s connotations of utopia, fiction, and
deferral, democracy also figures an unknown remainder or historical burden that is
supposed to be borne collectively, as something “we do not yet know what we have
inherited; we are the legatees of this Greek word and of what it assigns to us, enjoins us,
bequeaths or leaves us, indeed delegates or leaves over to us.”303 Literary scholar Nancy
Ruttenburg, among others, thinks democratic excess in terms of failures to tame a motley
assemblage of differences, anonymous strangers, inarticulate multitudes, and subaltern
traces it purports to circumscribe. For Ruttenburg, this democratic excess emerges as “the
characteristic voice of democratic personality—unanticipated, inarticulate, uncontainable,
heedless of the forms, ventriloquizing a higher will and truth” while for others the excess
takes shape not in abstracted personality but in unheralded narratives and material
302
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histories of the enslaved, women and queer subjects, native peoples, other
underclasses.304
But even these bedeviling, surplus characteristics of democracy appear exclusive
to the modes of U.S. cultural and political production. In Hemispheric Imaginings (2005),
for example, Gretchen Murphy mentions the widespread idea “in the United States that
South Americans were racially incapable of democratic self-rule.”305 In hemispheric
approaches to the literature and culture of democracy, the South Americas largely
represent ill-managed yet desirable acquisitions of territory and natural resources to
satisfy the growing appetites of Anglo-America’s empire for liberty.306 While AngloAmerican representations of disorderly South Americans mismanaging their own
territorial resources would seemingly encourage expansionist desires, such projections
were also daunted by adverse and unassimilable social, cultural, racial, and colonial
differences that the South Americas represented by way of Black Legend afterlives
discussed in the preceding Chapter 3.
This chapter foregrounds political-theoretical vantages from the hemispheric
South rather than Anglo-American expansionist schemes. I ask: How do we account for
theories of democracy from the perspective of Spanish-American subjects who
knowingly negotiate representations of the South Americas as politically backward and
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effectively anti-democratic? I address this question primarily across two theoretical and
ethnographic studies of U.S. democracy: Lorenzo de Zavala’s Viaje a los estados-unidos
del Norte de América / Journey to the United States of America (1834) and Tocqueville’s
well-known Democracy in America (1835). Zavala’s text not only predates Tocqueville’s
famous study by a year, but it is also published in the wake of the author’s exile and the
chaotic aftermath of Mexico’s independence. Questions about national sovereignty,
democratic forms proper to local circumstances, and ways to achieve national stability
while invigorating political participation in emergent republics were pressing concerns
for many inhabitants of post-independence Spanish America. As a political exile from an
independent yet politically unstable Mexico, Zavala assesses the North American
democratic experiment for inspiration on how to remedy post-independence ills. Much
like Tocqueville’s ethnographic analysis of American society, Zavala studies a number of
state constitutions; describes cities, rural societies, and the mores of U.S. citizens; he also
offers peripheral commentary on slavery and poverty in the U.S. However, Zavala
considers democracy as a specific question and possibility for addressing the political
turmoil in post-independence Mexico. By extension, Zavala integrates the condition of
exile and the contingencies of “northward” travel into his method of analysis in the Viaje,
which lends to his study of U.S. democracy a more wayward and less systematic
approach than that exemplified by Tocqueville.
The uneven, post-independence shift of political allegiance from the concept of
patria to nación helps guide our interpretations of nineteenth-century theories of U.S.
democracy penned by Spanish-American subjects. Literary historian Raúl Coronado
defines the untranslatable concept of patria not only as the place of one’s birth; he also
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elaborates its broader metaphorical senses of colonial hierarchy, the old monarchical
political order, and the desire for “the patriarchal home” conveyed by a Catholic
monarchy.307 According to Coronado, the concept of patria “insists on its connection to
the past, its ancestral origin, and provides a sense of stability, order, tradition. It is
nostalgic, and like its Greek roots nóstos, ‘returning home,’ and álgos, ‘pain’ or ‘ache,’
the patria is pessimistic, longing for a moment that will never return.”308 Another
keyword—the pueblo—figures the collective source of Spanish-American sovereignty
and, as the independence movements unravel, this collective political concept moves
toward the unknown and emergent arrangement of the nacíon (nation), “a symbol of the
future.”309 Nonetheless, the patria lulls the pueblo back in what Coronado likens to “a
siren song” of the past: “it holds out the lure of security, belonging, intimacy, the
known… of a sense of origins.”310 This ongoing struggle between the pueblo’s allegiance
to the patria’s familiar sociopolitical routines and the novel yet formally undetermined
nación characterizes Mexico’s post-independence conflicts that impel Zavala’s exilic
travels in the United States, and which I return to discuss in more detail in the second
section of this chapter.
Outcast from the patria—from a Mexican homeland—Zavala writes the Viaje as a
search for sources of inspiration from the sociopolitical practices and forms he observes
in the United States, which help delineate the inchoate nación for the Mexican pueblo. In
this chapter, I emphasize the importance of the condition, subjectivity, and narrative form
of exile to Zavala’s study of Anglo-American political life. José Quiroga offers a useful
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examination of the word in Keywords for Latina/o Studies (2016), “as a political term—
which it always is—‘exile’ names a condition and a subject.”311 Exile also implies a
contradictory mode of narration, where exilic narratives derive from “a before and after
the exile subject came to be” yet this same narrative arc also entails “a timeless waiting
for a resolution that will end the state that it names.”312 The exile is singled out of time
and place, and this double banishment that produces this exemplary figure is often a
prerogative of “the proper functioning of [a] government” that is incompatible with the
exile’s will or presence.313 Despite being cast out from a hostile political order, the exile
also represents “something beyond the singular, to the extent of practically abolishing
and re-instating the community.”314 This dynamic of destroying and reconstructing the
community resonates with the OED’s suggestion about “the word’s French etymon
relating to ruin and destruction [that] may have a distinct origin in classical Latin
excidium overthrow, demolition, ruin, destruction… although this is generally not
accepted.”315 I entertain this unaccepted etymological relation in relationship to Zavala’s
exile, since the the Viaje must envision alternatives to the entrenched political forms of
Spanish colonialism in the process of theorizing the nación, and of making the nación
compelling for Mexican inhabitants as a political collectivity, a pueblo. The experiences
of estrangement associated with the figure of the exile also help to illuminate the ways in
which democracy attempts—and often fails—to manage its own productions of excess
and exclusion.
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Such excesses, discordances, and otherwise undisciplined aspects of democracy
accumulate in the “figure of the remainder… [that] endures and exceeds any specific
historical moment.”316 Here, in the interpretation of the remainder, I borrow Zita Nuñez’s
investment in the ongoing irresolution between “the discourses of race and democracy” in
Cannibal Democracy (2008).317 As I mentioned previously, the current critical
conversation on the discursive irresolution between racial particularities—among other
social distinctions—and democratic societies seldom stray beyond the scope of the U.S.
nation-state. Nuñez brings a rare hemispheric and multilingual approach to the social,
cultural, and literary problem of democracy in the distinctive example of racial
democracy in Brazilian sociopolitical formations. This hemispheric approach orients our
critical attention to the limitations of democracy’s imaginary of inclusion, especially a
democratic arrangement calibrated to “incorporate” racial difference rather than manage
the inequalities of its three divisions (presumably, whites, natives, and blacks) as
Tocqueville theorizes race as a fundamental contradiction for U.S. democracy. Nuñez
traces instead “another possibility—that of the resistant remainder…. [which] suggests a
way out of the binaries—inclusion or exclusion, assimilation or separatism—that have so
dominated the way we have thought about Americanness.”318 This chapter’s contribution
to the analysis of “resistant remainders” focuses on a largely optimistic hemispheric
moment during the aftermath of the Spanish-American wars of independence (circa
1826) and before the 1846-1848 U.S.-Mexican War. I attend to the ways in which
Mexico in particular and the South Americas in general herald unique remainders and
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reminders of intersecting colonial legacies across Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America and Lorenzo de Zavala’s Viaje.
In the first section of this chapter, I examine the construction of postindependence Mexico and the South Americas as spaces of “backward” social and
political movements necessary to a theory of U.S. democracy in Tocqueville’s study.
Previous chapters have attended to canonical nineteenth-century revisions of the Black
Legend throughout the Spanish-American independence movements, which have
included narratives of New World conquest of indigenous societies (Chapter 1) and
discourses of racial taint (Chapter 3). Another incarnation of revisions to the Black
Legend involves the idea of backwardness. In this chapter, I argue that imputations of
sociopolitical backwardness are significantly revised in a post-independence conjuncture
of the Spanish Americas. In this post-independence moment for numerous polities of the
hemispheric South, ideas of backwardness go beyond Anglo-American perceptions of the
Spanish-American revolutions as failures to completely overcome or break away from
Spain’s colonial legacies.319 More damningly, in Tocqueville’s analysis, the very notion
of revolution in the South Americas is coterminous with ideas of sociopolitical
backwardness necessary to the ways in which an emerging U.S. empire legitimates itself
as an exceptional New World democracy. But as an improper and non-teleological
movement, the backwardnesses—social, political, colonial, and racial—that affix to what
Tocqueville calls “South America” in reference to a generalized space and the defunct
class of “Spanish” inhabitants who linger on in that imagined space illuminate
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possibilities for the critique of U.S. empire. This possibility of critique emerges through
the very imagination of a distinctly backward “South America” and “Mexico” that
Anglo-American settlers aspire to exert colonial control over in the name of democratic
freedoms.
The following section argues that Lorenzo de Zavala revamps the discourse of
backwardness into a method of exilic analysis and speculation of democratic forms. For
Zavala, the concept of South American “backwardness” indicates a mode of theorizing
U.S. democratic life informed by political insights into Mexico’s post-independence
instability. He translates the scripts of South American backwardness into a critical
relation of “secondariness” to the dominant economic, cultural, and institutional forms he
perceives in U.S. politics. This secondariness takes multiple forms, including Zavala’s
performance of cultural ambassadorship as he translates and synthesizes his observations
abroad in the Anglo-American states “of the North” into political lessons for a Mexican
audience.320 In this dual role as a theorist and translator, Zavala draws on second-hand
rumors and personal anecdotes that accompany—and often interrupt—his more
systematic analyses of U.S. laws, institutions, and social schema. On striking occasion,
these secondary rumors and anecdotes bring into view some regressive aspects of
democratic society in the United States, with a particular emphasis on the deadening of
social connections into calculated transactions, the institution of slavery, and aristocratic
disparities of wealth that sit uneasily beside the prevailing myths of social freedoms and
growing prosperity associated with the United States. My reading of the “secondary”
features of Zavala’s text diverges from current scholarly analyses that examine early
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Latinx encounters with U.S. democracy as an idealized form of liberalism that eludes
South American political conditions, where polities of the hemispheric South have yet to
cast off the cloak of colonial rule.321 Instead, this section foregrounds the political
critiques and social insights made possible by exilic Latinx insights into old colonial
relations costumed in the presumed novelties of U.S. democracy.
I. “South America Being Torn Asunder”: Race, Empire, and Political Dysfunction
in Democracy in America
Nineteenth-century American literary scholarship often contends with Alexis de
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America in order to theorize the racial logics of U.S.
democracy. Such discussions focus on the tenth and final chapter of the first volume, “A
Few Remarks on the Present-Day State and the Probable Future of the Three Races that
Inhabit the Territory of the United States,” where disorderly questions of racial
particularity, slavery, and indigenous dispossession are addressed separately from the
more systematic analyses of democracy as an exceptional political culture found nowhere
else but the United States. As its title indicates, the tenth chapter approaches the
sociopolitical effects of race as, simultaneously, democracy’s unspeakable remainder and
its constitutive exception.322 For Michael Denning in Culture in the Age of Three Worlds
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(2004), the racial divisions described in the tenth chapter split Tocqueville’s theory of
American exceptionalism into three discrete parts: “democracy in America,” “slavery in
America,” and “indigenous dispossession in America.”323 Jennifer Greiman in
Democracy’s Spectacle (2010) counters, “Tocqueville indeed offers the unified theory of
American exceptionalism for which Denning calls.”324 According to Greiman,
Tocqueville “[replicates] his model of popular sovereignty in his discussion of slavery”
through the alienated figure of “the stranger” that precedes and crosses the threshold of
the tenth chapter.325 In Specters of Democracy (2011), however, Ivy G. Wilson reorients
the study of democracy away from the alienated strangers and abstracted shadows of
Tocqueville’s work—key figures for racial exception in democracy—toward black
cultural production as a way to disallow “blackness to be continually maintained as the
mere shadow of democracy, as an apparitional entity separate from its substance.”326 In
Wilson’s argument, blackness does not name a spectral presence but rather a substantial
political tradition of black cultural production. While these texts advance important
analyses of democracy through various critical race studies approaches, they focus
mainly on black-white racial schisms within the boundaries of the U.S. nation-state.
By contrast, this section focuses on representations of the revolutionary Spanish
Americas that often interfaces with racial discourses in Tocqueville’s text. I do so in
order to understand how such representations render Tocqueville’s study of U.S.
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democracy inextricable from hemispheric colonial legacies. The tenth chapter not only
invokes the persistent irresolution between U.S. democracy and internal racial
distinctions, but also an unstable relation between democracy and empire as that which
informs the expansionist voracity of Anglo-American power. Tocqueville’s inconsistent
analysis of “Mexicans,” “Spaniards,” “the Spanish and Portuguese,” the “Spanish Race,”
“the Spaniards of South America,” “South Americans,” and even a footnote on Mexico’s
province of Texas produces an unwieldy array of subjects that complicate the ideas of
“democracy,” “America,” and even the categorical stability of the “three races” in the
tenth chapter. When Tocqueville mentions the “peoples of South America” he must
suddenly speak not only of “Americans” but of the distinctions and relationships between
“Europe,” “the English race,” “Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese,” “North America,”
“Anglo-Americans,” and “Americans of the United States.” South America not only
names a link between Old World and New World politics, then, but it also has its role in
unsettling Tocqueville’s conceptualization of democracy as innate to the United States.
Democracy in America, I argue, necessitates a shadow hemisphere characterized not by
democratic progress but by “backward” political movements. Tocqueville’s theory of
U.S. democracy revises the sociopolitical illegitimacy once affixed to Spanish
colonialism in the Americas into an indelible feature of South America’s political
revolutions.327 At stake in this discourse of political backwardness is a theory of how U.S.
democracy co-opts Mexico’s post-independence instability in order to conceal
expansionist interests westward and southward.
In the introduction to Materializing Democracy, Russ Castronovo and Dana D.
Nelson prioritize “asking questions that address our inability to narrate democracy’s
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shadow histories and speak forthrightly about our complex fantasies about it” (13). This
section avers that imaginaries of Spanish-American backwardness significantly subtend
democracy’s most constitutive “shadow histories.” This section begins with
Tocqueville’s discussion of the first Mexican Constitution of 1824, where he theorizes a
mode of revolutionary backwardness unique to Spanish America. Spanish America’s
backward political forms help to delineate U.S. democracy’s colonial afterlives and
disavowals, culminating in a counterintuitive scene of Anglo-American settlement in
Texas.
The Mexican Constitution of 1824 exemplifies, for Tocqueville, the insufficiency
of formal legal and institutional frameworks for the workings of democracy outside of
Anglo-American society. Tocqueville’s commentary on Mexico’s Federal Constitution
precedes the “Three Races” chapter. “Although [Mexican politicians] transported the
letter of the law,” Tocqueville writes, “they failed to transfer at the same time the spirit
which gave it life.”328 In his assessment of Mexican political dysfunction, Mexico’s
transcription of official codes and frameworks from the U.S. federal constitution fails to
instill democratic “spirit” in a non-U.S. body politic. This concept of a properly
democratic spirit has less to do with any of the three democratic factors that preoccupy
Latin American political theorists about the putative failure of democracy in Latin
America according to the following Tocquevillean rubric: physical conditions, legal
frameworks, and social customs.329
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Instead, I posit that specific Anglo-imperial legal fictions and colonial pasts
materialize this exclusive “spirit” of democracy. The improper political spirit that
impedes a simple transfer of “the letter of the law” not only annuls Mexican
constitutionalism and the imitative political order it supposedly inaugurates. Even worse,
Mexico’s political spirit produces highly unstable and backward political forms by way
of seemingly unstoppable malfunctions in governance. Mexican society “became tangled
endlessly in the machinery of their double system of government” that cycles relentlessly
“from anarchy to military despotism and back again.”330 This democratic “spirit,”
whether felicitously functional or catastrophically dysfunctional, manifests itself as a
formation of political power that pre-exists or at least lies beyond the making of a written
constitution. Following Tocqueville’s argument, Mexico’s undemocratic spirit refers to a
latent political force or arrangement that the transplantation of the U.S. federal
constitution fails to overwrite. Here, a malfunctioning political essence fails to animate a
unified political system and sets into motion a doubled system of government set at odds
with itself. The corrupted essence or spirit of democracy animates, in alternating fashion,
negative extremes of political order: by turns, it dictates an absolute centralization of
power (“military despotism”) and it abdicates to a decentralized dispersion of power
(“anarchy”).
Tocqueville extrapolates Mexico’s instance of constitutional dysfunction to all of
South America, which names a sociopolitical entity that represents U.S. democracy’s
shadow half. Through this generalization, Tocqueville instantiates a post-independence
revision of the Black Legend that reads Spanish America’s revolutionary upheavals as
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antithetical to political progress. I excerpt the following passage at length in order to
elaborate two distinct consequences for the interpretation of revolutionary failure in
South America:
We see in astonishment the new nations of South America being torn asunder for
a quarter of a century by an endless succession of revolutions and we expect to
see their return to what may be called their natural state. But who can say for sure
that revolutions are not these says the most natural state for the Spanish of South
America? In that country, society is struggling in the depths of an abyss from
which its own efforts cannot extricate it.
The people dwelling in this beautiful half of the Western hemisphere
appear stubbornly determined to tear out each other’s entrails; nothing can divert
them from such an end. Exhaustion drives them to take a moment’s rest which
becomes the impetus for a fresh bout of frenzy. When I turn to consider them in
this state, alternating between misery and crime, I am tempted to think that
despotism would be a blessing for them.
But these two words will never be linked in my mind.331
Tocqueville transfers the brutality and backwardness of Spanish colonial history into the
idea of ceaseless revolutions that afflict the nameless and undifferentiated “new nations
of South America.” In his view, the putative failure of the Spanish-American
independence struggles can be read in two possible ways. First, the “endless succession
of revolutions” can neither surmount the Spanish colonial past (incurring a return to
“their natural state”) nor can those revolutions be at all disentangled from the “misery and
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crime” of colonial histories. In the South Americas, then, the revolutions failed to
develop political society on new foundations and national fictions untethered from the
times of colonial rule. The Anglo-imperial and European expectation “to see their return
to what may be called their natural state” describes the failure of those revolutions as a
circular return to a prior colonial condition. Nonetheless, this is a potentially temporary
failure since the Spanish descendants of the region can still renew their political effort
toward the accomplishment of a modern revolution. To be clear, Hannah Arendt defines
the modern concept of revolution as an essential sociopolitical break that surpasses the
orders, customs, and traditions of the past. “The modern concept of revolution,” Arendt
writes, “[is] inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly
begins anew” along with “the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning
should coincide.”332
When Tocqueville poses the rhetorical question: “But who can say for sure that
revolutions are not these days the most natural state for the Spanish of South America?”
he proposes an entirely different political impasse for South Americans. In this case,
Spanish-American political movements reactivate and amplify—rather than break away
from—histories of conquest and colonialism. The rhetorical question Tocqueville poses
suggests that the newness of political revolution and proper democratic spirit was not
only foreclosed in South America, but also destined to worsen preexisting political
conditions. From Tocqueville’s point of view, Spanish-American revolutions do not cycle
to a point of return in Spanish colonialism (revolutionary lapse), nor do they break from
old political orders to a new beginning (revolutionary modernity). They unravel
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backward. As a political event, the failed revolutions of the South are an ongoing event
that intensify the Spanish empire’s illegitimate dominion and conquest of the New
World. In so doing, South America’s scene of revolutionary upheaval actively reverses
Hannah Arendt’s definition for modern revolution, producing its conceptual opposite of
backward revolution rather than merely “failed” revolution. For “the Spanish of South
America,” Tocqueville concludes, South America’s revolutionary regressions cannot
sustain written frameworks for democracy nor can it reap the matchless wealth of its
physical situation in “this beautiful half of the Western hemisphere,” which surpasses
even the ideal physical condition of North America.333
Although physical conditions and legal codes of a society are factors in a
democratic polity, according to Tocqueville, they are not sufficient for its felicitous
manifestation. Through Tocqueville’s translations of the Black Legend, we learn instead
that the immaterial substance of a proper democratic “spirit” is tightly bound to a specific
colonial history and therefore a specific set of colonial practices and legal cultures. In
other words, the advent of a successful modern revolution that begets “democracy” seems
tenable only in the afterlife of British colonial legacies in North America.
Tocqueville’s theory of democracy negates Spanish America’s revolutions in
order to define U.S. democracy’s apparent novelty, success, and progress. Initially, the
portrayal of Spanish-American disorder defuses any threat of inter-hemispheric conflict
between Anglo-Americans and South Americans, which in turn supports Tocqueville’s
broader thesis that U.S. democracy thrives because “it has no great wars to fear” from
other societies who inhabit the continent.334 Tocqueville likens the Union’s geopolitical
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situation to an island of continental proportions, where it sits at the “center of a huge
continent in which human industry can enjoy limitless expansion.”335 This continental
scale for expansion and industrial activity then gives way to the putative singularity of an
island, where “the Union is almost as isolated from the world as if it were surrounded on
all sides by the ocean.”336 He expresses a classical version of continental exceptionalism
here, but Tocqueville’s projection of geopolitical advantage in the figure of an island is
also strikingly counterintuitive. Of course, in the New World setting of the Caribbean,
islands were crucibles of colonial intrusion and sustained decolonial struggle. The figural
New World island, then, does not convey uncontested singularity, but rather a furiously
embattled colonial context. The elision between the United States’ continental centrality
and its exceptional insularity retroactively forecloses hemispheric and archipelagic
grammars of the Americas that once assailed the national imaginary discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3.337
Tocqueville proceeds to map the “oceanic” surround of U.S. exceptionalism as a set
of settler colonial and imperial geographies. Canada to the North is divided “into two
hostile nations” with a scant population, the displacement of “half-destroyed” indigenous
tribes mark the axis “from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico,” and finally the Southern point
of contact “with the Mexican Empire” occasions Tocqueville’s speculations over the
probability of inter-American war. He admits “one day serious wars may well develop”
along the point of contact with Mexico, but his elaboration of the region’s enduring and
mythic backwardness allows him to defer this concern: “But for a long time to come the
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backward state of civilization, the degeneration of its morals, and its extreme poverty will
stand in the way of any hope of achieving high status among nations.”338 Every time
Tocqueville represents U.S. democracy as an unstoppable political development he
introduces potential challenges to this very representation, such as when he briefly
anticipates the U.S.-Mexican War or invokes the tempestuous implications of anticolonial conflict represented by Caribbean histories.
This equivocal quality to American exceptionalism informs scholarly attention to
democracy’s degenerative inclinations into its own constitutive opacities.339 Literary
scholars of U.S. national literature and political theorists alike debate the paradoxes of
democracy as well as the possibilities and hazards it offers for arrangements of social life
or political belonging. Among the latter, Greiman discerns the tragic “narrative effect” of
Democracy in America, “with the death of the public sphere in a world of dissociation,
withdrawal into private consumption, and expansive regulation.”340 By contrast, literary
critic Christopher Castiglia in Interior States (2008) denounces the sort of critical
pessimism that surrounds contemporary treatments of democracy, amounting to a heap of
postmortems for democratic society. From this point of view, Greiman’s interpretation of
tragic narrative denouement in Tocqueville’s text might be understood as participating in
such postmortem diagnostics, one that posits “democracy was stillborn, done in at its
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inception” by factors that include the “social polarization” of the public, the institution of
slavery, and “incipient imperialism.”341 By contrast, the critical tendency that Castiglia
demonstrates is one that imputes an idealized potential to the concept of democracy
through an analysis that seeks to separate or seal deliberative democracy off from its own
internal contradictions. For Castiglia, the security state feeds off the social interiorization
of democracy, and so democracy can be thought of not as a lost or vacant cause, but as
simply being “misplaced” in the citizen-subject’s failure to self-regulate.342 According to
his argument, we can return to the “anti-institutional work of democracy” if we can
recuperate the “power of post-interior sociality [as] the democratic possibility
Tocqueville saw in Americans’ proclivity to association.”343 Despite a fundamental
disagreement in the sociopolitical stakes of Democracy in America, both Greiman and
Castiglia conceive of democracy as a theoretical and material question bounded by the
United States, rather than a discourse forged and understood through shifting political
orders and intersecting imperial histories in the hemisphere.
The boundary between Spanish-American exacerbations of the conquest in the
aftermaths of its revolutionary upheavals and Anglo-American democratic progress turns
out to be a mere effect of legal forms and fictions. In the last chapter, “The Future
Condition of the Three Races,” Tocqueville reiterates archaic Black Legend narratives
about the spectacular bloodshed of the Spanish conquest, which represents an
unambiguous violation of both indigenous sovereignty and life. He decries the Spanish,
who “let their dogs loose on the Indians… [who] pillaged the New World as they would a
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town taken by storm, without discrimination or compassion,” as well as the aftermath of
forcible racial mixing, where “the remnant of the Indian populations who escaped these
massacres ended up by mixing with their conquerors and by adopting their religion and
customs.”344 In his reference to the dogs as tools of avaricious conquest, Tocqueville
references a recurring trope in A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies (1552) by
Bartolomé de Las Casas—a classic source for revitalizations of the Black Legend even in
this nineteenth-century context.345 These dogs of conquest are unthinking, hyper-physical
extensions of the irrational greed and bloodshed that darken the Spanish colonies with
illegitimate and immoral dominion. This mode of New World settlement also directly
contradicts a core dynamic of U.S. democracy and British colonial policy alike, which
Greiman summarizes—using Tocqueville’s words—as a mode of “‘mixing without
‘combining’ (or ‘touching’ without ‘entering’)” across human difference, especially
racialized distinctions.346 The brute force of Spanish conquest falters in comparison to the
settler colonial policies of North America because, oddly, “If the Indian tribes had not
been tied to the land through agriculture at the time of the arrival of the Europeans, they
would doubtless have been destroyed in South America, just as they were in North
America.”347 Despite the atrocities of Spanish conquest, Tocqueville asserts the Indian
tribes have not been destroyed in South America. Native tribes of the southern Americas
not only “mix” with their conquerors, but in what Tocqueville calls the racial logic of the
“half-caste,” they have also been incorporated into Spanish colonial society. In the
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Anglo-American colonies of the North, Tocqueville perceives this destruction as absolute
even while it remains in progress.
In contrast to the Spanish, “the conduct of the Americans of the United States
toward the native races is characterized by a most singular affection for legal
formalities.” Here Tocqueville fully inhabits the equivocal voice Greiman describes as a
heightened feature of this chapter, where “he speaks dialogically and through anecdote,
alternately romanticizing racial difference, justifying it, and fretting over its implications
in baffled resignation.”348 Besides the fretful equivocations over racial difference as a
simultaneously integral and incompatible feature of democracy, the contradictory
registers of voice Tocqueville employs here also renders suspect the formal legal and
cultural basis on which U.S. democracy disavows its own expansive consolidations
through the dispossession of indigenous and enslaved peoples. In contrast to the brute
physicality of Spanish conquerors, Anglo-Americans masquerade the force of their
settler-colonial interests in the legal fictions provided in this instance by formal contracts
and, by extension, the passive violence the contract enables. Anglo-American settlers,
Tocqueville observes, “do not take over [indigenous] lands without having acquired them
through an appropriately drawn-up contract. If by chance an Indian nation is no longer
able to live on its territory, they take them by hand as brothers and lead them away to die
far from the land of their forefathers.”349 The contract’s pretension of equality between
parties brings into view the only recognized contact between Anglo-American settlers
and the nameless “Indian nation.” Contractual exchange appears as a gesture of kinship—
a holding of hands—that refigures the violent contacts of settler colonialism, where
348
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Anglo-Americans “take [the Indian nation] by hand as brothers and lead them away to
die far from the land of their forefathers.”
In this process of democracy-as-imperial expansion, there exists no apparent
outside to the erasures enacted by the United States’ settler colonial exercise of power.
Tocqueville compares the indelible stain of Spanish conquest with the fabricated
bloodlessness of Anglo-American settlement:
The Spanish, using unparalleled atrocities which bring an indelible shame upon
themselves, have not succeeded in exterminating the Indian race, nor even in
preventing them from sharing their rights; the Americans of the United States
have attained both these results with amazing ease, quietly, legally, and
generously, with no spilling of blood, with no violation to the great moral
principles in the eyes of the world. Men could not be destroyed with more respect
for the laws of humanity.350
Greiman helpfully describes the peculiarity of Tocqueville’s analytical voice in this
chapter, which culminates in the realization that “the United States has achieved a
precision in practices of extermination that Spanish colonists could only dream of.”351
Anglo-American performances of “respect for the laws of humanity” preclude any
sharing of rights with “the Indian race.” To render others nonhuman through U.S.
paradigms of legality and Anglo-centric enlightenment presents “no violation to the great
moral principles in the eyes of the world.” The Spanish colonial recognition of
indigenous “rights,” however limited, exposes Spanish colonial dominions to
international discussion of uniquely bloody violations. Yet this apparent binary between
350
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legal propriety and flagrant atrocity fails to hold. It contradicts Tocqueville’s earlier
analysis of Anglo-American settler logics that rely on “the appropriately drawn-up
contract” rescripts the logics of settler colonialism into a jarring fratricidal metaphor,
where Anglo-American “brothers” decimate the “Indian nation.” The narrative voice that
attributes “unparalleled atrocities” and “indelible shame” to Spanish colonials acquires a
calculated instability through its exaggeration of settler colonial bloodlessness in North
American territories, suggesting that the taints and imprints of Spanish slaughter help us
glimpse the destruction ongoing in Anglo-American domains. Contracts, treaties, and
other legal texts rescript the violence of U.S. expansionism as seamless policy and
reciprocity.
But other forms of democratic imperial intrusion—by means of economic
intervention or cultural displacement—can also proceed independently of an
accompanying legal document or a formal declaration of war. Such informal strategies of
settler colonial expansion appear capable of upsetting the geopolitical balance between
the “only two rival races [who] share the New World at present, the Spanish and
English.”352 No notion of the “creole” appears in Tocqueville’s schema because it proves
antithetical to a new settler colonial strategy he elaborates about Texas. He discerns all
subjects according to Old World imperial affiliations except for his reductive taxonomy
of racialized populations of the African diaspora and indigenous community; only a brief
mention of the Spanish-colonial “half-caste” breaks this mold.
Texas, then, becomes a present-day iteration of a longer chronology of interimperial settlement in the Americas that Tocqueville relays in the rest of the footnote.
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This chronology involves territorial disputes between varying degrees of “civilized
nations,” the shared European origins of English, French, and Spanish colonizers.353
Tocqueville’s remarks on the Mexican territory of Texas are brief, occupying a footnoted
observation and another mention in the conclusion. However, Texas represents a pivotal
entryway for U.S. expansion throughout the rest of South America. Tocqueville writes:
“The inhabitants of the United States are day by day gradually infiltrating into Texas
where they acquire land and, although obeying the laws of the country, establish the
dominion of their language and way of life. The province of Texas is still under Mexican
rule; but soon you will not find any more Mexicans there.”354 In the footnote, Tocqueville
observes, “One can see that if Mexico does not hasten to put a stop to this development,
Texas will soon be lost to them.”355
Tocqueville examines Anglo-American settlements in Texas as a novel strategy
for imperial expansion and settlement that might finally overthrow the rival sovereignty
of the “Spanish race” in all of South America. As a theorist of U.S. democracy,
Tocqueville does not specify any sort of recourse Mexico might employ to put a stop to
Anglo-American settlements in Texas. Texas annexation therefore looks like an
inevitable outcome of democracy’s imperial animations. Legal recourse for the Mexican
state looks especially futile when Tocqueville makes a reference to the 1828 Treaty of
Limits that confirmed the boundaries between Mexico and the United States:356
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The boundaries to separate these two races [“the Spanish and the English”] have
been settled by treaty. Yet, however favorable this treaty is to the AngloAmericans, I am quite convinced that they will soon infringe it. Beyond the
frontiers of the Union in the direction of Mexico lie vast uninhabited regions. The
people of the United States will force their way into these solitary areas even
sooner than those very peoples who have the right to occupy them. They will
snatch ownership of the land, settle there in social communities and, when the
lawful owner finally turns up, he will find the desert cultivated and foreigners
quietly settled on his inheritance.357
In spite of the extant treaty, there is no tenable defense against a form of imperial
force that erases all trace of its territorial, legal, and social violations. More precisely,
representations of Anglo-American expansionist violence always create the ideological
conditions for being sanctioned. Such an imperial power depends on reiterations of
longstanding settler colonial projections of empty, waste, and uninhabited lands
otherwise known as terra nullius. The settler colonial discourse that Tocqueville
ventriloquizes in this passage encodes all lands in “the direction of Mexico” as desert,
“vast uninhabited regions” in order to evacuate contending sovereign claims in the whole
of the hemispheric South. Unlike the trope of the “vanishing Indian” that is closely
associated with the concept of terra nullius, the assumed “Spanish” subject who populates
the space beyond “the frontiers of the Union in the direction of Mexico” must appear
belatedly in the future conditional tense. The “lawful” Spanish owner of South American
lands must unwittingly behold Anglo-American settlements “on his inheritance” in order
405.
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to obscure the acts of force, infringement, and theft that Anglo-American power
undertook to install itself in foreign land. The above passage echoes Tocqueville’s other
warnings of indigenous communities’ “finding” or “realizing” a loss of land and
community too late, and this belatedness plays into the illusion of imperceptible and
“quiet” Anglo-American expansion. Even the reader can be recruited as a legitimating
witness to this expansionist process when Tocqueville speculates over the progress of
Texas settlement, “The province of Texas is still under Mexican rule; but soon you will
not find any more Mexicans there.”358
This “Spanish” and South-American subject’s belated witnessing resolves interimperial conflict in the Americas by participating in his own despoilment. It is a
resolution that works tautologically in favor of U.S. democracy’s imperial tendencies. He
must “turn up” to recognize the irretrievability of his lawful land claim and the loss of his
inheritance. Beyond the Spaniard’s recognition of loss he ceases to exist; he turns up in
order to be turned out from the social community of suddenly Anglo-American settlers.
In addition to the constitutive, and therefore paradoxically intimate division among the
“three races” in the concluding chapter, this timeless “Spanish” subject must also be kept
close in order to animate political formations of U.S. democracy and to satiate its
imperial thirst for lands under formerly European sovereignties. Tocqueville’s text allows
us to understand how democracy must continually construct racial distinctions that
reproduce colonial intimacies and national exclusions necessary to U.S. democracy’s
aesthetic of autonomous expansion.
II. Zavala’s Exilic Analysis: On the Disenchantments of U.S. Democracy
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In 1830, Lorenzo de Zavala travelled to the U.S. in political exile from Mexico’s
post-independence turmoil. Today, his political legacy is remembered in contradictory
ways: between the 1820’s to his death in 1836, Zavala collaborated on two independence
projects for Mexico and Texas. He left his mark on Mexican independence when he
helped draft the Federal constitution of 1824, the very same constitutional document
Tocqueville condemns. But during the year of his death he was denounced in Mexico as a
traitorous accomplice to Anglo-American colonization of Texas and its eventual
annexation to U.S. territory, although he did not live to see either the state’s formal
annexation or the U.S.-Mexican War.359 Leading up to his exile in the U.S., Zavala’s
political beliefs aligned with advocates of Mexican Federalism, who favored a
decentralized confederation of states over the conservative faction’s centralization of
power in the Catholic church and the military. In a short-lived victory for the federalists,
the 1824 constitution co-written by Zavala drew from liberal reforms of the first 1812
Spanish constitution and borrowed from U.S. constitutionalism a three-branches division
of government. However, the congress made concessions to Mexican conservatives who
not only insisted on Catholicism as the official religion, but also blocked liberal
guarantees such as the freedom of speech and press.360 A coup in 1829 deposed the sitting
federalist president, Vincente Guerrero, and installed the vice president, Anastasio
Bustamente, who defected to Conservative influence. Zavala’s subsequent exile in the
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United States traced a path northward from Louisiana through Pittsburgh and up to
Quebec, and from there he backtracked to New York, Philadelphia, and D.C.
These travels became raw material for Zavala’s theoretical and ethnographic
study of U.S. democratic culture and politics, which allows us to reflect on early Latinx
political theories for the relation between Spanish-American political imaginaries and the
exceptionalism of U.S. liberal democracy. Zavala’s study took the form of a travel
narrative published in 1834, titled Viaje a los Estados-Unidos del Norte de América /
Journey to the United States of North America.361 Unlike Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America, the title of Zavala’s text notably indexes U.S. political forms in relation to the
northern coordinates of the Americas and disallows the conflation between the United
States and the rest of the hemisphere. Written in exile from a politically independent yet
unstable Mexico, the Viaje has been read as an assessment of the North American
democratic experiment for inspiration on how to remedy Mexico’s post-independence
ills. Current analyses of Zavala’s travel narrative lead up to its concluding chapter, where
the author pins his political aspirations on Texas as a possible resolution for
contradictions that inhere in liberal democracy. The concluding chapter is often seen as
providing a neat resolution to an otherwise compositionally miscellaneous, wandering,
and contradictory text shaped by the contingencies of Zavala’s exile. In his critical
introduction to the Recovery Project [RUSHLH] edition of Viaje, scholar John Michael
Rivera summarizes Zavala’s perception of Texas as a utopic “geopolitical space, located
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culturally and politically between Mexico and the United States… [a place where] the
diverse peoples who colonized Texas would come together and form a heterogeneous
people, the Texans, through a collective belief in a democratic state that ensured
individual rights.”362 In Chicano Nations (2011), Marissa K. López echoes this
understanding of Zavala’s political perceptions as instructive for destabilized Mexican
governance: “Zavala sees the racial and national diversity of Texas as the source of the
Mexican political sublime that its political institutions must capture.”363
Rather than work toward an idea of Texas as political utopia or progressive
resolution to Mexico’s turmoil, this section analyzes the ways in which Zavala
repurposes foreign discourses of Spanish-American “backwardness” into a methodology
for the critique of lingering imperial unfreedoms in postcolonial Mexico and within U.S.
democracy alike. On the one hand, Zavala denounces Mexican Conservatives’
codification of privileges for certain classes—the clergy and military—as a continuation
of Spanish colonialism, and on the other, Zavala’s journey in the United States takes aim
at the institution of slavery and informal forces of social inequality that cut across the U.S
North and South. This section’s analysis takes after the pattern of Zavala’s travels from
South to North and back again to the South in order to trace the collapse of binaries that
defines Northern freedoms against the illiberal South. Furthermore, I argue that that
Zavala’s method of juxtaposing anecdotes across multiple sources (from personal
recollection, other travel narratives, popular or rumored knowledges) help Zavala
theorize forms of sociopolitical regression in U.S. society. Through these anecdotal
juxtapositions Zavala develops a method of suspended translation that refuses transparent
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meaning or relations between the anecdotes he tells, but that nonetheless trace the
hemispheric implications of unfamiliar democratic forms.
In Zavala’s political analysis of U.S. liberal-democratic life, he often
ventriloquizes a version of the centuries-old slanderous discourse known as the Black
Legend. As we saw in Tocqueville’s manipulation of the discourse, in this period
representations of South-American political instability define the successes of U.S.
democracy by contrasting it with a racialized account of Spanish America’s social
backwardness and latent authoritarianism. Although Zavala dedicates Viaje to Mexicans
in the prologue, he risks repeating the discursive violence we hear in Tocqueville when
he chastises the archetypal Mexican as “belligerent, superstitious, ignorant and an enemy
of all restraint” in contrast to property-owning and hard-working North Americans.364 For
example, Zavala posits an overblown generalization between “The North American” and
“The Mexican” where “the former carries out the most arduous enterprises to their
conclusion, [while] the latter abandons them in the early states,” among other
comparisons for the U.S. citizen’s productive social, economic, and domestic virtues
against his countrymen’s unregulated work ethic.365 Zavala’s primary motivation for
writing the Viaje, he claims, lies in his conviction that “nothing can give more useful
lessons in politics to my fellow citizens than the knowledge of the manners, customs,
habits and government of the United States, whose institutions they have copied so
servilely.”366 The servile political mimicry that Zavala attributes to his “fellow citizens”
marks a point of tacit yet reflexive recognition concerning his own role in driving
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Mexico’s political instability. As the didactic voice of the travel narrative, Zavala omits
any explicit mention of his elected Presidency to the very Constitutional Congress that
produced the failed 1824 Mexican Federal Constitution that, if we recall in the preceding
section, even Tocqueville condemns as an improper copy of the U.S. constitution.367 In
the travel narrative’s very prologue, then, Zavala cannot escape being implicated in his
own accusations of “servile mimicry” in relation to U.S. political frameworks. What,
then, can he hope to gain by reiterating a hostile discourse of backwardness that targets
Mexico and Mexicans specifically and “South Americans” generally?
John Michael Rivera, the editor of Zavala’s Viaje for the Recovering the U.S.
Hispanic Literary Heritage Project, glosses Zavala’s translation of the Black Legend for
post-independence Mexico as a traditional characteristic of travel writing that emplots “a
story of political utopia” situated elsewhere from the traveller’s homeland. Rivera
explains that the Viaje draws from classical Greek political philosophies that define the
production of political theory in close relation to processes and imaginaries of “journey,
travel, spectacle and observation.”368 Zavala’s tendency to denigrate the place of his
national belonging therefore participates in the Greek notion of theoria in which the
“traveler represents the foreign space as an ideal political community, and, in doing so,
the writer attempts to identify the ‘foreign’ people and environment as ideal.”369 These
concepts of travel and spectacle traverse foreign communities that are, in turn, upheld as
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ideal political communities. According to Rivera, the negative discourse through which
Zavala reconstructs a “backward” Mexican citizenry follows in the tracks of this classical
political tradition, which in turn informs Viaje’s deviation from the colonial ideologies
that typify the familiar European generic tradition of the travel narrative. In travel
narratives of European imperial exploration, the traveller projects signs of savagery and
backwardness in the foreign lands he journeys, while the political-philosophical tradition
of theoria from which Zavala’s Viaje derives understands the traveller’s task as
altogether different. According to Rivera, the “logical function of the narrator is to
describe the conditions that make the given [foreign] utopia possible. This enables the
traveler to disseminate knowledge of the foreign space solely for the task of creating a
collective peoplehood in the country of the traveler’s origin.”370
Yet Rivera does not confront the ideological histories of Zavala’s Black Legendrelated portrayals of Mexican backwardness, which are fundamental to representations of
the U.S. as a democratic ideal. Zavala’s use of the Black Legend as an ideological
resource for the critique of Mexican politics carries with it a danger to Mexican social
and political formations after Spanish rule. After all, Zavala hazards sharing
Tocqueville’s previously-examined account of Spanish America’s backwardness,
dependence on the U.S., and teleological destiny to absorb U.S. democratic principles to
a degree that Mexico in particular and South America in general become
indistinguishable as likely acquisitions for the United States. In other words, why does
Zavala risk abetting and projecting U.S. imperial imaginaries in search of translatable
political lessons for Mexico?
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Zavala’s risk of complicity with Anglo-American imperialism in the Viaje inheres
in his self-fashioning as what Kirsten Silva Gruesz calls an “ambassador of culture,” an
often elite creole performance of transamerican translation and cultural mediation.
Ambassadors of culture derive in part from the figural authority of the Latin American
letrado, the colonial administrative functionary who “left a strong imprint on national
print cultures after independence.”371 The writings of post-independence ambassadors of
culture continued to weave social, cultural, and political power in an effort to confront
sociopolitical pressures that “put a premium on the hasty building of national identities”
in the vacuum left by colonial rule.372 Unlike the colonial letrado who organized and
conveyed information to colonial officials, cultural ambassadors addressed broader
hemispheric publics—official and popular audiences alike—“to represent the national
body by codifying through metaphor and figurative language its cultural identity, its
specificity.”373 The goal no longer entailed the management of the colonies, but the
didactic shaping of society into a consciously national body.
Ambassadorial figures reconstitute the hierarchical channels of written colonial
authority proper to the letrado into the multifocal influences of hemispheric cultural
transmission. “To see the work of the cultural ambassador as no more than an ongoing
complicity in imperial acts,” Gruesz warns, “is to oversimplify the case.”374 According to
Gruesz, such an oversimplification overlooks cultural ambassadorship’s contradictions
that illuminate the problems of post-independence statecraft and asymmetries of power
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across the Americas that contend with differing colonial legacies and contexts.
Furthermore, the cultural ambassador continuously switches between multiple roles; in
one capacity the ambassador of culture is a curator of foreign tastes and knowledges for
shaping an emerging sense of national peoplehood at home and in another, he poses
abroad as an informal delegate of a people yet to become proper “citizens.” Gruesz limns
a final paradox of the “citizen-ambassador: despite the stature that appears to accompany
the ambassador’s position, his is a peculiarly self-abnegating kind of authority, since it
derives from a relationship of secondary representation.” Such secondariness
characterizes the cultural work of hemispheric translation in its multiple senses as
adaptation, circulation, and mediation.375 The ambassador’s cultural eminence is
undermined by the taint of translation’s secondariness that “has much to do with the
American fetish of originality.”376
Zavala’s “secondary” authority of cultural ambassadorship manifests in the
opening pages of the Viaje, which introduces the text’s self-reflexive quality, its primary
Mexican audience, and its methodology for interrogating stark definitions of AngloAmerican progress against judgments of Mexican backwardness. As he pens his political
theories and observations in North American exile, Zavala is keenly aware that his
Mexican readers would object to and retaliate against his exaggerated generalizations in
the prologue: “I seem to hear some of my fellow countrymen yelling: ‘How awful! See
how that unworthy Mexican belittles and exposes us to the view of civilized peoples.’
Just calm down, gentlemen, for others have already said that and much more about us and
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about our forefathers, the Spaniards.”377 Here, Zavala notes the long history of negative
foreign representations about Spanish colonial legacies and its persistent afterlife in
foreign conceptions of Spanish-American political life. When Zavala cites the Black
Legend, “For others have already said that and much more about us and about our
forefathers, the Spaniards,” Zavala marks his particular use of the discourse as a new
development, a departure from its prior history since both Zavala and his Mexican
audience denounce it as a derogatory discourse pronounced on the foreign tongues of
rival, often Anglo-imperial interests.378 Zavala’s novel claim on the U.S. liberal public
sphere coincides with the hypothetical Mexican’s anomalous interruption of the
narrator’s recirculation of negative foreign stereotypes. In this respect, the Viaje offers an
unusual remedy for the post-independence, nineteenth-century hemispheric political
imagination: its counterintuitive circulation of defamatory tropes into the AngloAmerican public sphere opens the discourse of South American sociopolitical degeneracy
to critical exposure and elaboration. Recall that in Tocqueville’s text the “Spanish”
subject of Mexico appears only to observe Anglo-American settler colonialism and, by
way of passive observation, to legitimate Anglo-American expansion in the South
Americas. By contrast, the anonymous Mexicans who object to Zavala’s reiteration of the
Black Legend on U.S. soil make the presence of their protest heard across the U.S. public
sphere. Furthermore, unlike the direct authority of the colonial-era letrado, Zavala
imagines his authority as contestable and vulnerable to the spoken dissensions of
Mexico’s inchoate public.
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The Mexican dissidents react to Zavala’s pronouncement of their sociopolitical
backwardness in the prologue as a betrayal by one of their own. Here, the anonymous yet
national objection to this variation of the Black Legend about “backwardness” does not
stage a struggle between the “tainted” Mexican subject and a foreign interest that
tarnishes their nationality or political heritage. Instead, there is a mutual struggle over
post-independence troubles being “exposed to the view” of North Americans who might
be empowered to exploit Mexico’s political problems from near and far. As a Yucatecanborn creole writing in exile for a Mexican audience, however, Zavala’s use of Mexico’s
discursive backwardness might allow the concept of backwardness itself to be
repurposed. In other words, a critical orientation to thinking through the meaning and
substance of sociopolitical “backwardness” can operate outside a binary that simply
codes Mexican society as “unproductive,” or resistant to development, and AngloAmerican culture as “industrious,” or exemplary of teleological progress. Centuries of
familiarity with the sociopolitical implications of Black Legend representations of
backwardness lend to Zavala and his Mexican audience critical insight into
representations of stainless sociopolitical advancement. As we saw in Tocqueville’s
study, the joint terms of backwardness and progress mask U.S. democracy’s intimate
connections to racial subjection, expansion, and resource acquisition. Although Zavala’s
methodological approach is less systematic than Tocqueville’s analysis, his engagement
with the irreconcilable contradictions of the U.S. republic leads to an understudied
rejection of Anglo-American “customs and traditions” in pursuit of his political utopia.
To demonstrate the ways in which Zavala’s exilic analysis of U.S. democracy
crosses between idealizations and critiques of U.S. democracy, I turn to the conclusion of
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the Viaje. The conclusion attracts the bulk of scholarly attention on the text because it is
perceived to be “the most theoretical of all [Zavala’s] chapters” as it paradoxically urges
Mexicans to take inspiration from Anglo-American sociopolitical arrangements yet
cautions against direct imitation in the construction of their own political paradigms.379 In
a passage that exemplifies one of the text’s double imperatives, that is, to take inspiration
from U.S. political life, I quote at length:
Those who cannot resist the conviction of obvious facts of daily
experience resort to doleful prophecies and predict now the dissolution of
the great republic. We shall answer them that the present good is better
than hopes unrealized; that there is probably no man or people who would
prefer living under oppression or in poverty to the happy and independent
existence of that republic; only because some dyspeptic politicians tell
them that prosperous situation will not last two hundred years. No, never
will the strength of that living and persevering example of social Utopia
be weakened by such arguments. Be welcome to spy out their small and
fleeting mob scenes; exaggerate the heat of their public debates, the
turmoil of their elections, their most curious aberrations of Presbyterian
fanaticism, their aversion to the black caste, their difficulties because of
their system of slavery, their questions of tariffs, momentary difficulties
with their banks, make the most unfavorable comments concerning these
political and economic crises; a positive solution, a happy and quick
insight comes forward to answer all your arguments. That nation, full of
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life and movement continues its course towards a goal, and from the
frontiers of Nova Scotia to New Mexico the North American labors only
upon these principles: work and the rights of the citizen. His code is
concise, but clear, pure and easily perceived.380
In alternating fashion, the political good Zavala perceives in “the great republic” of the
U.S. is asserted and undermined. This passage initially reads as a propagandistic defense
of U.S. politics in the face of general critiques of Anglo-American society’s
distinguishing flaws and contradictions that portend its demise within “two hundred
years.” But Zavala’s defense of U.S. politics sabotages itself at every turn as the list of
Anglo-American electoral “turmoil,” “curious aberrations,” racial aversions, economic
crises, unresolved questions for government revenue, and religious fanaticisms multiply.
This excess of democratic tribulations cast doubt on any “happy and quick insight” that
endeavors to “answer all your arguments” boding the demise of U.S. democracy. Here, in
the general aspect of its political strife, early republican U.S. turmoil comes to resemble
post-independence Mexican unrest. Furthermore, this compilation of Anglo-America’s
sociopolitical pitfalls are not merely the slanders of anonymous critics, but specific
sociopolitical impasses that Zavala encounters and contemplates in his own chronicles of
travel throughout the United States. Throughout the chapters of the Viaje, he studies the
contradictions of democracy through personal and reported anecdotes, newspaper
clippings, legal codes, and other forms of observation. Even in its most panegyric
passages, Zavala’s political-theoretical conclusion vexes distinctions between progress
and backwardness; moral ideal and lived imperfection; and political utopia and social
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dystopia, in addition to the ways in which these distinctions are mapped as AngloAmerican and South American oppositions.
We can see the contradictions of Zavala’s own performance of cultural
ambassadorship reflected in the resolution he imagines for ongoing political turmoil in
Mexico. In the conclusion, Zavala holds out Northern Mexican territories (“the states of
Chihuahua, Coahuila and Texas, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Durango,
Zacatecas, Sonora, Sinaloa, and the Territories of New Mexico and the Californias”) as
an experimental zone where inter-American mingling between U.S. settlers and Mexican
citizens will model the overall social and political formation of Mexico.381 He perceives
that exchanges between Anglo-Americans and Mexicans will not result in an exact copy
of U.S. political or social forms but produce an unprecedented combination: “The
Mexican republic then within a few years will come to be molded to a combined regimen
of the American system and Spanish customs and traditions.”382 At the time of Zavala’s
writing, the term “American” is not exclusive to the United States, and it still conveys a
hemispheric imaginary for a sociopolitical arrangement yet to come. Here I dispel the
idea that Zavala’s political aspirations were coterminous with the geopolitical boundaries
of “Texas,” as López and Rivera both suggest. Instead, Zavala imagines instead a wider
dispersal of transamerican possibility in territories that interface with U.S. influence.
Most strikingly, Zavala outright rejects Anglo-American “customs and traditions” for the
shaping of Mexico’s political system. This refusal is characteristic of broader currents of
Spanish-American political thought that insist on locating a unique cultural source for the
animation of national independence, such as Simon Bolívar’s well-known “Jamaica
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Letter” and Jose Martí’s “Nuestra America.”383 While this current of thought inform’s
Zavala’s insistence on “Spanish customs and traditions,” I want to suggest that Zavala’s
“secondary” authority—as both a cultural ambassador in exile and an elite creole subject
reckoning with the afterlives of the Black Legend for post-independence Mexico—also
hones a critical attunement to specific sociopolitical disorders in the United States.
Zavala attributes the underdevelopment of liberal democracy in the U.S. South to
the suppression of free speech and press, which links the perpetuation of slave regimes to
heightened legal restrictions for public speech acts, publications, and the prohibition of
literacy instruction for the enslaved. In the second chapter, he considers two laws passed
in the Louisiana legislature a few months before his arrival in New Orleans on March 7,
1830, that contain to his dismay “extremely anti-liberal provisions.”384 These provisions
not only impede the circulation of ideas in speech and print, but they also legalize the
banishment of free people of color from the state. The white or free black subject who
distributes any writing or assumes a public platform that “has a tendency to create
discontent… and rebellion” among the state’s enslaved and free black inhabitants face
penalties of life imprisonment or outright death sentences.385 Zavala’s chapter on slavery
in the southern United States provokes a rare moment of nostalgia and veneration for the
land he left behind. Zavala commends the deposed, Afro-Mestizo ex-president Vincente
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Guerrero for an emancipation decree issued on September 16, 1829, which provides an
unusual contrast with Louisiana’s recent legislation in favor of Mexico’s enlightened
abolition of slavery: “As he goes from the Mexican Republic to the states which permit
slavery in our sister republic, the philosopher cannot fail to feel the contrast that is noted
between the two countries, nor fail to experience a pleasant memory for those who have
abolished this degrading traffic.”386
The second Louisiana state law, presumably passed sometime after the
restrictions on the public sphere, mandates the expulsion of free black people from the
state. Zavala remarks, “This type of exceptional laws has an extraordinary influence on
the moral progress and the civilization of the states that permit slaves, such as Georgia,
South Carolina, and Louisiana.”387 He goes on to compare the high proportion of
circulating newspapers in free states versus the declining rate of newspaper publications
in slave states. This North-South calculation of circulating newspapers in the public
sphere attempts to explain the democratically retrograde presence of slavery in the South.
The critical conversation on Zavala’s Viaje grapples with Southern slavery and
legislation of the U.S. public sphere as persistent problems in Zavala’s theory for utopic
democractic politics. Historian Stephen J. Mexal considers the passages from Zavala’s
travels to Louisiana as the moment in which a liberal praxis without a violent, racialized
exception proves unattainable. Despite critical consensus on the narrative’s representation
of U.S. slavery as a constitutive feature of the liberal-democracy Zavala encounters in the
U.S., there remains a scholarly tendency to insist that, if not in lived practice, then in
theory or imagination, Zavala hopes to redress the defects of liberalism to safeguard an
386
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intact democratic ideal. Mexal remarks that Zavala strives for “a never-realized third
way” between the dilemmas of U.S. and Mexican politics, and that Zavala continues a
transcendent search for “an authentic and originary liberalism” associated with the openended sociopolitical potential he finds in Texas and in Mexican territories bordering the
United States.388 In a similar vein, literary scholar Cara Kinnally frames Zavala’s
representations of sociopolitical devolution in the U.S. and Mexico as a link in “a
common fight against degeneracy and, subsequently, a call to move towards a true liberal
democracy of moral, political, and cultural progress.”389 Across distinct political
conditions and challenges in the U.S. and Mexico, in both cases these scholars suggest
that restraints on the public sphere impede the realization of “a true liberal democracy.”
But how does “a true liberal democracy” or “a never-realized third way” for democracy
propose to disentangle itself from hemispheric legacies of colonialism, slavery, and
racialization? What if Zavala’s theoretical aim was not to theorize democratic progress at
all costs, but rather to linger on democracy’s lapses and reverses?
In the sixth chapter, Zavala claims that the Northern U.S. possesses the highest
proportion of newspapers of any country in the world and counts twenty-eight
newspapers circulating in New York alone. Even with these unprecedented conditions for
a lively print public sphere, the notion of unmarred liberal progress remains untenable
here. Consider, for instance, that nineteenth-century American literary scholarship frames
the public sphere as the very conceptual space where slavery and racialized oppressions
are enforced throughout the exercise of popular sovereignty.390 Marissa K. López
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similarly notes, in Chicano Nations, that Zavala does not locate racial and gendered
particularities outside democratic functions, but instead that they “simultaneously”
constitute and are constituted by “the political institutions they inhabit.”391 These
inhabitations of human difference within democratic institutions, however, are
paradoxically expressed through varying forms of exile, punishment, and estrangement.
Accordingly, Zavala observes that in the North, “in spite of [the] emancipation of the
African class and its descendants, it is excluded from all political rights, and even from
the common trade with the others, living to a certain degree as though
excommunicated.”392 Zavala represents this racialized excommunication through an
anecdote he receives second-hand, from an anonymous traveler, about the son of a
Haitian general who visits “New York for the purpose of having a good time while he
was learning something.”393 Despite the young Haitian’s wealth and social rank, “in the
theater he was not admitted to the seats of the white people, nor in the churches, nor in
any society. At the first opportunity he went back to his country vowing never to visit the
United States again.”394 For Zavala, the study of U.S. democracy entails an analysis of
both the institutional and popular forces of exclusion that cut across, for instance, the
Louisiana state legislatures and the public social spaces of the North-east. The secondhand story of the Haitian general’s son exemplifies an informal process of social
excommunication in comparison to the legalized banishment of black literacy and
antislavery publications mandated by Louisiana law.
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Codified forms of social inequality nonetheless garner most of Zavala’s critical
energy because, according to the Viaje, many of Mexico’s post-independence troubles
derive from laws that reinscribe colonial precedents for governance. He assesses two
opposing claims for the arrangement of social hierarchies in the U.S., where one side
perceives the existence of “a true aristocracy” there while others “say that it is the
country of liberty and of absolute equality.”395 Zavala locates himself among those of the
second opinion because “no law, no custom, no historical record exists in that country
whose tendency would be to form an aristocratic class. Civil law calls all citizens before
the same courts; political law clothes them with the same rights.”396 By contrast, he
defines the legalized system of privileges in Mexico as “an aristocracy of exceptional
laws and therefore a dying one in a popular republican society” as such laws remain
bound to “former concerns.”397 Here Zavala omits a detailed analysis of Mexican law and
exceptional legal clauses, but we are meant to recall the pre-existing colonial privileges
accorded to the military and clergy which beleaguered even the making of the 1824
Federal Constitution that Zavala oversaw before his exile.398 From Zavala’s point of
view, any apparent privileges of power and wealth in the States derive from personal
merit rather than from an explicit “prerogative of the law.”399 He even counts the
hereditary transmission of privilege in the United States as compatible with narratives of

395

Zavala, Viaje, 92.
Zavala, Viaje, 92.
397
Zavala, Viaje, 93.
398
“Mexicans remained politically divided with the Federalists favoring strong states and a
limited central government while conservative Centralists, predominantly the power elite of the
Church, military officers, and the wealthy, desired a more familiar strong national government.
The continuing bitter rivalry fostered instability and only the first president served his full fouryear term. Subsequent military coups removed and installed new leaders over the next fifty years”
in Margaret Swett Henson, “Understanding Lorenzo de Zavala,” 5.
399
Zavala, Viaje, 94.
396

265
meritocracy, where “statesmen can pass on their venerable names to their children and
grandchildren if these maintain with their own intelligence, patriotism, and honor the
luster of their forebears.”400 Zavala’s narrow focus on the legal codification of
occupational privileges in Mexico fails to articulate the relationship between social
privileges and material advantages that create informal but similarly pernicious structures
of inequality.
Informal processes of social disparity elude Zavala’s explicit analysis of the U.S.
democracy. These nonlegal processes of social distinction do, however, interrupt in form
or feeling the rigid binary narratives he usually inscribes between a regressive Mexican
state and modern U.S. sociopolitical institutions. Interruptions to the stark comparisons
Zavala draws between his idealization of U.S. institutions and his derision of Spanish
colonial afterlives in Mexican governance often take the form of anecdotal narratives in
the Viaje. We can recall, for instance, the second-hand rumor about the son of the Haitian
general in New York City, which subverts Zavala’s prior analysis of racial
governmentality in Louisiana that linked forms of unfreedom, exclusion, and political
suppression to exceptional restrictions on the print public sphere. In other words, the
anecdote of the Haitian general confronts Zavala with nonlegal but nonetheless public
modes of racial governmentality and social exclusion. Another anecdote occurs to Zavala
that puts his binary analysis of aristocratic legal guarantees in Mexico and putative
meritocracy in the United States into question. This time he recollects the anecdote from
personal experience on a transatlantic voyage from Europe to the United States in 1831:
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Here are two classes of people that in the United States of the North
maintain a kind of habitual hierarchy whose natural privileges depend in
no way whatsoever upon legislation. I remember that as I was going from
Europe to the United States in 1831 on the beautiful packetboat Francis I
there was at the same time on the boat a family of Mr. Francois Depau, a
millionaire merchant of New York and one of the partners of the
packetboat company. There were many distinguished passengers, among
them General Santander, Señor Acosta, at the present time chargé
d’affaires from Nueva Granada to the United States, a noble Italian named
Suzarelli, in short all of them people of education and high principles.
Notwithstanding this, Mr. Depau and his family ate by themselves in the
ladies’ section, thus perhaps having to associate less with us. I confess that
conduct was offensive to me in such circumstances. But whom did it
offend, or what right could there be to say anything against their ridiculous
isolation? I looked at him with scorn, the same as my companions. Many
from the United States of the North do this also.401
This anecdote illustrates a formation of “habitual hierarchy” among elite social classes in
the absence of codified legal privileges. Accompanied by South-American diplomats and
an Italian nobleman on the voyage, Zavala observes the self-isolation of “a millionaire
merchant of New York” named Francois Depau. Together, Depau’s French name and
wealth sound reminiscent of the excesses of French aristocracy yet Zavala affiliates this
figure with New York. The self-imposed isolation of Depau and his family cause
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resentful sentiments among Zavala and his companions, who interpret the Depau family’s
isolation as a desire “to associate less with us.” Zavala is at a loss to explain the
merchant’s insulting behavior and his own embittered reaction to it, which makes this
anecdote of “habitual hierarchy” in the absence of legal mandates difficult to place in
Zavala’s overall analysis of aristocratic versus meritocratic social and political orders. In
the passages that surround this anecdote, Zavala often attaches to the idea of “personal
merit” an array of genteel values that include “intelligence, patriotism, and honor” that he
and the group of diplomats furnished with “education and high principles” also satisfy.
Zavala therefore experiences the imposition of Depau’s self-isolation as a form of social
division that violates shared elite values and esteem. Depau’s isolation is described by
Zavala as “ridiculous” because it is a brazen exercise of wealth and power that surpasses
the cultivated gentility of creole diplomats and the Italian nobleman, not to mention that
it suggests a form of racial exclusion given the suspicion of being not-quite-white often
associated with Spanish-American creoles.402
Zavala never writes directly about his potential racialization in North American or
European cultural contexts.403 Although Zavala does not understand himself as a
racialized subject in North America or Europe, this anecdote occurs only a few passages
after the second-hand rumor about the son of the Haitian general who also has no prior
consciousness as a racialized subject. What Zavala absents about foreign processes of
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racialization in his own anecdote aboard the Francis I, he theorizes materially in the
second-hand anecdote about the Haitian: after debarking from his ship in New York City,
the son of the Haitian general finds “[the best hotels] would not admit him because of his
color” even though his spectacular wealth adorns his appearance in the “gold chains,
rings, and diamond buttons, etc.” he wears.404 The young Haitian experiences the entire
series of rejections from public spaces as “the same insults everywhere he went,”
resonating with Zavala’s own residual affective memory of Depau’s conduct that “was
offensive to [him],” and inexplicably so.405 To be clear, Zavala by no means confronts the
historically specific formation of anti-black discrimination faced by the scion of the
Haitian general, which expels him from all public spaces of the city. But in the ways that
dominant Anglo-American society orients itself toward elite foreign subjects, Zavala’s
anecdotal juxtapositions of a transatlantic voyage alongside that of the Haitian narrate
Anglo-American enactments of social exclusion and deliberate stratifications as mundane
ways of subordinating foreign elites. By the end of Zavala’s own anecdote, Depau’s
“ridiculous” performance of moneyed isolation turns out to not be so singular an exercise
of power: “many from the United States of the North do this also.”
Aside from Depau’s singular exercise of wealth, power, and refusal to associate,
Anglo-American relations of power can also be manipulated in more invasive forms by
anonymous citizens without exceptional wealth. An early anecdote from Zavala’s journey
returns us to another scene of conflict aboard a boat, this time on a steamboat from New
Orleans to Pittsburgh. Zavala describes his only personal encounter with AngloAmerican law enforcement:
404
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The 16th we went aboard at 12:00 noon, and a little before the departure of
the boat the sheriff presented himself asking for Mr. Zavala. The sheriff
was accompanied by a man whom I did not know. The officer told me that
the individual’s name was Browerman and that he had presented himself
at the city court asking that I pay ninety—four dollars that he said that I
owed him for repairing a coach when I was governor of the State of
Mexico. Note the evil workings of this man who waited until the moment
of the departure of the steamer, which made it necessary for me either to
be delayed, which would put me terribly behind schedule, or to pay him,
although I was certain that I did not owe that amount, for I had paid him in
Mexico when it was due. But I had not kept the receipt, and I cannot
imagine how there can be any right for such a demand in a foreign
country, far from the place where the debt is supposed to have been
contracted. The only recourse that I had was to get to Mr. Breadlove,
Mexican vice-consul, who fortunately was on the boat, to stand good for
me. Thus I got out of this small and unpleasant embarrassment.
After two years of travel in which this matter was forgotten I had
to pay in Mexico on October 4, 1833, the sum of $105.50, which included
court costs, with judgment without my consent, which receipt I still have,
as well as those of all the artists, innkeepers, and others that I have paid, in
order to avoid another similar happening.406
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The sheriff accompanies an individual named Browerman, who Zavala describes as an
audacious con artist. It should be noted that the figure of the con artist often populates
literary imaginaries of Mississippi steamboats, such as in Herman Melville’s The
Confidence-Man (1857). The steamboat—along with its ever-shifting population of
traveling strangers—by extension represents a mobile microcosm of democratic life.407
The sheriff introduces Browerman and communicates Browerman’s attempt to extort
from the exiled Mexican diplomat a charge of 94 dollars transacted in Mexico. Zavala
laments, “I cannot imagine how there can be any right for such a demand in a foreign
country, far from the place where the debt is supposed to have been contracted.”
Although Zavala complains of Browerman’s “evil workings,” it is the officer who relays
all of Browerman’s claim and embodies an extension of the city court in which
Browerman allegedly submitted his claim. Any appeal to the concepts of right, law, and
legitimacy—or of equal access to the court, since the force of law has been dislocated to
the decks of a steamboat—are suspended in a way that empowers Browerman’s possibly
spurious claim and transamerican pursuit of a “debt” Zavala supposedly allegedly
contracts in Mexico. Zavala cannot produce the receipt for this unanticipated charge; in
the absence of documentary proof in receipts, the conflict devolves into a quotidian battle
of hearsay, repute, and authority figures that pit the local sheriff against the Mexican
vice-consul who Zavala asks to “stand good for [him].”
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When Zavala briefly returns to Mexico after his two-year exile, he finds
Browerman’s charge awaiting him with added court costs. He saves the receipt of this
judgment along with all of the transactions throughout his travels since this steamboat
incident. We might imagine Zavala burdened throughout the rest of his travels with a
hefty suitcase stuffed with receipts—a mobile archive of North American transactions—
in order to refute future double-charges and counterfeit claims.
The anecdote about the extortionist aboard the steam boat closes the second
chapter of the Viaje, which contains Zavala’s most sustained discussion of slavery in
North American states. Zavala previously focuses on the receipt as a document that plays
a crucial role in the institutionalization of punishment under bondage in the southern
slave states of the United States. Zavala observes, “When a master wishes to punish a
slave, male or female, he will send that person to the jail with a note that contains the
order for the number of lashes that the jailer is to administer. The poor man or woman
returns home with a note that shows that the indicated punishment has been carried
out.”408 These orders of punishment are returned as receipts from the jail. This system
leverages a strange corporeal debt on the enslaved person who is tasked with the
responsibility to transmit the master’s order of punishment to the jailer and return with
that punishment enacted on their body and recorded in a note. Zavala does not provide a
rationale for this practice, but we can read it for its effect as it instantiates an economy of
punishment that converts slavery into a putatively quantifiable regime of disciplinary
violence. It also stages a pre-emancipation relation between plantation slavery and
carceral unfreedoms. As Saidiya Hartman argues in Scenes of Subjection (1997),
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“emancipation instituted indebtedness” through new socioeconomic burdens on the
values of free will, obligation, and responsibility. However, Zavala observes here an
economy of racialized indebtedness that precedes the abolition of slavery.409 Unlike his
personal anecdotes, the “receipts” or “notes” associated with chattel slavery in no way
provide documentary proof against arbitrary and unanticipated charges that, like the
confidence man named Browerman, arrive on a whim and introduce the possibility of
double-charges with cumulative penalties. Rather, the receipts of slavery guarantee the
multiplication of arbitrary charges of punishment. This documentary practice connects
the unrestricted violence of plantation slavery with the supposedly measurable discipline
doled out in jails. In Zavala’s account, the scenes of subjection between these two
institutions of slavery are hidden from direct sight yet take the form of sonic
amplification and daily regularity: “Often as one passes by the jail in the morning the
cries and laments of those unfortunate people can be heard.”410
Zavala transcribes the Duke of Weimar’s eyewitness account of Louisiana slavery
in his 1825-1826 travel narrative, which observes the intensification of punishment
between the sites of slavery and the jail. This anecdote, set primarily in the boarding
house where the Duke resides for his visit, dispenses with the figure of the receipt as
necessary to endlessly renewable charges of punishment not only dictated by
slaveholders, but by any given subject with the entitlements of whiteness. The Duke
narrates an unnamed Frenchman’s outrage with a domestic slave who faces impossible
demands on her labor and time: she cannot provide water for the Frenchman with the

409

Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 131. On the debt of emancipation, see particularly Chapter 5,
“Fashioning Obligation: Indebted Servitude and the Fetters of Slavery,” pp. 125-163.
410
Zavala, Viaje, 20.

273
immediacy he demands while occupied with other chores assigned by her mistress. In a
rage, the Frenchman “struck her fiercely,” provoking her reaction in self-defense to seize
the attacker’s throat with her hands.411 When the Frenchman’s wanton brutality meets the
enslaved’s grip of self-defense, the punishments rapidly become incalculable: “the
landlady, Madame Herries, trying to satisfy the cruel guest, ordered that they give the
slave twenty-five lashes with a leather whip, and to double the pain of the victim this
punishment was inflicted by her lover who was a slave in the same house.”412 The
punishment of twenty-five lashes is redoubled by the violation of intimacy incurred in its
delivery “by her lover who was a slave in the same house.” The Duke concludes the
anecdote with an additional scene of punishment that represents intensified connections
between the violence of slavery and disciplinary institutions as a form of anonymous
white entitlement. The Frenchman—dissatisfied with Madame Herries’ punishment—
proceeds to the police, “where when the unfortunate slave girl was brought in by two
constables she was beaten again in the presence of the accuser.”413 The enslaved domestic
laborer is condemned between the systems of slavery and the jail. The punishments
multiply outward from the embodied limitations of her labor as well as her racial and
gendered particularities. It is as though the superfluity of punishment overcompensates
for the impossibility being asked of her: to become as multiple as the demands brought to
bear on her body, work, and time. She is commanded to do two things at once (to fetch
water and to complete household chores); to be in two places at once (in the kitchen and
the patio), to carry out the incompatible orders of two “masters” (Madame Herries and
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the nameless Frenchman). Following this pattern of redoubling, “two constables”
administer and leave unrecorded her countless tortures from the boarding house to the
jail. The duke concludes the anecdote with a regret, “I am very sorry that I did not take
the name of this evil Christian in order to publish it and denounce him to public scorn.”414
The very anonymity of the Frenchman implies the ubiquity of arbitrary violence and
judgments in the U.S. South. This anecdotal scene also demonstrates the ways in which
subjects of Old World empire and Anglo-American citizens partake in the same histories
of colonialism and slavery only to wreak intensified forms of unfreedom.
Such anecdotal moments in Zavala’s travel narrative often feature as secondary
and subordinate forms of narration to his broader analysis of U.S. political institutions
and the idealized work ethic of Anglo-Americans. By extension, these anecdotes define
the literary aesthetics and translative methods of Zavala’s cultural ambassadorship. In the
Viaje, the anecdotes are sometimes transcribed and sometimes re-membered from
personal experience; they read like digressions; and they are part of the cultural
ambassador’s work of translating and recirculating knowledges of foreign social and
political cultures. But the digressive secondariness of the anecdotes specifically
illuminate the points of social and cultural degeneracy that attend U.S. democracy. For all
its apparent systematic and institutional progress, political society in the U.S. pays the
price of its social and cultural life by reducing itself to transactions: “In no country in the
world do they deal more constantly with mercantile business and how to make money.
Very few people speak of abstract questions or matters without including some material
interest.”415 In implicit favor of Mexican culture, he contrasts this Anglo-American world
414
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of monetary interrogations with a Mexican cultural and social ethos: “A Mexican will ask
what kind of government, what religion, what customs and what theaters, if any, he can
expect to find in this or the other place” (86). Ultimately, Zavala’s anecdotal
disillusionments with the stifled, financial character of U.S. democracy reaffirm his elite
creole desire for “Spanish customs and traditions,” a desire that might be productively
read in partial anticipation of what José Muñoz calls the senses of brown, an affective
difference oriented toward “embeddedness in a vast and pulsating social world” (395).416
III. Conclusion: Outlaw Society in Joaquín Murieta
The Life and Adventures of Joaquín Murieta (1854) by John Rollin Ridge, an
exiled member of the Cherokee, unfolds a sensational fiction of California banditry in the
wake of the 1848 U.S.-Mexican War. The advent and aftermath of the U.S.-Mexican War
extinguishes any flicker of trans-american optimism in Lorenzo de Zavala’s analysis of
U.S. democracy.417 It also forecloses Zavala’s imagined repair of Mexico’s postindependence unrest through a unique democracy to be forged in the crucible of the
Northern Mexican states, a site for the unique settler-colonial mixing of the “American
system and Spanish customs and traditions.” In the seismic shifts of the MexicanAmerican War that consolidated U.S. power over the rest of the hemisphere, one might
expect that the trace of Mexico’s post-independence irresolution would be superseded by
the losses of war. However, Ridge begins the novel with the backstory of Joaquín’s
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origins in the Mexican province of Sonora, where the narrative of post-independence
disorder initially prevails over the violation of Mexican sovereignty, U.S. plunder of
annexed territory from Mexico, and the impossible conditions imposed by the 1848
Treaty of Guadeloupe-Hidalgo. I conclude here in order to argue that the contested
political futures of the Spanish-American independence movements are not entirely
overwritten by the Mexican-American War. Instead, the outlaw society that assembles
under Joaquín Murieta’s name in Ridge’s novel imaginatively reanimates unresolved
political formations from the earlier Spanish-American revolutions.
Much like Zavala’s prologue to the Viaje, the protagonist initially censures his
homeland for its post-independence cycles of instability. From a young age, Joaquín tires
“of the uncertain state of affairs in his own country, the usurpations and revolutions
which were of such common occurrence, and resolved to try his fortunes among the
American people.”418 A single sentence summarizes the inter-imperial ravages of the
U.S.-Mexican War as a simplified transfer of territory: “The war with Mexico had been
fought, and California belonged to the United States.”419 This sentence intervenes
between the protagonist’s initial distaste with Mexico’s geopolitical instability and his
avowed aversion to Mexican compatriots. Through the conventions of sensational fiction,
Joaquín reproduces the ideological stigma of the Black Legend not in words, but in
opposing feelings of “[disgust] with the conduct of this degenerate countrymen and [fire]
with enthusiastic admiration of the American character.”420 When readers first “hear of
him in the Golden State” the narrative affirms that post-1848 California proves no
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better—and eventually, more pernicious—in political conditions or in the moral character
of its Anglo-American inhabitants than his homeland. Although “the country was then
full of lawless and desperate men,” the corrupt character of Anglo-American society in
California never taints the exceptional “name of Americans.”421
Seduced by the myth of American exceptionalism and depicted with
assimilationist tendencies from the novel’s beginning, Joaquín’s moral integrity
succumbs to “the internal and external racial violence of assimilationist politics” that
literary scholar Jesse Alemán delineates.422 A series of Anglo-American abuses against
Joaquín’s property, body, livelihood, and the rape of his lover named Rosita culminate in
the racializing spectacle of public Anglo-American mob violence enacted by the lash.
The sting of the lash also unleashes Joaquín’s double-sided criminality, which scholars
have read as an outcome of both Anglo-American imperial violations and as an innate
feature of Mexican national alterity. Representations of Joaquín’s unbridled criminality
are often linked to his accomplice, Manuel Garcia, whose nickname “Three-Fingered
Jack” alludes to a figure of Caribbean anti-slavery insurgency.423
Rather than interpret Joaquín’s individuated criminality, I am more interested in
the initial collectivity of Joaquín’s infamy, which blurs the boundary between Joaquín’s
character and the band of thieves that operate under the cloak of his name. Despite
Joaquín’s early condemnation of the “uncertain state of affairs in his own country,” the
very height of the banditti’s insurgent network operates through various kinds of
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organized uncertainty. The uncertainties of the span, scale, purpose, and scope of the
outlaw society in the first half of Joaquín Murieta can be read as remainders of
unresolved political formations that cross over from the Spanish Americas. Brought up
amid common “usurpations and revolutions” that plague Mexico and the Spanish
Americas, Joaquín’s criminal turn introduces forms of sociopolitical tumult long familiar
to the post-independence Spanish Americas back to post-1848 California.424 “At one
time,” Ridge writes, “the northern countries would be suffering slaughters and
depredations, at another the southern, and, before one would have imagined it possible,
the east and the west, and every point of the compass would be in trouble.”425 The
omnipresence of sensational violence is as much in excess of the individual named
Joaquín as it is to discrete national and state borders in the hemisphere.
Here, I do not suggest that the outlaw society represented in Ridge’s novel
represents an innately emancipatory political formation. Much like Lorenzo de Zavala’s
elite creole political aspirations in the Viaje, the political visions touted toward the
conclusion of Joaquín Murieta are encumbered by what Mark Rifkin describes as “an
ideology of individualism, offering an elitist perspective that is critical neither of
possessive individualism nor the civilization program.”426 For example, whenever
Joaquín appears in his “real features” he performs Anglo-American desires for wealth
and stature with a tinge of palatable ethno-racial difference.427 Oddly, this means that
Joaquín’s “real features” are also his best disguise. Riding through the streets of
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Stockton, “so finely was he dressed, and so superbly was his horse caparisoned that,
without seeming to know it, [Joaquín] was observed of all observers.”428 While donning
his “real features,” Joaquín “carelessly [looks] at the different objects which happened to
attract his attention” with “a piercing black eye.”429 This sets up a circuitous and diffuse
scene of mass public observation in which he, “without seeming to know it,” participates
in making himself “the most observed of all observers.” Perceived in the “real features”
of his aristocratic comportment, the onlookers never recognize Joaquín for a wanted
criminal. They look in admiration of a “young Mexican Grandee… on a journey of
pleasure” before he signs his own bounty notice. In reaction, the townswomen belatedly
declaim his “wild and terrible look.”430 In addition to the racialized stereotyping of Three
Fingered Jack’s irrational bloodthirst—Joaquín’s accomplice and alter-ego—the band of
thieves also target stereotyped Chinese migrants in ways that presage and align with the
racial exclusions of Anglo-American policy in the Chinese Exclusion Act.431
The consolidation of the band’s outlaw political movements under Joaquín’s
aristocratic leadership and the attendant reduction of the outlaws’ political purpose into a
simplified revenge plot can be read as what David Kazanjian calls in The Colonizing
Trick (2003) the “ritual of foreclosure” that regulates the salacious excesses of social
transgression represented in popular genres.432 The narrative’s collapse into Joaquín’s
individuality and the dissolution of a transamerican political project into an imagined
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“end” in satiable vengeance is instead an effect of a different logic of narrative
foreclosure in the novel. The introduction of U.S.-Mexican War veteran Harry Love and
other authority figures of Anglo-American law into the narrative spur the intensification
of the band’s bourgeois individualism, the thieves’ performance of racial exclusions, and
the binary reinforcement of gendered roles. Previously, the outlaws not only allowed the
peripheral women of the band to cross-dress in “shirts and pantaloons” but the narration
affirmed their potential preference “for these garments, perhaps, to any other” given the
roguish mobility they perform in them. As Love and the other sheriffs close in on
Joaquín’s trail, what was once an illegible and transamerican collectivity comes into
narrow view as the individual whim of Joaquín’s spectacular vengeance compounded by
the racially-coded violence of Three-Fingered Jack. But what if we read this
diminishment of outlawed political futures as a “real feature” of the genre in which Ridge
writes, but that nonetheless persists as another disguise or trick the narrative never fully
discloses?
Along with Rifkin, I remain interested in the “cross-hatching, condensation, or
perhaps conflation of different geopolitical struggles in the amalgamated figure of
Murieta and his band” that in my view lingers after the downfall and dismembering
punishments brought down on Murieta and Jack by Love and the authorities.433 The
amalgamations of Murieta and the banditti encompass the “numerous conquered,
alienated, and racialized collectivities within U.S. borders” at the nexus of Cherokee
removal, U.S. westward expansion, and inter-imperial settler colonial policies.434 But in
Rifkin’s analysis these collectivities are captive even if they are potentially insurgent;
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they are unassimilable social forms and cultural differences enclosed within the national
borders of the United States. Let us turn to the traces of insurgent collectives that Rifkin
acknowledges “have not dissipated with [Murieta’s] death.”435 In the closing passages of
the novel, Ridge writes:
It [the organization of outlaws] exists now only in scattered fragments
over California and Mexico. Its subordinate chiefs… will never be able to
revive it in its full force; and, although all the elements are still in active
existence, they will make themselves felt in nothing more, it is probable,
than petty out-breaks, here and there, and depredations of such a character
as can easily be checked by the vigilance of the laws.436
This passage hedges against its own prediction that the organization’s anonymous
subordinate members “will never be able to revive it in its full force.” The absolute
foreclosure (“Never”) of reviving the organization’s scattered elements is tempered by
the gambling language of probability over the occurrence and scale of “petty out-breaks.”
Let us recall that in the novel’s early depictions of spectacular and widespread banditry,
Joaquín lived life in unspectacular anonymity: “He resided for weeks at a time in
different localities, ostensibly engaged in gambling, employed as a vaquero, a packer, or
in some other apparently honest vocation, spending much of his time in the society of the
sweetest of all companions the woman that he loved.”437 Joaquín’s multiplicity of
vocations and supposed locales put the odds in the favor of the “elements… still in active
existence” and beyond the narrow vigilance of the narrator and the laws.
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Coda
Returns of Taint:
The Tornatrás, Feminine Opacities, and Contemporary Statelessness
In a contemporary poetry collection entitled Thrall (2012), Natasha Trethewey
draws on a selection of Mexican casta paintings and Spanish-American lexicons for racial
intermixture to develop an ekphrastic poetics for the autobiographical, estranged
relationship between a mixed-race daughter and her white father.438 The casta artworks of
the eighteenth-century Mexican painter, Juan Rodríguez Juárez, inspires an early
sequence of four poems grouped together under the section title “Taxonomy.” The first
three poems of this section, “De Español y de India Produce Mestiso,” “De Español y
Negra Produce Mulato,” and “De Español y Mestiza Produce Castiza” culminate in the
final poem, “The Book of Castas,” which does not describe any single painting but rather
reflects on the racial logics that subtend the whole system. It also evokes the genre of
casta painting that depicts a unified set of racial categories (figure 3).
“The Book of Castas” explores a constitutive paradox of the Spanish colonial
racial taxonomy and its visual orders. As a whole, these paintings visually encode a
teleology of generational progressions toward the whiteness embodied by the peninsular
Spaniard that is ideologically possible in the span of three generations; apparent
whiteness and peninsular origins partially factor in the cumulative notion of calidad
(social status or quality).439 The preceding poem and painting, “De Español y Mestiza
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Produce Castiza,” summarizes three generations between the initial taint on “pure”
Spanish lineage and the recovery of blood purity, a return to peninsular Spanish status
(figure 4). Keep in mind that such cycles of taint and recovery are only possible in the
imagined order of the casta system through the specific reproductive encounter—or more
precisely, conquest—of the Spaniard over the generalized figure of “the Indian.” The
poem transfigures typical casta painting titles into non-rhyming couplets, with each
successive line taking the reader along the most direct path for the correction of racial
defect in Spanish colonial calidad. Trethewey also observes the castiza’s turning posture
and outstretched arms as she precariously twists toward the Spanish father:
from a Spaniard and an Indian,
a mestizo;
from a mestizo and a Spaniard,
a castizo;
from a castizo and a Spaniard,
a Spaniard.
We see her here—
one generation away—
Nearly slipping
her mother’s careful grip. (23)
White space pushes the second lines of these final couplets further to the right. Oriented
rightward, the line arrangements evoke the castiza child’s domestic reach toward her
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father and analogous transatlantic extension “as if back to Spain, / to the promise of
blood” (23). By contrast, the fourth and final poem named after the whole taxonomic
system reconsiders “The Book of Castas” as tantamount to “the book of naught: not
Spaniard, not white” (24). Although whiteness is the teleological end of this Spanish
colonial “catalog / of mixed bloods,” the tainted castas are barred by logics of
generational progression and the expanse of lifetimes from attaining the social privileges
of that end. As we will see, however, this book of naught impossibly contains—via the
enclosures of categorization—the variety of life and kinship arrangements beyond the
direct generational advancements toward which the castiza child strains her body.
For instance, the system produces its own incoherent racial subjects that embody
refusals of teleological progressions toward peninsular whiteness. More specifically,
these castas arise from misdirected desires and reproduce putatively backward subjects
that turn away from Spain and, more broadly, from affiliations with European imperial
whiteness. “The Book of Castas” poem lists some of the names for these improper racial
subjects that exist chaotically within the frames of this colonial visual catalog: “mulattoreturning-backwards (or / hold-yourself-in-midair) and / the morisca, the lobo, the chino,
sambo, albino, and the no-te-entiendo—the / I don’t understand you.” Two of these casta
designations refer to movements recalcitrant to teleologies of whiteness, which in the
poem appear only in English translation. The “returning-backwards” or “hold-yourselfin-midair” modifiers for the mulatto subject translates back into the original Spanish as,
respectively, the “tornatrás” (sometimes conveyed in two separate words, Torna Atrás)
and “tente-en-el-aire,” a generational suspension that defers for a lifetime duration the
hierarchical progression toward the birth of a “Spaniard.” Among the other casta
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designations, the system itself seems to confess—in the category of “no-te-entiendo” (of
mestizo and mulato parentage)—its overall epistemic instability contingent on the
fluidities as well as reversals of colonial racial formations in the Spanish Americas. Nor
can the system properly account for unpredictable and wayward desires in apparent
rejection of Spanish whiteness; it can only name them as aberrant or inhuman, such as the
“lobo,” or “wolf” (of black and native parentage).440 Finally, it attests to failures of
interpretation intrinsic to the opacities that attend the very idea of taint. Or, as Trethewey
puts it, “Call it the taint — as in / T’aint one and t’aint the other” (25). The conclusion to
“The Book of Castas” returns to revise the preceding ekphrastic poem that elaborates the
painting of the castiza and her parentage:
illicit and yet naming still
what is between. Between
her parents, the child,
mulatto-returning-backwards,
cannot slip their hold,
the triptych their bodies make. (25)
In between all three figures—mother, father, and progeny—Trethewey names and
thereby instantiates the phantasmatic yet illicit presence of the “mulatto-returningbackwards” (tornatrás) as a leftward counterpoint to the child’s turn away from her
mestiza mother, in a rightward reach toward the Spanish patriarch. The poem closes: “all
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her kind / in thrall to a word,” in a sense, held both in the arms of her racially-marked
mother by the collective designation for racial taint, the “castas.”
I want to think about the tornatrás as a conceptual figure that animates the variety
of Black Legend deviations this dissertation examines across all four chapters. The figure
brings together notions of heuristic opacity, legacies of conquest, racial taint, and
sociopolitical backwardness. Akin to—precursor to, even—Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus
that inspires Walter Benjamin’s angel of history, who faces “backward” toward a
simultaneity of past and present catastrophes while blown “forward” into the future by
the storm of progress, the tornatrás also indicates a backward orientation that challenges
progressive political teleology (figure 5).441 Trethewey translates the term “Torna Atrás”
as “return-backwards,” which implies the irreversible taint of black blood that threatens
to reappear without warning in the futurity of generational lines. Other ways of naming
such unforeseen returns of taint include “throwback” or to “hark back.”442 The tornatrás
simultaneously indicates a return and a reversal. The Real Academia Española (RAE)
elaborates two senses of the word tornatrás in the colonial context of the Spanish
Americas. In the narrower taxonomic sense, the tornatrás is a child with “Spanish father
and albina mother, or of an albino father and a Spanish mother.”443 In the broader sense,
the term refers to any “descendant of mestizos and with characteristics attributed to one
of the original races [razas originarias],” although it does not specify what counts as one
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of the originary races.444 If those original races are coded as white or peninsular Spanish,
black or Afro-diasporic, and Native American, I’ve yet to see a tornatrás represented as a
return (or presumed restoration) to peninsular whiteness. Nonetheless, in this broader
sense, the term modifies other casta designations—such as “mulatto” and “lobo”—
orienting them toward backward returns and introducing yet another variable of
instability into the overall taxonomic system.
Enthralled by the tornatrás as an internal and illogical break in Enlightenment
racial logics, Trethewey returns to dedicate a poem after this casta designation. Based on
an anonymous painting circa 1785-1790, she elaborates the poem after “De Albina y
Español, Nace Torna Atrás” (From Albino and Spaniard, a Return-Backwards Is Born,
figure 6). Titled “Torna Atrás,” the poem accordingly stands apart from the series of
“Taxonomy” poems. The poem’s form is also aberrant in relation to the rest of the
collection. Most of the poems are written in couplets and tercets, and occasionally
quatrains of short lines. This poem comprises twenty-nine sequential lines that span
nearly margin-to-margin, resembling prose on the page. Trethewey sets the scene: “The
unknown artist has rendered the father a painter and so / we see him at his work: painting
a portrait of his wife— / their dark child watching nearby, a servant grinding colors / in
the corner” (48). In paintings that represent Spanish status, the burden of taint is usually
ascribed to the mothers. Artists often depict maternal figures as the bearers of taint,
phenotypically or internally, to contrast with the purity of Spanish patriarchal
counterparts. In this case, the mother is an albina, and her child, the tornatrás, reveals her
whiteness to be superficially skin-deep rather than a proper correlation of pure Spanish
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blood. In this painting, she also wears a chiqueador, an artificial beauty mark of latecentury fashion. Regarding the chiqueador, Trethewey writes, “If you consider the
century’s mythology / of the body—that a dark spot marked the genitals of anyone / with
African blood—you might see how the black moon / on her white face recalls it” (48-49).
Despite its title, the poem “Torna Atrás” focuses primarily on the Spanish father’s
shortcomings of artistic skill, insight, and sensibility to render his wife’s portrait. The
portrait he paints is—rather than a faithful depiction of the mother, the wife—a reflection
of his own desire and the “need to see himself / as architect of Truth” (49). Tretheway
eventually construes this ekphrastic poem as the medium for her autobiographical
reflections on filiation, to clarify why, “to understand [her] father, [she looks] again and
again at this painting; how it is / that a man could love—and so diminish what he loves”
(49). The tornatrás, in Trethewey’s case, figures her own recurring gaze on the painting
to contemplate the cutting intimacies of race and gendered power relations.
I depart from Trethewey’s autobiographical reflection of the asymmetrical
relation between the adult parents in the painting to linger with the tornatrás child, who is
simultaneously marginal and central in both painting and poem. In the painting the
Spaniard subtracts his wife’s chiqueador, jewelry, and decorative black lace from view as
though to reassert the artifice of immaculate purity undermined by the tornatrás child that
stands behind him. In turn, the child also escapes the upward gaze of the mother although
she faces in his direction. The child’s face and upper-body turns toward the laborer
dressed in tattered clothes, whose back is washed in light and whose visage is obscured in
shadows while he grinds colors for the patriarch’s painting. Meanwhile, the tornatrás’s
own stance and gaze seem uncertain, in mid-turn; although he stands nearby his parents,
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he does not seem to observe them at all as Trethewey suggests in her poem, given that he
is a step closer to the foreground. Instead, the tornatrás catches the viewer of the portrait
in a side-glance while he holds his own opaque, monochrome artwork—a sketch portrait
of an unidentifiable face—unregarded by anyone in the workshop. He wields an
instrument (unidentifiable by me) but which he might have used for his art. But this
artist’s instrument also resembles a dagger, the concealable weapon par excellence of
betrayal. The tornatrás, then, is poised for a betrayal of imperial blood logics, of the
whole taxonomic order that binds whiteness to “calidad/quality” and blackness to
“lack/defect.” He does not stand in between his parents—the generic arrangement of
casta paintings. Instead, his place is usurped by or ceded to a decoy, the father’s
lackluster portrait of desire. Unseen by the painting’s subjects, the tornatrás slips from the
typical trappings of imperial and visual orderings of kinship and, obliquely, he inducts
the viewer’s gaze into breaking generic conventions.
The tornatrás of the casta paintings finds conceptual accomplices in feminine
figures for opacity and reversal, the Spanish-American tapadas who wore headscarfs
called saya-y-mantos—textile traces of medieval Spanish-Moorish influences (figure
7).445 To be clear, I borrow my understanding of “opacity” from Édouard Glissant, The
Poetics of Relation, in which the opaque “is not the obscure, though it is possible for it to
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be so…. It is that which cannot be reduced, which is the most perennial guarantee of
participation and confluence” (191). A glimpse into irreducible Tapada opacities appears
in the opening “tableau” of Melville’s Benito Cereno by the end of what is, perhaps, the
most diffuse sentence in the entire novella:
With no small interest, Captain Delano continued to watch her [the San
Dominick]—a proceeding not much facilitated by the vapors partly
mantling the hull, through which the far matin light from her cabin
streamed equivocally enough; much like the sun—by this time
hemisphered on the rim of the horizon, and, apparently, in company with
the strange ship entering the harbor—which, wimpled by the same low,
creeping clouds, showed not unlike a Lima intriguante’s one sinister eye
peering across the Plaza from the Indian loop-hole of her dusk saya-ymanta.446 (162)
The narrator, Captain Delano aboard the Bachelor’s Delight, and the vapor-cloaked San
Dominick are triangulated perspectives that remain highly volatile. Delano’s “watching”
becomes a spatialized and spectralized “proceeding” through the narrative’s rhetorical
transmutations of vapor, streaming cabin light, oblique dawn sunlight, and “a Lima
intriguante’s one sinister eye peering across the Plaza from the Indian loop-hole of her
dusk saya-y-manta.” Before Captain Delano ever sets foot on The San Dominick, speaks
to a taciturn Don Benito, and becomes both audience and prop to a puppet-act expertly
manipulated by rebellious slaves, the reader notices him being watched, in turn and
unaware, by an estranging yet omniscient presence. The reader, if not Delano, encounters
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that omniscient presence in the double negative, a litotes: a presence unlocatable but “not
unlike” the eye of a Lima intriguante who emerges, refracted and vaporous, between the
narratological equivocations of sun- and cabin- light. She appears, perhaps, as an omen of
incomplete and secreted knowledge; or the misinterpretations, oversights, and
mistranslations that come about Delano’s inability to think beyond the structures and
tropes of racial slavery. Her purely figural presence also throws into question the point at
which the staging of the puppet-play and performance of racial scripts begin—indeed, her
audience precedes his first step on the San Dominick. As I heed the kinds of
reassessments that the tornatrás beckons me toward in future revisions of this project, I
will return to Spanish-American contexts for and theories of nineteenth-century feminine
opacities such as the tapada that inhabits Melville’s Benito Cereno; Anglophone travel
narratives in South America; and the “blackened” protagonist of María Amparo Ruíz de
Burton’s satire of New England abolitionism, the Gold Rush, and the Civil War in Who
Would Have Thought It? (1872).
Insofar the tornatrás figures the recurrence of interconnected political impasses
marked by Black Legend tropes of foreign disorder and racial taint, it draws our sharp
attention to contemporary U.S. imperial ploys throughout the hemisphere. In 2019, we
“return-backward” yet anew to neocolonial designs of debt imposition and capital
extraction in Puerto Rico (pre- and post-Hurricane María), U.S. mercenaries profiteering
in Haiti, and U.S. intensifications of strife and usurpations in Venezuela, to highlight a
few examples that accompany twentieth-century repetitions of xenophobic fearmongering along the U.S.-Mexico border. In our political present, the taint of the
tornatrás also alerts us to the creation of contemporary conditions for statelessness and
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forced migration that newly imperil vulnerable populations. In this case the discursive
echoes of the Black Legend now resound across networks of global crises and persistent
imperial formations, altered to the conditions of our times.
In a recent event that eerily evokes the 1806 slave mutiny aboard the Tryal—the
historical inspiration for Melville’s Benito Cereno—108 migrants were rescued from the
Mediterranean Sea by a Turkish oil tanker, El Hiblu 1. When a group of migrants who
intended to seek asylum in Europe learned that they were to be returned to Libya, they
staged a takeover and “forced the crew to put the Libya-bound vessel on a course north
toward Europe.”447 According to headlines, press reports, and official statements, the
migrants’ assertive claim on European asylum has been unsurprisingly denounced as an
illegitimate act of violence: the political assertion for asylum is reduced to an act of
hijacking, terrorism, and piracy, resulting in charges brought against three teenagers—
Abdalla Bari (19, Guinea), unidentified by name (15, Guinea), unidentified by name (16,
Ivory Coast)—in a Maltese court of law.448 Black Legend afterlives entail recursive
formations of socioracial taint, legal fictions, and imperial debris significant for our
contemporary understandings of the ways in which modern governance manufactures
labor, migration, and refugee crises.449
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The Associated Press, “Tanker, Hijacked by Migrants, Is Escorted to Malta,” The New York
Times, March 28, 2019
448
The Associated Press, “3 Teenage Migrants Are Charged in Malta With Hijacking Ship at
Sea,” The New York Times, March 31, 2019.
449
For future directions, I want to think discursive residues of the Black Legend as akin to Angela
Naimou’s thinking of the legal racial slave as “a category of personhood in the Americas, whose
fragments, while degraded, participate in shaping the conditions of contemporary life” in Salvage
Work (2015), 7. Here I also think alongside Ann Laura Stoler’s notion of imperial ruination in
Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination (2013).
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Each of the foregoing geopolitical impasses are related to the neocolonial
afterlives of Black Legend taint—understood since the nineteenth-century as a
confluence of nationalist and imperial forces of exclusion and dispossession—that further
divest vulnerable communities of possibilities for self-determination, life-sustaining
resources, and modes of social reciprocity and belonging.450 As the prosecution of
teenage migrants aboard El Hiblu 1 demonstrates, the afterlives of sociopolitical taint are
diffuse in the global South rather than a specific ideological and cultural residue of the
hemispheric South. This does not annul, however, the material and ideological relevance
that Black Legend narratives of taint and defect continue to have in the southern
Americas and in hemispheric borderlands.
The tight and seemingly timeless bind between social constructs of taint and
criminality derives not only from the logics of Spanish colonial rule, but it also
compounds with Anglo-imperial legal genealogies worth mentioning here. The interimperial intersections between ideologies of taint illuminate the reiterative cyclicality of
Black Legend discourses from nineteenth-century transmissions of South American
political disorder to contemporary migrations from the global South toward the United
States and the European Union. Colin Dayan traces this Anglo-imperial genealogy of
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To get a sense of the asymmetrical violence that conditions this recent event, United for
Intercultural Action, a European network of 550 anti-racist organizations in 48 countries compiles
an ongoing “List of Deaths” dated since 1993 to monitor “the human impact of the policies
building so called ‘Fortress Europe.’” As of its most recent version, it counts 36,570 documented
deaths. No equivalent records exist within a comparable timespan for the Americas; the Missing
Migrants Project draws its global estimates from inter-governmental orgs and media sources
rather than a coalition of independent organizations. See UNITED, “List of Deaths,” April 1,
2019, http://unitedagainstrefugeedeaths.eu/.Accessed May 30, 2019; Missing Migrants Project,
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ Accessed May 30, 2019.

294
taint in Blackstone’s commentaries that impels codifications of race, disciplinary
violence, and forms of unfreedom:
[Blackstone] referred to natural liberty as ‘residuum,’ and he figured this
residue of nature, the savage essence that must be ferreted out, as a stain.
The imprint of corruption becomes the legitimating metaphor for
sacrifice… Blackstone’s language thus connected the figurative nature and
the material body: ‘For when it is now clear beyond all dispute, that the
criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as
a monster and a bane to society, the law sets a note of infamy upon him,
puts him out of its protection, and takes no further care of him barely to
see him executed. He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or
blackened’ (4:380). The image of the ‘blackened’ person, disabled but not
dead, remained a more terrifying example of punishment than the
executed body…. The racialized fiction of blood supplemented the
metaphoric taint.”451
Legal ascriptions of taint violently consign marked subjects to a silencing social ban, a
death sentencing. This genealogy of taint—racial and criminal—that Dayan elaborates is
a formative part of what Stephanie Smallwood and Saidiya Hartman describe as the
“archive’s ‘episteme’ of silence with regard to the lives of the enslaved.” Epistemes of
silence also inform, under distinct yet recursive contexts and conditions, contemporary
flows of migration, crises of statelessness, and relatedly, undesired recourse to
unsalvageable statist forms. The political purchase on the present that the work of this
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dissertation aspires to, then, is to develop modes of apprehending social forms and
political imaginaries—however partial—that betray such silencing consignments. At the
same time, the chapters have sought to connect alternative practices of freedom and
social arrangements that dominant powers fail to “[ferret] out, as a stain.”
In a final contribution to this coda’s assemblage of Black Legend visual and
political cultures, I turn to an open letter published on social media platforms on July 7,
2016 on behalf of the artistic collective responsible for repainting La Puerta de la
Bandera (The “Doorway” or “Gate” of the Flag, figure 8).452 La Puerta de la Bandera is
a contemporary mural of the Puerto Rican flag and of notable community members
located on an abandoned building in the historical center of San Juan, Puerto Rico. My
closing engagement with this mural keeps particularly in mind the indiscernible drawing
held by the tornatrás in the right hand accompanied by the dagger-like instrument held in
the left.
The open letter announced that a group of artists—all women—repainted La
Puerta from the original 2012 mural of the typical flag with a blue triangle and three red
stripes to black. The open letter begins with a call addressed to “Estimdx Hermanx” in
the original Spanish and “To our visiting tourists” in the English translation: “The flag is
black; Puerto Rico is standing up to fight! Let it be known!” The letter explains that by
turning the flag’s traditional colors to black, the artists intend to transform the door into
“a portal that would prompt discussions over the social, economic, and political crises
that the Island faces”—in particular, the most urgent generated by the passage of
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Artists in solidarity and RESISTANCE and La Puerta, “OPEN LETTER: A CALL TO
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296
PROMESA (Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act) into
law.453 A neocolonial legal imposition, the bill installs a fiscal control board to impose
long-term and damaging austerity measures on the island at the behest of a group of Wall
Street hedge fund investors.454 The statement offers preliminary guidelines for the
interpretation of the blackened door:
In present times, the blue triangle represents the three branches of the
Government: executive, legislative and judicial. The three red stripes
symbolize the blood that gives life to those powers. The laws, the
governors and the courts, up to this moment, have not served in the
interests of the people. To replace these colors with black (the absence of
light) creates new readings. Ours is a proposal of RESISTANCE, not to be
thought of as pessimist. On the contrary, it speaks about the death of these
powers just as we know them, but hope is still present in the white stripes
that symbolize individual liberty and its capacity to claim and defend their
rights.455

453

Here I offer my own translation of the original Spanish, since the English translation in the
open letter does not refigure the door as “portal.” The original Spanish reads: “Su difusión [de la
puerta] local e international ha side incalculable. Es por ésto sue decidimos repintar la Puerta la
noche del lunes, 4 de Julio de 2016, sabiendo que se transformaría en un portal question
provocaría discussions sober la crisis social, económica y política cue enfrenta la Isla.”
454
See Alyosha Goldstein, “Promises Are Over: Puerto Rico and the Ends of Decolonization,”
Theory & Event (2016); Marisol LeBrón, “People Before Debt: Puerto Ricans Confront the
Island’s Debt Crisis from Below” NACLA Report on the Americas (2016); Yarimar Bonilla,
Marisol LeBrón, Sarah Molinari, and Isabel Guzzardo Tamargo, “Puerto Rico Syllabus,”
https://puertoricosyllabus.com Accessed May 30, 2019. See especially sources organized under
the heading “PROMESA and Imposition of a Fiscal Control Board.” Given the institutional
location of this dissertation, I must acknowledge that serving among the seven-person fiscal
control board is Penn Law professor David Skeel.
455
The passage in the original Spanish reads: “En la actualidad el triángulo azul representa las
tres ramas del Gobierno: el ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial. Las tres franjas rojas simbolizan la
sangre que da vida a estos poderes. Las leyes, los gobernantes y los tribunales, hasta este
momento, no han servido a los intereses del pueblo. Reemplazar estos colores con el color negro
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Popular reactions to the door’s repainting misunderstand the black flag as a veil of
mourning, first in resignation to the unchecked policies of a U.S.-based fiscal control
board and secondly in the aftermath of Hurricane María. Contrary to this
commonsensical interpretation of the mural, the artists’ statement renders the black of the
flag—repainted overnight on July 4, 2016, and marking “the absence of light”—as an
opportunity to create new readings in order to reimagine Puerto Rico and the world
otherwise, beyond the death of irredeemable institutional powers that continuously
imperil vulnerable communities. The collective’s statement resorts to creativity in general
and the blackened mural in particular “as a vehicle of expression… [to] transmit ideas, to
provoke reflection, to transform and to (re)create realities”—and I would add—to guide
the decolonial thrust of paintbrushes, pens, and glinting edges.

(que es la ausencia de LUZ) crea nuevas lecturas. La nuestra es una propuesta de RESISTENCIA,
no es pesimista, al contrario, habla sobre la muerte de estos poderes tal cual los conocemos, pero
la esperanza sigue representada en las franjas blancas que simbolizan la libertad del individuo y
su capacidad para reclamar y hacer valer sus derechos.”
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Figure 3: Ignacio María Barreda, Las castas mexicanas (1777)
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Figure 4: Juan Rodríguez Juárez, De español y mestiza produce castiso (1715)
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Figure 5: Paul Klee, Angelus Novus (1920)
Source: https://www.imj.org.il/en/collections/199799
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Figure 6: Anonymous, De albina y español, nace torna atrás (c. 1785-1790)
Source: ARCA (Proyecto visual de las Americas coloniales)
http://artecolonialamericano.az.uniandes.edu.co:8080/artworks/1111
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Figure 7: Courret Hermanos, Tapada limeña (undated, Source: Library of
Nineteenth-Century Photography)
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Figure 8: Puerta de la bandera (2016)
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